Andreas Roellgen
TIMKENAbout Andreas Roellgen
Executive Vice President and President of Engineered Bearings at The Timken Company; based in Colmar, France; 27 years at Timken as of 2024, and one of the company’s Named Executive Officers in 2024 . Company performance outcomes tied to his incentive plans: 2024 corporate annual cash incentive paid at 81.0% of target (Adjusted EBITDA, EBITDA margin, Free Cash Flow metrics) ; 2022–2024 PSUs earned at 136.8% based on three‑year cumulative adjusted EPS and ROIC . Timken’s longer-term shareholder returns: annualized TSR of 2.8%, 6.7%, and 7.6% over 3-, 5-, and 10-year periods, respectively (context for performance-linked compensation) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Timken Company | Executive Vice President, President of Engineered Bearings | 27 years at Timken (as of 2024) | Not disclosed |
External Roles
No external public company directorships or external roles disclosed for Andreas Roellgen in Timken’s 2025 and 2024 proxy statements.
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (USD) | $530,030 | $595,044 |
| Target Bonus (USD) | $395,683 | $437,878 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 74.7% (derived from $395,683 ÷ $530,030) | 73.6% (derived from $437,878 ÷ $595,044) |
| Actual Annual Cash Incentive Paid (USD) | $511,278 | $354,502 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive – Corporate Plan (applies to NEOs)
| Metric (Weight) | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | 2024 Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (60%) | $705M | $940M | $1,175M | $840M | 78.8% |
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin (20%) | 15.0% | 19.7% | 21.0% | 18.4% | 86.5% |
| Free Cash Flow (20%) | $271M | $387M | $541M | $345M | 82.0% |
| Plan Result | 50% | 100% | 200% | 81.0% of target | 81.0% |
- Andreas’s 2024 cash incentive outcome: target $437,878 ; payout $354,502 (81% of target) .
Long-Term Incentives – Grants and Structure
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs Granted (#) | 4,975 | 5,950 |
| RSUs Grant-Date Fair Value (USD) | $424,567 | $483,676 |
| PSUs Target (#) | 7,475 | 8,900 |
| PSUs Grant-Date Fair Value (USD) | $637,917 | $768,163 |
| RSUs Vesting | 25% per year over 4 years | 25% per year over 4 years |
| PSUs Cycle & Vesting | 2023–2025 (3-year), cliff vest post-cycle | 2024–2026 (3-year), cliff vest post-cycle |
PSU Performance Framework
| Metric & Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024–2026: Cumulative Adjusted EPS (50%) | $14.86 | $19.81 | $24.76 | Straight-line interpolation |
| 2024–2026: Adjusted ROIC (30%) | 9.8% | 13.7% | 16.2% | ROIC <9.0% → 0 payout for cycle |
| 2024–2026: Relative TSR vs S&P 400 Capital Goods (20%) | 25th pct | 50th pct | 75th pct | Defined 30-day average price plus dividends methodology |
| 2022–2024 PSU Actual | — | — | — | Earned at 136.8% of target |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership and Ownership Guidelines
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Beneficially Owned (Jan 1, 2025) | 106,541 shares; <1% of class |
| Rights to Acquire (Options/Time-based RSUs by Mar 1, 2025) | 27,513 shares |
| Stock Ownership Guideline | 3× base salary (NEOs) |
| Andreas’s Actual Ownership Multiple (Dec 31, 2024) | 12.5× base salary |
| Hedging/Pledging Policy | Hedging and pledging prohibited |
Outstanding Equity Awards (Unvested at Dec 31, 2024)
| Award Type | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unvested RSUs (#) | 632 | 1,700 | 3,732 | 5,950 |
| Unearned PSUs at Target (#) | — | 5,100 | 7,475 | 8,900 |
| Options Exercisable (#) | 6,850 (2017) | 7,925 (2018) | 8,525 (2019) | — |
Employment Terms
Severance and Change-in-Control (CIC) Economics
| Provision | Term |
|---|---|
| Severance Multiple (Involuntary, no CIC) | 1.0× (base salary + actual annual cash incentive for full year; reduced by statutory French severance); continuation of certain benefits and outplacement/unemployment |
| CIC Multiple (Double Trigger) | 2.0× (sum of greater-of base salary and greater-of target annual cash incentive in year of termination/change in control; reduced by French statutory severance) |
| Equity Treatment on CIC | Unvested equity vests upon qualifying termination after CIC; PSUs vest based on actual performance through most recent date prior to CIC; options exercisable for 3 years; benefits continue through CIC multiple period; trust arrangement secures payments |
| Equity Treatment (Retirement/Other) | Retirement: normal vesting; PSUs prorated to separation date and paid at end of performance period |
| Other Benefits (Estimated) | $21,700 for Andreas under termination scenarios (benefits plus outplacement) |
| Clawback | Standalone policy: mandatory recovery for restatements; permissive recovery for misconduct; forfeiture for detrimental activity/restrictive covenant breaches |
| Non-Compete/Confidentiality | Required as consideration for severance (jurisdictionally permissible) |
| Anti-Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for executives |
Investment Implications
- High alignment: 12.5× ownership vs 3× guideline, hedging/pledging prohibited; beneficial ownership of 106,541 shares plus rights to acquire 27,513 shares supports long-term alignment .
- Incentive mix tied to value creation: STIP at 81.0% in 2024 reflects pay sensitivity to operational outcomes; PSUs emphasize adjusted EPS, ROIC, and relative TSR with robust targets; last completed cycle paid above target at 136.8% .
- Retention risk appears contained: Moderate severance (1.0×) and CIC (2.0×) multiples, double-trigger equity, and continued benefits; France-based pension arrangements (FRIP and Europe Executive Plan) vest at retirement, further stabilizing retention incentives .
- Pay-for-performance oversight resilient: Strong say-on-pay support (96% in 2024; 98% in 2023) and explicit clawback provisions mitigate governance risk and support investor confidence .