Todd Skinner
President, International at TRU
Executive
About Todd Skinner
Todd C. Skinner is President, International at TransUnion, leading growth across international markets since August 2021 after joining TransUnion in 2014 and previously serving as Regional President for Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean . He holds a bachelor’s of commerce from St. Mary’s University and an MBA from the Kellogg–Schulich Executive MBA program, with prior leadership roles at First Canadian Title and HSBC, including CEO of HSBC Financial and COO/Credit Officer roles in Retail Banking & Wealth Management . TransUnion’s 2024 performance delivered revenue of $4,184M (+9%), consolidated adjusted EBITDA of $1,506M (+12%), and adjusted diluted EPS of $3.91 (+16%), with EBITDA margin at 36.0% . In Skinner’s remit, International Revenue ($979.4M) and International Adjusted EBITDA ($440.1M) both hit maximum performance (200% payout) under the 2024 annual plan, reflecting strong execution .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| TransUnion | President, International | Aug 2021–present | Leads growth across international markets; succeeded planned transition and expanded execution globally . |
| TransUnion | Regional President (Canada; later Canada, Latin America & Caribbean) | 2014–2021 | Drove double-digit constant currency growth; expanded remit to LATAM & Caribbean . |
| First Canadian Title Default Solutions | President | Prior to 2014 | Led technology recovery business with operational turnaround focus . |
| HSBC | Chief Credit Officer / Chief Operations Officer, Retail Banking & Wealth Management | Prior to 2014 | Led risk and operations; drove retail banking and wealth discipline . |
| HSBC Financial (subsidiary) | President & CEO | Prior to 2014 | Oversaw consumer finance, payments and auto finance businesses . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) | Global Board representative for TransUnion | Current . |
| Buro de Credito (Mexico) | Board of Directors | Current . |
| Trans Union de Mexico S.A. | Board of Directors | Current . |
| TransUnion International UK Ltd. | Board of Directors | Current . |
| TransUnion CIBIL Limited (India) | Board of Directors | Current . |
| Cliffside Capital | Board of Directors | Current . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (USD) | $527,448 | $529,755 |
| Target Annual Incentive (% of Base) | 100% | 100% |
| Actual Annual Incentive Paid (USD) | — (Not an NEO in 2023) | $907,871 |
Performance Compensation
| Component | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Result | Payout % | Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Defined Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA | 20% | $1,354.6M | $1,472.4M | $1,531.3M | $1,513.5M | 169.8% | $179,947 |
| Defined Adjusted Diluted EPS | 20% | $3.56 | $3.87 | $4.03 | $3.93 | 137.0% | $145,193 |
| Defined International Adjusted EBITDA | 15% | $383.7M | $417.1M | $433.8M | $440.1M | 200.0% | $158,927 |
| Defined International Revenue | 35% | $901.9M | $949.3M | $977.8M | $979.4M | 200.0% | $370,829 |
| Strategic Individual Objectives | 10% | — | — | — | 100% achievement | 100.0% | $52,976 |
| Total Annual Incentive | — | — | — | — | — | 171.4% | $907,871 |
Long-Term Incentives (structure and target values):
- 2024 target annual LTI grant value: $1,750,000; increased to $2,300,000 effective Sep 3, 2024, with an additional grant on that date .
- Mix: 50% PSUs (three-year performance: Relative TSR 50%, Cumulative Revenue 20%, Cumulative Adjusted Diluted EPS 30%) and 50% RSUs vesting 33% on Aug 28, 2025; 33% on Aug 28, 2026; 34% on Aug 28, 2027 .
Historical PSU performance (2012–2024 cycle):
| PSU Grant | Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout % | Shares Earned |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 PSU (vested Feb 25, 2025) | Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA | 30% | $4,183.1M | $3,706.3M | 0% | 0 |
| 2022 PSU | Cumulative Revenue | 20% | $10,174.0M | $9,569.1M | 0% | 0 |
| 2022 PSU | Relative TSR (Russell 3000 – Commercial & Professional Services) | 50% | 50th percentile | 30th percentile | 61% | 1,986 |
| 2022 PSU | Total Weighted Payout | — | — | — | 30% | 1,986 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership (common shares) | 913 shares; <1% of outstanding . |
| 2024 Stock vested | 8,031 shares; $735,093 value realized . |
| 2024 target annual LTI value | $1,750,000; increased to $2,300,000 effective Sep 3, 2024 . |
| RSU vesting schedule | 33% on Aug 28, 2025; 33% on Aug 28, 2026; 34% on Aug 28, 2027 . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | CEO 6x salary; other executives (including direct reports) 3x salary; 75% net share retention until met; reduced to 50% of requirement for executives aged ≥60 . |
| Compliance status | All NEOs had satisfied guidelines as of Dec 31, 2023 . |
| Hedging/pledging policy | Prohibits short sales, derivatives, and hedging; pledging prohibited unless CFO and CLO preapprove; margin accounts prohibited . |
| Insider trading preclearance | Trades by Section 16 insiders require preclearance and are restricted during blackout windows . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Skinner Employment Agreement Terms |
|---|---|
| Severance (involuntary termination without cause or voluntary resignation for good reason) | 1.5x the sum of annualized base salary and the average of the prior two years’ actual bonuses; paid in equal installments over 18 months; pro rata target annual incentive if termination after July 1; company-provided outplacement (max $35,000); continuation of benefits for 18 months (including Company-paid Canadian national healthcare portion) . |
| Change in control treatment | Upon a qualifying termination within two years following a change in control (double trigger), all RSUs and PSUs vest; PSU values calculated at target for scenario table; RSU/PSU values based on closing price $92.71 on Dec 31, 2024 . |
| Clawback | Broad clawback policy compliant with SEC and NYSE, permitting reduction/cancellation/recoupment of incentive compensation upon restatement, mistakes, or misconduct . |
| Restrictive covenants | Non-compete 12 months post-termination; customer and employee non-solicitation 12 months post-termination; confidentiality obligations . |
Separation scenario values as of Dec 31, 2024:
| Scenario | Severance Payments | Value of PSUs/RSUs | Other Benefits | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary Termination | $1,954,982 | — | $41,315 | $1,996,297 |
| Death/Disability | — | $7,174,085 | — | $7,174,085 |
| Qualifying Termination Following Change in Control | $1,954,982 | $7,174,085 | $41,315 | $9,170,382 |
Investment Implications
- Strong pay-for-performance alignment: 84%+ of NEO pay is at-risk, with Skinner’s 2024 AIP paying 171.4% of target on broad-based outperformance and International segment metrics at maximum payout (200%) .
- Increased LTI target mid-year signals retention focus: Skinner’s target annual LTI rose from $1.75M to $2.30M effective Sep 3, 2024, with an additional grant—indicative of the need to retain experienced leadership in International growth markets .
- Selling pressure considerations: Skinner adopted a Rule 10b5-1 plan on Sep 10, 2025 to sell up to 9,950 shares through Dec 31, 2026, creating a predictable but modest supply over time; insider trading policy and preclearance reduce governance risk .
- Governance mitigants: Strict anti-hedging and pledging restrictions; formal stock ownership guidelines (3x salary for executives) with 75% share retention until met; all NEOs compliant as of Dec 31, 2023 .
- Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger vesting and sizable equity acceleration could increase payout under a transaction scenario (total $9.17M in illustrative table), yet clawback and restrictive covenants moderate adverse behaviors .
2024 company-level performance (Revenue +9%, Adjusted EBITDA +12%, Adjusted EPS +16%) and International segment outperformance underpin pay outcomes, suggesting Skinner’s execution contributed materially to value creation in his scope .