Jeffrey D. Puckett
TYLER TECHNOLOGIESAbout Jeffrey D. Puckett
Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Tyler Technologies since February 2021; age 58; executive officer since 2021. He oversees cloud initiatives, corporate technology/IT, and information security; led “One Tyler” and deepened the AWS partnership, and previously served as Chief Strategy Officer (2019–Feb 2021) and earlier as President of the Courts & Justice division with roles at Tyler dating back to 1992; before Tyler, he worked in public safety for the public sector . During 2024, Tyler delivered 9.5% revenue growth to $2.138B, recurring revenue up 11% (84.5% mix), SaaS revenue up 22%; GAAP net income rose 58.5% to $263.0M and cash from operations reached $624.6M, reflecting operating leverage from the cloud transition .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tyler Technologies | Chief Operating Officer | Feb 2021–present | Oversees cloud initiatives, corporate technology/IT/security; drove AWS partnership and Tyler 2030 vision; led “One Tyler” initiatives . |
| Tyler Technologies | Chief Strategy Officer | 2019–Feb 2021 | Led cross-disciplinary efforts and acquisition evaluations . |
| Tyler Technologies (Courts & Justice division) | Roles including President; senior roles in implementation, development, sales | 1992–2019 | Built operating discipline and product execution in justice segment; foundation for enterprise cloud shift . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public sector | Public safety | Not disclosed | Frontline domain experience in government operations . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary (USD) | $300,000 | $325,000 | $325,000 |
| Target bonus (% of base) | 85% | 100% | 100% |
| Short‑term PSUs earned (#) | 873 | 929 | 801 |
| Short‑term payout (% of target) | 110% | 125% | 150% |
Performance Compensation
Annual (Short‑term) PSU plan details
| Year | Metric (weight) | Threshold | Target range | Max | Actual | Payout | Vesting mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Non‑GAAP EPS (100%) | $6.93 (40%) | $7.41–$7.449 (100%) | $8.01 (175%) | $7.50 | 110% | 1‑year; vested Mar 1, 2023 . |
| 2023 | Non‑GAAP EPS (100%) | $7.07 (40%) | $7.55–$7.589 (100%) | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | 125% (Committee determination) | Grant Mar 1, 2023; first‑anniversary determination . |
| 2024 | Non‑GAAP EPS (100%) | $8.61 (50%) | $8.95–$9.099 (100%) | $9.38 (150%) | $9.55 | 150% | Vested Mar 1, 2025 . |
Notes: Non‑GAAP EPS excludes share‑based comp, payroll taxes on stock transactions, amortization of acquisition intangibles, acquisition costs, lease restructuring and other items .
Long‑term incentives (PSUs and RSUs)
| Grant year | Instrument | Units | Vesting | Performance metrics and weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | PSUs | 2,500 | 3‑year cliff | 3‑yr cumulative recurring revenue growth; earnout schedule: <25.6% = 0%; 25.6–29.59% = 50%; 29.6–33.59% = 80%; 33.6–39.59% = 100%; 39.6–45.59% = 120%; ≥45.6% = 150% . |
| 2022 | Stock options | 6,500 (two tranches) | 3–4 year ratable; 10‑year life | Stock price appreciation; options were discontinued for NEOs after 2022 . |
| 2023 | PSUs | 5,934 | 3‑year cliff | 50% 3‑yr cumulative recurring revenue growth and 50% 2025 operating margin (non‑GAAP); revenue earnout: <28.9%=0%; 28.9–32.89%=50%; 32.9–36.89%=80%; 36.9–42.89%=100%; 42.9–46.89%=120%; ≥46.9%=150%; margin earnout: <23.5%=0%; 23.5–23.99%=50%; 24.0–24.49%=80%; 24.5–25.49%=100%; 25.5–25.99%=120%; ≥26.0%=150% . |
| 2023 | RSUs | 781 | 1/3 per year over 3 years | Time‑based retention. |
| 2024 | PSUs | 4,762 | 3‑year cliff | 50% 3‑yr cumulative adjusted recurring revenue growth and 50% 2026 net adjusted operating margin; revenue earnout: <22.5%=0%; 22.5–27.72%=50%; 27.73–33.09%=80%; 33.10–40.49%=100%; 40.50–48.14%=120%; ≥48.15%=150%; margin earnout: <26.0%=0%; 26.0–26.49%=50%; 26.5–26.99%=80%; 27.0–27.99%=100%; 28.0–28.49%=120%; ≥28.5%=150% . |
| 2024 | RSUs | 567 | 1/3 per year over 3 years | Time‑based retention. |
Program design: Target mix for NEOs is roughly 80% performance‑based (annual and long‑term PSUs) and 20% service‑based (salary + RSUs) . The company eliminated stock options for NEOs starting in 2023 based on shareholder outreach and peer practices .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Date (record) | Direct shares | Options exercisable within 60 days | Stock awards vesting within 60 days | Total | % of class |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 17, 2023 | 6,030 | 52,648 | — | 58,678 | <1% |
| Mar 15, 2024 | 4,654 | 53,291 | — | 57,945 | <1% |
| Mar 14, 2025 | 6,966 | 51,032 | — | 57,998 | <1% |
Alignment policies:
- Stock ownership guideline for NEOs is 4× base salary; compliance evaluated annually, with covered persons in compliance or making meaningful progress as of year‑end 2024 .
