Jaymi Wilson
Senior Vice President and General Manager, North America Automotive; Global Sales and Marketing at 
Gentherm
GenthermExecutive
About Jaymi Wilson
Jaymi Wilson, age 48, is Senior Vice President and General Manager, North America Automotive, Global Sales and Marketing at Gentherm (THRM), appointed to this role in January 2023. She holds a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Michigan and an MBA from Eastern Michigan University, with a career spanning manufacturing, engineering, business planning, sales, strategy, and corporate development across automotive companies including Visteon and SMR Automotive . In 2024, Gentherm delivered Product Revenue of $1,456.1 million and Adjusted EBITDA of $182.9 million, with company TSR value of $89.94 versus a peer TSR of $80.91; executive incentives were anchored to Adjusted EBITDA, revenue, relative revenue growth, and a TSR modifier for long-term PSUs .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gentherm | SVP & GM, North America Automotive, Global Sales & Marketing | Jan 2023–present | Leads regional automotive P&L and global sales/marketing execution |
| Gentherm | SVP, Strategy, Marketing & Corporate Communications | 2018–2022 | Drove corporate strategy, marketing positioning, and communications |
| Gentherm | VP & GM, Medical Business | 2017–2018 | Led medical segment operations and growth initiatives |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Visteon | Various roles in manufacturing, engineering, business planning, sales management, strategy, corporate development | Not disclosed | Contributed to operational and commercial capabilities |
| SMR Automotive | Various roles | Not disclosed | Expanded industry experience in automotive subsystems |
Fixed Compensation
| Element | 2023 | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $453,600 | $467,208 | 3% increase effective Apr 1, 2024 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 70% | 70% | Max payout 200% of target |
| Actual Annual Bonus ($) | — | $378,392 | Earned bonus factor 115.7% |
| Perquisites | — | Company-owned automobile eligibility per executive policies | Provided under offer letter framework |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Cash Incentive – Metrics and Payout
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA ($mm) | 40% | 168.0 | 187.0 | 208.0 | 193.9 | 132.9% |
| Revenue ($mm) | 40% | 1,469.0 | 1,500.0 | 1,600.0 | 1,473.0 | 56.5% |
| Strategic Goals (Automotive NBAs / New Tech Wins / Renewable Energy Share) | 20% | As set | As set | As set | 2,400; 8; 17% respectively | 200% each |
| Total Earned Bonus Factor | — | — | — | — | — | 115.7% |
2024 Long-Term Equity – Grant Design and Targets
| Grant Date | Instrument | Equity Mix Weight | Metric | Performance Period | Vesting | Target Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 15, 2024 | PSUs | 60% of LT grant | Adjusted EBITDA Margin (75% of PSUs) | Annual 2024, 2025, 2026 and three-year to 12/31/2026 | Cliff vest of earned PSUs at 3 years | $405,000 (EBITDA Margin) |
| Mar 15, 2024 | PSUs | 60% of LT grant | Three-year Relative Revenue Growth (25% of PSUs) | Three-year to 12/31/2026 | Cliff vest at 3 years | $135,000 (Rel. Rev. Growth) |
| Mar 15, 2024 | PSUs Modifier | Applies to PSUs | Relative TSR ±25% modifier | Three-year to 12/31/2026 | Applied to PSU payout | — |
| Mar 15, 2024 | RSUs | 40% of LT grant | Time-based | Three-year ratable annual vesting | Ratable (1/3 annually) | $360,000 |
| 2024 Equity – Granted Units | Count | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs granted (2024 award) | 6,759 | Three-year ratable vesting |
| PSUs outstanding (2024 award) | 10,137 | Unearned; valued at $404,669 at 12/31/24 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Amount | As-Of | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shares owned directly/indirectly | 16,367 | Mar 11, 2025 | Beneficial ownership table |
| RSUs/PSUs vesting within 60 days | 4,831 | Mar 11, 2025 | Included in total |
| Total beneficial ownership | 21,198 | Mar 11, 2025 | Less than 1% of class |
| RSUs unvested (3/11/2022 grant) | 795; MV $31,736 | Dec 31, 2024 | Valued at $39.92 per share |
| PSUs unearned (3/11/2022 grant) | 1,215; MV $48,489 | Dec 31, 2024 | 2022 PSU earnout: ROIC 85%, EBITDA 0%, rTSR 0% determined in Q1’25 |
