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Gerald Harder

Chief Operating Officer at Trinity Capital
Executive

About Gerald Harder

Gerald “Gerry” Harder (age 63) is Trinity Capital Inc.’s Chief Operating Officer (COO), serving since March 2022; he joined TRIN in 2019 (previously Chief Credit Officer) and sits on the Investment Committee. Harder’s core credentials span credit underwriting, operations, and engineering leadership across venture-backed tech, with prior senior roles at Sand 9 Inc., Cirrus Logic, White Electronic Designs, and ON Semiconductor . TRIN ties NEO pay to BDC-relevant performance factors (e.g., net investment income, return on average equity, dividend yield, NAV growth, AUM growth), with discretionary bonus outcomes benchmarked versus plan and peers .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Trinity Capital Inc.Chief Operating Officer2022–presentLeads operations, platform scaling, and new business initiatives; Investment Committee member
Trinity Capital Inc.Chief Credit Officer2019–2022Oversaw lending, underwriting, and credit processes
Trinity Capital Investments (predecessor)Operating Partner2018Analyzed investment opportunities; collaborated on strategy and asset allocation
Trinity Capital Investments (predecessor)Managing Director2016–2018Investment strategy and execution
Sand 9 Inc.EVP, Engineering & Operations2012–2015Led design/production of MEMS-based timing devices
Cirrus LogicDirector of Operations2011–2012Operational leadership
White Electronic DesignsVP of Engineering2008–2010Engineering leadership
ON SemiconductorTechnical leadership roles2004–2008Product/technical leadership in semiconductors

External Roles

No external directorships or board roles disclosed for Harder .

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year compensation for Harder (NEO Summary Compensation Table):

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)500,000 500,000 625,000
Actual Bonus Paid ($)732,200 792,800 715,000
Stock Awards Fair Value ($)999,992 742,769 1,759,998
  • Target bonus: Increased for 2024 from $500,000 to $650,000 (committee-set, discretionary) .

Performance Compensation

ComponentMetricWeightingTargetActualPayoutVesting
Annual Cash Bonus (2024)NII, ROAE, dividend yield, NAV growth, AUM growth; operational metricsDiscretionary Committee-set (not disclosed) Assessed vs AOP and BDC peer group 110% of target (paid Q1’25) n/a
Restricted Stock (Dec 2024 pull-forward grant)Time-based RSn/an/aGrant FV $1,759,998 n/a25% vest on 3/15/2026; remaining vest quarterly over 3 years

Notes:

  • Company did not grant options in FY2024; no option awards outstanding at 12/31/2024 .
  • Committee approved a pull-forward cadence for 2024 awards; Harder received full annual RS in Dec 2024 with the four-year vest schedule aligned to March 2025 cycle .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership (shares) and alignment:

Metric2024 (Record Date 4/15/2024)2025 (Record Date 4/15/2025)
Total Beneficial Ownership (shares)266,233 (direct/indirect) 305,281 (direct/indirect)
Ownership % of outstanding<1% <1%

Outstanding unvested equity (year-end):

Metric2023 YE2024 YE
Unvested RSUs (#)101,696 170,728
Market Value of Unvested RSUs ($)1,477,643 (at $14.53) 2,470,434 (at $14.47)
Options (exercisable/unexercisable)

Policies and practices:

  • Hedging/short-term/speculative trading prohibited; pledging only with pre-approval and demonstrable non-recourse capacity (no pledging by Harder disclosed) .
  • Clawback policy adopted under Nasdaq Rule 5608 / Rule 10D-1; recovery of incentive comp upon accounting restatements .

