Jeffrey Myers
About Jeffrey Myers
Jeffrey Myers (age 57) is Chief Sales and Marketing Officer – Vacation Ownership at Travel + Leisure Co., serving in this role since June 2018 after a long tenure at Wyndham Vacation Ownership dating back to 1991, including EVP Sales for Club Wyndham and WorldMark (2002–2007) and CSO (2008–2018) . In 2024, TNL delivered net revenue of $3.9B and Adjusted EBITDA of $929M, with 8% tour growth and VPG over $3,000, providing a favorable pay-for-performance backdrop for sales leadership . The company emphasizes Adjusted EBITDA for annual incentives and 3-year average Adjusted Diluted EPS for PSUs, aligning incentive outcomes with shareholder value creation .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wyndham Vacation Ownership | Joined in 1991; progressive leadership roles | 1991–2002 | Built sales leadership pipeline; site leader and regional SVP roles |
| Club Wyndham & WorldMark by Wyndham | EVP of Sales | 2002–2007 | Scaled core brands’ sales engine; drove owner/member growth |
| Wyndham Vacation Ownership | Chief Sales & Marketing Officer | 2008–2018 | Led global sales/marketing; prepared organization for TNL spin/branding |
| Travel + Leisure Co. (Vacation Ownership) | Chief Sales & Marketing Officer | 2018–present | Oversees sales/marketing across multi-brand VO portfolio |
External Roles
Not disclosed in the proxy or filings for Mr. Myers.
Fixed Compensation
2024 cash compensation and perquisites:
- Base salary: $596,684
- Target annual cash incentive: 100% of base salary (corporate plan portion equals 50% of total bonus opportunity; sales incentive constitutes remaining 50%)
- Actual annual incentive payout (corporate plan portion): $331,060 (111.6% of corporate target)
- Sales incentive payout: $339,583 (114.2% of target)
- Total non-equity incentive (annual + sales): $670,643
2024 perquisites and company contributions:
- Automobile $26,079; Financial planning $14,087; 401(k) match $18,333; Deferred compensation match $73,688; Recognition income $2,706; Aggregate tax gross-up $4,376; Other $7,598; Total $146,867
Multi-year compensation for Jeffrey Myers:
| Metric ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 548,586 | 569,503 | 591,395 |
| Stock Awards (RSUs+PSUs grant-date FV) | 2,249,936 | 3,499,970 | 3,199,995 |
| Non-Equity Incentive | 856,549 | 384,402 | 670,643 |
| All Other Compensation | 171,350 | 132,393 | 146,867 |
| Total | 3,826,421 | 4,613,191 | 4,608,900 |
Deferred compensation balances (Officer Deferred Compensation Plan, 2024):
- Executive contribution $122,814; Company contribution $73,688; Aggregate earnings $564,713; Ending balance $3,402,464 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (2024 design and outcomes):
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target Setup | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate annual incentive | Adjusted EBITDA | 100% | Performance tiers 90%–106% of target with 25%–200% payout; interpolation applied | Corporate: 108%; Wyndham Destinations NA: 120%; Travel & Membership: 92% | Myers corporate payout 111.6% ($331,060) | Cash paid in 2025 |
| Sales incentive (Myers) | Net Operating Income & Cost Management (WVC North America) | 50% of total bonus | Eligible up to 200% per metric; >200% paid over following 2 years subject to service | 114.2% of target | $339,583 | Cash (portion in 2024) |
Long-Term Incentive (LTIP):
- Mix: Other NEOs (incl. Myers): 25% PSUs, 75% time-vesting RSUs .
- PSU metric: 3-year average performance against Adjusted Diluted EPS (2024–2026), with 0–200% vesting at performance period end; annual thresholds/targets set each year .
- 2022 PSU cohort (performance period 2022–2024) paid at maximum 200% based on cumulative Adjusted Diluted EPS .
2024 LTIP grants (March 12/15, 2024):
| Award Type | Shares/Units | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Key Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 53,109 | 2,399,996 | Vest ratably over 4 years (each anniversary of March 15, 2024) |
| PSUs (target) | 17,703 | 799,999 | 3-year average Adjusted Diluted EPS, 0–200% vesting (2024–2026) |
Option/award activity in 2024:
- Options exercised: 13,569 shares on 11/18/2024; value realized $175,135 .