- Anti‑hedging and pledging policy prohibits hedging and discourages pledging; prohibition to the extent of ownership guideline; no 10b5‑1 plans in 2024, and as of Mar 27, 2025 only the CEO had a plan; no other director/officer (including Puckett) had a plan .
Employment Terms
- Contract structure: One‑year employment agreements with automatic annual renewal (replaced legacy five‑year agreements); renewals exercised for NEOs .
- Severance and change‑of‑control: If terminated without cause or for defined “good reason,” severance equals then‑current base salary plus target bonus, plus 12 months of medical benefits; change‑of‑control uses a “double trigger” (transaction plus qualifying termination within 12 months); unvested equity accelerates upon termination without cause, disability, death, or qualifying change‑of‑control termination .
- For Puckett, target bonus = 100% of base salary (2023–2024), implying 1× base + 1× target bonus (i.e., 2× base) in severance amount .
- Clawbacks: Executive compensation recovery policy and incentive compensation recovery policy in force .
- Tax gross‑ups: Company does not provide excise tax payments or gross‑ups on future post‑employment compensation to NEOs .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs. equity mix: Approximately 85–90% of target NEO compensation is equity and “at risk”; shift from options to PSUs/RSUs increases explicit performance linkage and reduces asymmetric risk of option overhang .
- Performance metrics and rigor: Short‑term plan uses graduated EPS pay curve with a hard floor; long‑term PSUs split 50/50 between multi‑year recurring revenue growth and operating margin—directly aligned with Tyler’s cloud transition and profitability objectives .
- Peer benchmarking: Compensation Committee uses a peer group (e.g., ANSYS, Jack Henry, PTC, Veeva, Splunk, Pegasystems, Ziff Davis, ACI Worldwide, Envestnet, RingCentral, HubSpot, Blackbaud, Fair Isaac) and Radford survey, targeting NEO total compensation at or below peer medians with performance upside .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- Say‑on‑pay approvals: 2022—94% ; 2023—over 97% ; 2024—over 96% .
- Investor engagement: Regular dialogue focused on enterprise risk, board refresh, compensation practices, and cloud strategy; Committee affirmed current design based on strong support .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of performance equity (PSUs) tied to recurring revenue and margin supports shareholder value creation during the cloud migration; ownership guidelines and anti‑hedging/pledging policy strengthen alignment .
- Retention risk: One‑year auto‑renew contracts reduce lock‑in versus historic five‑year terms, but severance (base + target bonus) and accelerated equity on certain terminations mitigate flight risk; continued strong say‑on‑pay support suggests investor confidence in design .
- Selling pressure: No 10b5‑1 plan in place for Puckett as of Mar 27, 2025; insider trading policy enforces blackout windows and pre‑clearance, reducing opportunistic sale risk .
- Pay‑for‑performance: 2024 short‑term payout at the maximum (150%) reflects outperformance on EPS; long‑term PSU metrics focus on durable, multi‑year growth and margin expansion central to Tyler’s 2030 plan .