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Adam D. Zambanini

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer at TREX COTREX CO
Executive

About Adam D. Zambanini

Adam D. Zambanini (age 48) is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Trex Company, Inc., a role he has held since October 25, 2023; he previously served as President of Trex Residential Products (July 2018–Oct 2023) and earlier held senior marketing roles at Trex (2005–2018). He holds a B.S. in mechanical engineering from Penn State University and an MBA from Averett University . During his tenure in senior leadership, Trex delivered FY2024 net sales of $1.2B (+5.2% y/y), EBITDA of $360M (+10.4% y/y) with EBITDA margin of 31.3% and FY2024 net income of $226M (+10.2% y/y); TSR indexed to 2019=100 was 153.6 in 2024, reflecting multi-year value creation .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Trex CompanyExecutive Vice President & Chief Operating OfficerOct 2023–PresentOversees company operations and execution
Trex CompanyPresident, Trex Residential ProductsJul 2018–Oct 2023Led residential products business
Trex CompanyVice President, MarketingJan 2011–Jul 2018Directed marketing for Trex brand/product portfolio
Trex CompanyDirector, MarketingSep 2005–Dec 2010Senior marketing leadership
Rubbermaid Commercial ProductsProduct ManagerJan 2000–Sep 2005Product management in building-products adjacencies

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Rubbermaid Commercial ProductsProduct ManagerJan 2000–Sep 2005Prior employment before Trex

Fixed Compensation

Metric2022202320242025
Base Salary ($)468,000 484,000 550,000 569,000
Target Annual Bonus (% of Salary)80% 80% 80% 80% (unchanged program mechanics noted)
Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($)— (no payout) 774,400 499,488

Notes: 2024 annual cash incentive paid at 113.52% of target for all NEOs (mechanics below) .

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Incentive Mechanics (2024)

MetricWeightTargetActual (Adjusted)Achievement vs TargetPayout MultipleWeighted Contribution
Pretax Income75%$300.0M (target increased by $8M due to zero aluminum tariffs) $301.309M (adjusted for extraordinary items) 100.4% 103.5% 77.6%
Operating Cash Flow25%$218.0M (target increased by $8M due to zero aluminum tariffs) $229.862M (adjusted) 105.0% 143.5% 35.9%
Total Payout113.52% (77.6% + 35.9%)

Threshold/Max: 80% threshold = 25% payout; ≥112.5% = 200% payout; straight-line interpolation .

Long-Term Equity Incentives (grants and structure)

  • Mix: 35% time-based RSUs (3-year, 1/3 vesting annually), 50% performance-based RSUs (PSUs; 3 annual tranches against EBITDA targets: 1-year, cumulative 2-year, cumulative 3-year), 15% Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs; 3-year 1/3 vesting; 10-year term; grant price = market close on grant date) .
  • Adam Zambanini grant values: 2023 LT equity $1,235,000; 2024 $1,403,000; 2025 $1,451,000 .

PSUs – 2025 Vesting Outcomes (based on EBITDA targets)

Grant YearTarget # SharesPayout %Shares Vested (Mar 2025)
20221,680 0% (cumulative 2022–2024 EBITDA at 68.04% of target) 0
20233,624 200% (cumulative 2023–2024 EBITDA at 143.35% of target) 7,248
20242,574 106.42% (2024 EBITDA at 100.80% of adjusted target) 2,739

EBITDA adjustments: 2024 EBITDA adjusted down by $1.486M (surface flaking reserve release exclusion) to $358.858M; 2024 target increased by $8M to $356.0M due to zero tariffs .

SARs – 2024 Grant Details

Grant DateSARs Granted (#)Exercise/Base Price ($/Sh)VestingTerm
Feb 19, 20244,694 90.86 1/3 per year over 3 years 10 years

2024 Equity Vesting (actual RSU shares and values)

DateShares Vested (#)Price ($)Value ($)
Feb 17, 202473590.8666,809
Feb 21, 202489490.9381,299
Mar 1, 202410,96194.611,036,986
Total 2024 RSU Vesting12,5901,185,094

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Ownership DetailAmount
Beneficial ownership (Mar 10, 2025)232,404 shares (includes 33,226 unvested RSUs and 29,142 SARs exercisable within 60 days; excludes 11,899 SARs not scheduled to vest within 60 days)
Ownership as % of outstandingLess than 1%
Unvested time-based RSUs at 12/31/241,176 (2022 grant), 5,073 (2023 grant), 5,404 (2024 grant)
Target PSUs unearned at 12/31/241,680 (2022), 7,247 (2023), 7,721 (2024)
SARs outstanding (exercisable/unexercisable)2,440/1,219 (2022 grant, $82.01), 2,271/4,542 (2023 grant, $56.80), —/4,694 (2024 grant, $90.86)
Stock ownership guidelines (EVP/SVP multiple)1.5× base salary; all NEOs meet guidelines
Anti-hedging and anti-pledging policyExecutives prohibited from hedging or pledging company equity
Insider trading policyPre-clearance required; trades only in prescribed windows