- RSUs/PSUs vested: 43,021 shares vested on 3/10/2024; value realized $1,946,270 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership as of Dec 31, 2024:
- Shares beneficially owned: 257,284; amount represents less than 1% of outstanding shares .
- Executive stock ownership guidelines: Other Executive Officers must hold ≥2x base salary market value; as of Dec 31, 2024, all NEOs exceeded requirements .
- Hedging/pledging: Company policy prohibits hedging and pledging (incl. margin accounts) for directors and senior executives .
Outstanding equity awards (as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Type | Grant Date | Quantity | Status/Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Options | 3/7/2019 | 55,679 | Exercisable; $44.38 strike; expire 3/7/2029 |
| Stock Options | 3/4/2020 | 55,206 | Exercisable; $41.04 strike; expire 3/4/2030 |
| RSUs | 3/10/2021 | 8,475 | Unvested balance; ratable over 4 years |
| RSUs | 3/10/2022 | 15,959 | Unvested balance; ratable over 4 years |
| RSUs | 3/10/2023 | 36,006 | Unvested balance; ratable over 4 years |
| RSUs | 3/15/2024 | 53,109 | Unvested balance; ratable over 4 years |
| PSUs (2022 grant) | Perf. period ended 12/31/2024 | 21,278 | Vested/paid at maximum (200%) |
| PSUs (2023 grant) | Perf. period ends 12/31/2025 | 8,742 | Threshold shares indicated; actual payout depends on performance |
| PSUs (2024 grant) | Perf. period ends 12/31/2026 | 35,406 | Maximum shares indicated; actual payout depends on performance |
Ownership of Company Stock (table basis):
- Outstanding shares used for % calculations: 67,063,541 .
Employment Terms
Employment letter and incentives:
- Employment letter (effective June 1, 2018): Base salary initially $500,000; annual incentive target 50% of salary; continued participation in Sales & Marketing Leadership Incentive Plan with a $250,000 target award; eligibility for equity grants and standard executive benefits .
- Severance (without cause): Lump sum equal to 200% of (base salary + highest annual incentive in last 3 years, capped at then-target); COBRA reimbursement up to 18 months; time-based equity vesting of awards that would vest within 1 year; PSUs vest pro rata (time in performance period plus 12 months) subject to performance; options/SARs exercisable up to 2 years (not beyond original expiry) .
Change-in-control policy:
- Cash severance is double-trigger (requires termination without cause or constructive discharge following a change-in-control) .
- All long-term equity awards fully vest upon change-in-control; PSUs deemed achieved at target for CIC purposes; no excise tax gross-ups for executive officers .
Potential payments (as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Termination Event | Cash Severance ($) | Medical Benefits ($) | Equity Acceleration ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death or Disability | — | — | 8,922,587 | 8,922,587 |
| Termination without Cause | 1,790,052 | 63,564 | 4,811,265 | 6,664,881 |
| Qualifying Termination Following CIC | 1,790,052 | 63,564 | 8,922,587 | 10,776,203 |
TNL Financial Performance Context
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD) | $3,095,000,000* | $3,231,000,000* | $3,328,000,000* |
| EBITDA ($USD) | $798,000,000* | $860,000,000* | $867,000,000* |
Values retrieved from S&P Global.*
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Myers’ variable pay is high (corporate bonus based 100% on Adjusted EBITDA and a substantial sales incentive), with LTIP PSUs tied to 3-year average Adjusted Diluted EPS. The 2022 PSU cohort paid at 200%, and 2024 annual/sales incentive outcomes exceeded targets, signaling strong execution in VO sales momentum .
- Retention and CIC economics: Severance at 2× salary+bonus and pro-rata PSU treatment, plus significant equity acceleration in CIC, balance retention with shareholder-friendly policies (double-trigger cash severance, no gross-ups) .
- Ownership and risk controls: Beneficial ownership of 257,284 shares, compliance with ownership guidelines, and strict prohibitions on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment and collateral risk; however, ongoing RSU/PSU vesting and occasional option exercises can create scheduled selling pressure around vest dates .
- Performance execution risk: Incentives emphasize EBITDA and EPS, focusing management on profitable growth; dependency on VO tour growth and VPG sustainability suggests sensitivity to consumer demand cycles—an area where sales leadership is critical, but macro cyclicality remains a factor .