Julie Duffy
TEXTRONAbout Julie Duffy
Executive Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer (CHRO) at Textron (TXT) and one of the company’s Named Executive Officers. She has 27.5 years of credited service, participates in Textron’s pension plans, and meets executive share ownership requirements (3x salary) under Textron’s policy . Company performance context for 2024: revenues were $13.7B, segment profit $1.2B, and backlog rose to $17.9B; annual incentive payout for executives was 67.7% of target due to below-target profitability and cash flow, while the 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid at 122.3% of target . Pay-versus-performance TSR shows the value of a $100 investment at $174.3 at year-end 2024, illustrating long-term alignment of equity awards with shareholder outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Textron Inc. | Executive Vice President & CHRO (NEO) | Not disclosed | Oversees enterprise human capital and executive compensation programs |
No additional prior role details for Ms. Duffy were disclosed in the reviewed filings.
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | — |
No external directorships or roles for Ms. Duffy were disclosed in the reviewed filings.
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $653,269 | $692,308 | $740,385 |
| Target Bonus ($) | $495,000 | $525,000 | $562,500 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | ~75.7% | ~75.8% | 75% |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | $644,000 | $593,000 | $381,000 |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Structure and Outcome
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Component Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise Net Operating Profit (NOP) ($mm) | 60% | $1,384 | $1,203 | 32.9% |
| Manufacturing Cash Flow ($mm) | 35% | $759 | $695 | 29.8% |
| ESG (qualitative) | 5% | 100% | 100% | 5.0% |
| Total Payout (% of Target) | — | — | — | 67.7% |
Long-Term Incentive (PSUs) Design and Results
- PSU metrics and weights: Average ROIC (50%), Cumulative Manufacturing Cash Flow (30%), Relative TSR vs S&P 500 (20%) over three years .
- 2022–2024 PSU cycle earned 122.3% of target; Ms. Duffy’s units and payout shown below .
| Item | 2022–2024 PSU Units/Value |
|---|---|
| Units Granted | 7,507 |
| Units Earned | 9,182 |
| Grant Date Target Value ($) | $533,522 |
| Payout Value ($) | $699,852 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Metric | Amount / Status |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (shares) | 149,975 (less than 1%) |
| Options Exercisable within 60 Days | 111,350 shares |
| RSUs Vesting within 60 Days | 3,754 shares |
| Unvested RSUs (not obtainable within 60 days) | 8,508 shares |
| Unvested PSUs (cash-settled when earned) | 17,015 share equivalents |
| Executive Ownership Guideline | 3x salary; all NEOs meet requirements |
| Anti-Hedging/Pledging | Executives prohibited from hedging or pledging Textron securities |
2024 Equity Grants and Vesting Schedules (Design)
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Quantity | Exercise Price | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024–2026) | 3/1/2024 | Target 2,087; Max 16,690 | — | Earned over 3-year period; typically cash settled |
| RSUs | 3/1/2024 | 4,173 | — | Vest in full at 3rd anniversary |
| Stock Options | 3/1/2024 | 13,655 | $88.68 | Vest ratably over 3 years |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Severance (Not for Cause / Good Reason) | Under Severance Plan for Key Executives: lump sum equals base salary + larger of average last 3 annual incentives or current target; health benefits continued for 18 months . Illustrative amount if terminated on 12/28/2024: $3,615,351 (includes equity treatment per plan assumptions) . |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) | Double-trigger: severance per plan; full vesting acceleration of long-term incentives; full vesting under SPP/SSP/TSP; health benefits continued for 18 months . Illustrative CIC termination amount (12/28/2024 assumption): $3,638,989 . |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank compliant recovery policy; “no-fault” restatement clawback; long-term awards include non-compete clawback within 2 years post-termination . |
| Non-Compete | Violation during employment or within 2 years post-termination triggers forfeiture/repayment for long-term awards . |
| Anti-Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for executives . |
| Tax Gross-Ups | Company policy states no tax gross-ups for officers hired after 2008; CIC gross-ups only apply to CEO letter agreement, not Key Executive plan participants . |
Retirement, Deferred Compensation, and Perquisites
| Program | 2024 Details |
|---|---|
| Pension Present Value (Total) | $5,059,433 (TRP $1,024,189; Spillover $3,362,333; TSPPSO $672,911) |
| Deferred Income Plan (DIP) Balance | $25,894; above‑market DIP earnings $48 |
| Spillover Savings Plan (SSP) Balance | $179,540 |
| 2024 Perquisites | $0 (no perqs disclosed for Ms. Duffy) |
Compensation Structure and Governance Notes
- Target 2024 direct compensation for Ms. Duffy: Base $750,000, Target Annual Incentive 75% of salary ($562,500), Target LTI 175% of salary ($1,312,500); CHRO received a 7.1% base salary increase in 2024 .
- Program mix: PSUs 50%, stock options 25%, RSUs 25%; annual incentive metrics weighted 60% NOP, 35% cash flow, 5% ESG .
- 2024 say‑on‑pay support: ~94.1% approval .
- Talent peer group used for benchmarking includes A&D and industrial peers; list updated in 2023 to better reflect A&D focus (e.g., Howmet Aerospace, Huntington Ingalls, TransDigm) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong ownership policy (3x salary), prohibition on hedging/pledging, and Dodd‑Frank clawback support pay-for-performance discipline and reduce misalignment risk .
- Incentive design: Heavy weighting to ROIC and manufacturing cash flow in PSUs and to NOP/cash flow annually ties pay to capital discipline and cash generation; 2024 cash incentives paid below target (67.7%), while PSUs for 2022–2024 paid above target (122.3%) reflecting longer‑term performance; expect realized pay to be sensitive to stock price and operating execution .
- Retention/turnover risk: Standard Key Executives severance with double‑trigger CIC, continued vesting at retirement eligibility, and clear non-compete clawbacks; low perquisites and no gross‑ups in the plan mitigate shareholder-unfriendly optics, lowering external pressure risk .
- Trading signals: No pledging allowed; beneficial ownership of 149,975 shares and significant outstanding equity suggest ongoing alignment; 2024 below-target cash incentive could signal near‑term moderation in realized cash comp, but PSU structure and backlog growth support long-term incentive value if execution continues .