Julie Heskett
TEGNAAbout Julie Heskett
Julie Heskett, 52, is Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of TEGNA, appointed in January 2024, after serving as SVP Financial Planning & Head of Investor Relations (Dec 2021–Dec 2023) and SVP Financial Planning & Business Operations (Jun 2017–Dec 2021). She oversees accounting, internal audit, FP&A, treasury, investor relations, and tax, and is credited with transforming finance via shared service centers and regional finance roles, alongside strategic sourcing leadership . Her long-term incentives are tied to two-year Adjusted EBITDA and Free Cash Flow as % of Revenue; for the 2023–2024 cycle, TEGNA achieved $1,685,893,000 Adjusted EBITDA and 17.5% FCF/Revenue vs targets of $1,936,526,000 and 18.3%, driving an 82.2% payout of performance shares, with her earned 12,081 shares scheduled for distribution after Feb 28, 2026 subject to service vesting . She holds 52,919 shares beneficially (no pledging) and exceeds the company’s 3x salary stock ownership guideline, indicating alignment with shareholders .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| TEGNA Inc. | SVP, Financial Planning & Head of Investor Relations | Dec 2021–Dec 2023 | Led investor relations; strengthened planning rigor contributing to enhanced disclosure and engagement |
| TEGNA Inc. | SVP, Financial Planning & Business Operations | Jun 2017–Dec 2021 | Implemented shared service centers for accounting/AP/payroll; created regional finance directors/analysts; led strategic sourcing |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary Rate ($) | $530,000 |
| Salary Earned ($) | $531,577 |
| Target Bonus (%) | 90% |
| Target Bonus ($) | $477,000 |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | $450,000 |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting/Distribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (2023–2024 PS cycle) | 2/3 | $1,936,526,000 | $1,685,893,000 | 82.2% of target PS | Earned PS for Heskett: 12,081; paid shortly after Feb 28, 2026 subject to service vesting |
| Free Cash Flow as % of Revenue (2023–2024 PS cycle) | 1/3 | 18.3% | 17.5% | 82.2% of target PS | Earned PS aligned with above; distribution after service period |
| 2024 LTI Grant Components | Value |
|---|---|
| Performance Shares (Target #) | 51,522 |
| RSUs (#) | 41,470 |
| RSU Vesting | Generally ratable over 4 years; double-trigger acceleration on CIC only if qualifying termination or awards not assumed |
| PS Structure | Two-year performance cycle (Adjusted EBITDA, FCF % of Revenue) with three-year service vesting; payout capped at 200% |
Program design: Other NEO annual equity mix is 55% performance shares and 45% RSUs, emphasizing pay-for-performance; maximum payouts capped at 200% .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Shares Owned (Record Date) | 52,919; percent of class “*” (<1%) |
| “Share Investment” (incl. DCP units vesting within 60 days) | 61,395 |
| Shares Pledged | None (company-wide statement for directors/executives) |
| Stock Ownership Guideline | 3x base salary (all current NEOs exceed) |
| Hedging/Short-Selling/Pledging Policy | Prohibited for executives; anti-hedging and anti-pledging policies in place |
Employment Terms
| Term | Key Details |
|---|---|
| Plans | Participates in TEGNA Executive Severance Plan (TESP) and 2015 Change in Control Severance Plan (CIC Plan) |
| Severance Multiple (TESP) | 1.5x for Heskett, applied to base salary + 3-year average bonus; includes prorated current-year bonus; contingent on release and restrictive covenants (non-compete, non-solicit, non-disparagement, confidentiality) |
| CIC Eligibility | Double-trigger: severance if involuntary termination without cause or resignation for good reason within 2 years post-CIC (or in connection with CIC); includes lump-sum based on designated multiplier; prorated bonus; COBRA cash benefit; Section 4999 cutback if beneficial |
| RSU/PSU CIC Treatment | RSUs do not accelerate on CIC absent qualifying termination or if awards are not continued/assumed; PSUs follow plan terms; distribution after service period |
| Estimated Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024) | Change in Control: Total $4,378,670; components—RSUs $1,664,774; PS $820,563; Severance Pay $1,893,333 . Involuntary Termination (without cause): Total $3,084,921; RSUs $1,162,330; PS $502,591; Severance Pay $1,420,000 . Retirement/Voluntary: Total $928,419; RSUs $425,828; PS $502,591 . Death: Total $2,128,925; Disability: Total $2,692,217 . |
| Clawback | Broad recoupment policy (restatements and misconduct causing material harm, up to 3 years) and NYSE/SEC-compliant executive clawback adopted in 2023 |
| Cash Severance Policy (Shareholder Guardrail) | Shareholder approval required for any new executive cash severance >2.99x base + target bonus |
Compensation Structure Notes
- Annual bonus decisions consider a multi-metric framework across revenue, operating income, net income, EPS, Adjusted EBITDA, EBITDA margins, subscription revenue, and FCF % of revenue, plus individual KPIs; 2024 performance finished below expectations, with Heskett paid $450,000 .
- 2024 LTI target for Heskett set at 225% of base salary ($1,192,500), converted into PSUs and RSUs using the Feb 29, 2024 close; earned PSUs and RSU values vary with stock performance and achievement against targets .
Compensation Peer Group and Say-on-Pay
- TSR peer group used for performance comparisons: E.W. Scripps Company, Gray Television, Inc., Nexstar Media Group, Inc., Sinclair, Inc. .
- Say-on-Pay support: 89.7% approval in 2024; no specific program changes were made in response .
Performance Compensation (Detailed Mechanics)
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Payout Curve |
|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares | Adjusted EBITDA (2-yr sum vs targets) | 2/3 | 0% below 80%; 65% at 80%; 100% at 100%; 200% at 110%; linear interpolation |
| Performance Shares | FCF as % of Revenue (2-yr aggregate vs targets) | 1/3 | Same as above; capped at 200% |
Risk Indicators & Governance
- Anti-hedging, anti-pledging, blackout and pre-clearance procedures for insiders; Ethics Policy in effect, no waivers granted .
- No related party transactions since January 1, 2024 reported .
- Equity awards are discretionary (generally granted March 1); the company does not currently grant stock options or option-like awards .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: High proportion of at-risk pay with multi-year PSUs tied to Adjusted EBITDA and FCF % of revenue; 2023–2024 payout below target (82.2%) underscores sensitivity to operational performance .
- Insider selling pressure: RSUs vest ratably over four years for 2024 grants and earned PSUs from the 2023 cycle distribute shortly after Feb 28, 2026—these windows may create scheduled liquidity events; hedging/pledging prohibitions and pre-clearance reduce opportunistic trading risk .
- Retention and change-in-control economics: Participation in TESP (1.5x multiple) and CIC Plan with double-trigger equity treatment provides meaningful downside protection; estimated CIC and involuntary termination packages ($4.38M and $3.08M) indicate moderate retention incentives without tax gross-ups; shareholder guardrails limit cash severance inflation .
- Ownership alignment: Beneficial ownership (52,919 shares), guideline compliance (≥3x salary), and no pledging support long-term alignment and reduce collateralization risk .
- Governance quality: Strong say-on-pay support (89.7%) and robust clawback frameworks lessen compensation-related governance risk .