| RSUs unvested (3/14/2023 grant) | 2,726; MV $108,822 | Dec 31, 2024 | Valued at $39.92 |
| PSUs unearned (3/14/2023 grant) | 7,356; MV $293,652 | Dec 31, 2024 | Valued at $39.92; performance assumptions per plan |
| RSUs unvested (3/15/2024 grant) | 6,759; MV $269,819 | Dec 31, 2024 | Valued at $39.92 |
| PSUs unearned (3/15/2024 grant) | 10,137; MV $404,669 | Dec 31, 2024 | Valued at $39.92 |
| 2024 stock awards vested | 3,632 shares; $196,091 value | 2024 | Value realized excludes fees/taxes |
| Deferred compensation – 2024 | Exec contrib $130,254; Company contrib $4,944; Earnings $18,471; Balance $237,762 | Dec 31, 2024 | NQDC participation |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited by policy | — | Governance policy includes prohibition on pledging/hedging |
| Stock ownership guidelines | In place | — | Policy noted; specific multiples not disclosed |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Detail |
|---|---|
| Offer letter dates | Initial offer letter Nov 11, 2013; amendments at promotion to VP Jul 11, 2018 and to executive officer Sep 14, 2021 |
| Initial exec comp terms | Base salary $350,000 at 2021 promotion; target bonus 50%; equity eligibility; welfare benefits; company automobile |
| Severance – termination without cause / good reason | Lump-sum: 1 year of salary + pro-rata current bonus at target; 1 year health & welfare benefits; outplacement per plan |
| Change-in-control (double trigger) | If terminated within first 12 months post-CIC: 24 months salary + 2 years of target bonus; 18 months health benefits; accelerated vesting of RSUs; PSUs vest based on actual performance through CIC for stock price/TSR measures and at target for other measures |
| Potential payments (illustrative at 12/31/24) | Severance amount $1,121,299 (no CIC); Severance $1,588,507 + equity accel $1,157,187 (with CIC termination within 12 months); total $2,745,694 |
| Non-compete / Non-solicit | 12 months post-termination; severance conditioned on release and compliance |
| Clawback policy | Newly adopted clawback policy overseen by Compensation & Talent Committee |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shifts emphasize performance-based pay: 2024 design weighted 60% PSUs and 40% RSUs for non-CEO NEOs; PSUs focused on Adjusted EBITDA Margin (75%) and Relative Revenue Growth (25%) with rTSR modifier ±25% .
- Annual plan simplification: 2024 plan reduced metrics and used independent payout on three goals; Adjusted EBITDA overachieved while revenue underachieved, strategic goals maxed, yielding a 115.7% earned bonus factor .
- Objective adjustment policy: PSU goals adjusted for specified unusual items (e.g., M&A, restructuring, regulatory/accounting changes); TSR peers maintained since 2018; FX adjustments generally excluded for PSUs .
Compensation Peer Group and Say-on-Pay
- Relative TSR comparator group includes 25 automotive/industrial peers (e.g., Adient, Aptiv, BorgWarner, Ford, GM, Lear, Magna, Sensata, Visteon) .
- Say-on-pay: 2024 annual meeting approval of 2023 NEO compensation was ~86% .
Governance and Committee Oversight
- Compensation & Talent Committee members: John Stacey (Chair), Charles Kummeth, Betsy Meter; focus includes executive compensation alignment, clawback policy, stock ownership guidelines, and risk mitigation .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High portion of at-risk, performance-linked equity with multi-year PSU design and rTSR modifier suggests strong linkage to profitability/margin expansion and relative growth; prohibition on pledging/hedging reduces misalignment risk .
- Retention: Double-trigger CIC protections (24 months salary + 2 years target bonus and equity acceleration) and 12-month non-compete/non-solicit support retention; significant unvested RSUs/PSUs across 2023–2024 reinforce multi-year commitment .
- Trading signals: Scheduled three-year RSU vesting cadence and PSU outcomes tied to EBITDA margin and relative revenue growth may create periodic vesting-related liquidity, but 2024 realized vesting value was modest ($196k), and policy prohibits hedging/pledging .
- Performance execution risk: 2024 revenue under target (56.5% payout) while EBITDA outperformed (132.9%) and strategic goals maxed; PSU earnout for 2022 showed zero payout on EBITDA and TSR components, highlighting potential variability in long-term performance realization .