Employment Terms

  • Role and tenure: COO since March 2022; officer since 2019 .
  • A&R NEO Agreement (effective 3/14/2025) base salary: $650,000; eligible for discretionary annual cash bonus and equity awards under 2019 LTIP; full benefits participation .
  • Severance (termination without Cause or resignation with Good Reason): 12 months of base salary for Harder; increases to 2× base salary if within 24 months following a “Covered Transaction” (change in control under 2019 LTIP) .
  • Bonus upon termination: Earned but unpaid bonus; pro-rata current-year bonus; if within 24 months post-Covered Transaction, lump sum equal to 1× average of last three annual bonuses .
  • Equity vesting acceleration: RS/awards accelerate for tranches that would vest within two years from termination; if within 24 months post-Covered Transaction, full acceleration applies (full acceleration automatically applies to Executive Chairman; applies to other NEOs, including Harder, upon post-transaction qualifying termination) .
  • COBRA payments: Company contributions for 12 months; increases to 24 months lump sum if within 24 months post-Covered Transaction .
  • Restrictive covenants: Confidentiality, non-compete, and non-solicitation provisions per A&R NEO Agreement .

Potential change-in-control economics (illustrative as of 12/31/2024):

BenefitDeathDisabilityTermination Without Cause/Good ReasonWithin 1 Year After Change in Control; Termination Without Cause/Good Reason
Severance ($)541,667 541,667 541,667 541,667
Bonus ($)596,667 596,667 596,667 596,667
Equity Award Acceleration ($)2,483,142 2,483,142 2,483,142 2,483,142

Performance & Track Record

  • Portfolio stewardship (Q2’25): 76% secured loans / 17% equipment financing / 4% equity / 2% warrants (cost basis); 99.1% performing (FV); nonaccrual FV ~$15.6M (4.9% of debt FV); 81% first-lien coverage; weighted average LTV 20%; top-10 debt investments = 23.1% of portfolio at cost; portfolio companies raised ~$1.3B in equity during Q2’25, supporting capital access and debt servicing .
  • Strategic co-invest platform (SBIC “green light” progress): Fund will programmatically co-invest alongside TRIN’s BDC (U.S. jurisdiction limits apply); SBA debentures deliver low-cost leverage; management expects launch next year; raises ~$87.5M equity to access ~$275M total capital, generating management and incentive fees to TRIN .

Compensation Committee Analysis

  • Committee composition: Independent directors Michael E. Zacharia (Chair), Richard P. Hamada, Ronald E. Estes .
  • Independent consultants: Mercer (2021) and FW Cook (2024) for peer group and benchmarking; comparators include internally managed BDCs, REITs, and broader financials of comparable size .
  • Pay-for-performance alignment: Committee ties annual outcomes to NII, ROAE, dividend yield, NAV/AUM growth and operational deployment/capitalization metrics; 2024 bonuses paid at 110% of target based on performance vs plan and peers .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Section 16 reporting: Company disclosed certain late Form 4 filings due to administrative error, including one Form 4 for Harder (gift) and vesting reports filed late on behalf of executives; Company attributed issues to internal administrative errors .
  • No option repricing, tax gross-ups, or related-party transactions involving Harder disclosed; Company maintains hedging/pledging restrictions and a clawback policy .

Equity Ownership & Alignment – Additional Notes

  • Significant unvested RSU balance ($2.47M at YE2024; 170,728 shares) creates retention and alignment; no options outstanding reduce volatility-linked selling pressure .
  • Stock ownership guidelines not disclosed; insider trading policy restricts hedging/pledging and derivatives use .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Harder’s compensation levers (cash bonus tied to NII/ROAE/dividend/NAV/AUM and multi-year RSU vesting) align with BDC shareholder value drivers; his unvested RSU balance supports retention .
  • Retention/COC economics: A&R NEO terms (12 months base; 2× base and full acceleration on post-transaction qualifying termination) suggest reasonable retention incentives without excessive change-in-control windfalls; potential accelerated vesting in post-CoC scenarios could create event-related supply, but no options mitigate immediate exercise pressure .
  • Execution: Q2’25 credit/portfolio metrics and SBIC co-invest infrastructure reflect disciplined underwriting and platform expansion; Harder’s operational leadership is integral to scaling fee-generating businesses with low-cost leverage, supporting EPS/dividend trajectory .
  • Governance: Clawback and hedging/pledging restrictions reduce misalignment risk; minor Section 16 filing lapses appear administrative rather than structural .