Employment Terms

Severance Agreements (involuntary termination without cause / resignation for good reason)

  • Benefits: Lump sum = 1× (base salary + greater of target prior-year bonus or prior-year actual bonus), plus prior-year earned incentive if unpaid; accelerated vesting of all outstanding equity (PSUs vest at target); up to 12 months health/dental continuation; Section 409A timing safeguards .
  • Estimated benefits (as of 12/31/24):
    • Involuntary termination: Cash $1,324,400; benefits $21,981; intrinsic value of equity awards $1,983,447; total $3,329,828 .

Change-in-Control (CIC) Agreements (double-trigger)

  • Benefits on termination within 90 days before to 2 years after CIC: Lump sum = 1.5× (base salary + greater of target bonus measured per agreement), pro-rata current-year target bonus, 18 months health/dental/life continuation; equity awards vest at target whether or not employment loss occurs; excise tax cutback to avoid 4999 tax; 409A compliance .
  • Estimated benefits (as of 12/31/24):
    • Termination in connection with CIC: Cash $2,426,600; benefits $34,187; intrinsic value of equity $1,983,447; outplacement $25,000; total $4,469,234 .

Clawback

  • Compensation recovery policy (Oct 2023) for incentive-based compensation upon accounting restatements, three-year lookback .

Compensation & Incentives

Summary Compensation (reported)

YearSalary ($)Stock Awards ($)Option/SAR Awards ($)Non-Equity Incentive ($)All Other Comp ($)Total ($)
2022468,000 702,950 124,050 459,704 1,754,704
2023484,000 1,049,750 185,250 774,400 30,231 2,523,631
2024550,000 1,192,550 210,450 499,488 33,345 2,485,833

Pay-for-Performance Architecture

  • Annual: 75% pretax income, 25% operating cash flow; threshold 80% (25% payout), target 100% (100% payout), max ≥112.5% (200% payout) .
  • Long-term: PSUs tied to annual and cumulative EBITDA over 3 years with same threshold/target/max framework; time-based RSUs and SARs vest one-third per year .

Say-on-Pay & Peer Group

  • Say-on-Pay approval: 92% of votes cast at 2024 annual meeting ; 91% at 2023 meeting .
  • Compensation peer group (unchanged in 2024): AAON, A.O. Smith, Advanced Drainage Systems, Allegion, Armstrong World Industries, Cavco, Eagle Materials, Floor & Decor, Fortune Brands Innovations, Griffon, Hayward Holdings, Helen of Troy, Lennox, Louisiana-Pacific, RH, Simpson Manufacturing, The AZEK Co., Yeti .
  • Target positioning vs peers (weighted average NEOs): 2024 base salary 93.77%, TTC 94.89%, TDC 94.04%; 2025 base salary 94.33%, TTC 93.81%, TDC 98.24% of peer median .

Performance & Track Record

  • FY2024 financials: Net sales $1.2B (+5.2% y/y); net income $226M (+10.2% y/y); EBITDA $360M (+10.4% y/y); EBITDA margin 31.3% (+150 bps y/y) .
  • TSR (value of initial fixed $100 investment): 2024 Trex $153.60; peer-group $218.00; prior years provided in pay-vs-performance disclosure .

Related Party Transactions

  • No related party transactions to report for fiscal 2024 .

Risk Indicators & Policies

  • Anti-hedging/pledging in place for executives; insider trading policy with pre-clearance and windows .
  • Compensation risk review: Company concludes policies/practices are not reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Material portion of compensation is performance-based with multi-year PSUs tied to EBITDA, supporting long-term value creation; ownership guidelines and anti-pledging policy reinforce alignment .
  • Vesting cadence and potential selling pressure: Regular annual vesting of RSUs/SARs (e.g., 12,590 RSUs vested in 2024 totaling $1.185M for Zambanini) could create periodic liquidity events; any disposals will be reported via Form 4 and subject to insider trading windows .
  • Retention/transition risk: Severance provides 1× salary+bonus and accelerated vesting; CIC double-trigger with 1.5× salary+bonus and accelerated vesting may reduce volatility in executive transitions but increases payout obligations in M&A scenarios .
  • Pay discipline: Strong say-on-pay support (92% in 2024) and benchmarking to peer medians suggest manageable pay inflation risk; continued use of EBITDA, pretax income, and cash flow as metrics aligns incentives to profitable growth .