Sign in

Sheri Savage

Chief Financial Officer at Ultra Clean HoldingsUltra Clean Holdings
Executive

About Sheri Savage

Sheri L. Savage is Chief Financial Officer of Ultra Clean Holdings, Inc. (UCT), serving as CFO since July 2016; she joined UCT in April 2009 and previously served as SVP of Finance and Chief Accounting Officer (Feb–Jul 2016). She holds a B.S. in Managerial Economics from the University of California, Davis and was 54 years old as of the 2025 proxy filing date . UCT’s FY2024 performance improved materially: GAAP revenue rose to $2.10B (+20.9% YoY), non-GAAP operating margin expanded to 6.9% (from 4.9%), and non-GAAP EPS increased to $1.44 (from $0.56), with $313.9M cash and equivalents; FY2024 quarterly revenue was $563.3M, and FY2025 Q1 outlook guided revenue to $505–$555M and non-GAAP EPS to $0.22–$0.42 . Performance PSUs granted in 2022 vested at 0% based on the program’s pre-determined criteria, indicating rigorous design and outcome alignment .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Ultra Clean Holdings, Inc.Senior Director of FinanceApr 2009 onward (initial role)Finance leadership during growth and acquisitions
Ultra Clean Holdings, Inc.SVP Finance & Chief Accounting OfficerFeb 2016 – Jul 2016Led accounting and reporting; bridge to CFO role
Credence Systems Corp.Corporate Controller & VP FinanceFeb 2008 – Feb 2009Finance leadership in semiconductor test equipment
Credence Systems Corp.Director of Internal AuditMay 2006 – Feb 2008Built internal audit controls framework
ProtivitiVarious accounting/finance rolesAdvisory experience in controls and audit
KLA‑TencorVarious accounting/finance rolesIndustry exposure to process control and yield mgmt
Arthur Andersen LLPManager, Business Process Risk AccountingMay 1996 – Oct 1999Risk accounting and process controls

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
No public company directorships disclosed for Savage

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Base Salary ($)$500,000 $550,000 $572,000
Target Bonus (% of Base)85% 85%
Actual Cash Incentive Paid ($)$485,484 $423,814 $514,066

FY2024 bonus components for Savage: 1H $178,380; 2H $106,641; Annual $229,046; Total $514,066 .

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Incentive Plan (FY2024 Design and Outcome)

ComponentWeightingTarget RangeActual/PayoutMetricsVesting/Payment
Corporate performance (quarterly, paid semi-annually)55% of cash opportunity0–200% of TargetContributed to total achievement of 106.8% of Target for Savage Revenue, operating and operational KPIs set by Compensation & People Committee Semi-annual payouts (1H, 2H)
Corporate performance (annual)45% of cash opportunity0–200% of TargetIncluded in total achievement Annual corporate goals Annual payout
Individual performance15% of cash opportunity0–100% of TargetIncluded in total achievement Role-specific objectives Annual payout

Design details: Each executive’s annual incentive payout cannot exceed 185% of Target without Committee approval . The Committee sets goals at start of year and resets 2H quantitative corporate goals in July to reflect sector volatility .

Long-Term Equity (RSUs/PSUs) Grant Sizing and Metrics

FY2024 “refresh” grants (award mix and values)

ExecutiveTime-Based RSUs (#)Performance-Based PSUs (#)Total (#)Target Equity Value ($)
Sheri L. Savage17,289 17,289 34,578 $1,500,000 (60-day avg price basis)

Program design

  • PSU primary metric: Relative GAAP revenue growth vs a Performance Peer Group (US and non-US semiconductor-exposed companies), payout linearly 0–200% from 30th to 80th percentile and above .
  • Modifiers: Absolute operating EBITDA margin vs annual operating plan (+25%/0/−25% of target, averaged across years; not interpolated) and relative TSR vs peer group (+25%/0/−25% of target; not interpolated) .
  • CFO award mix: 50% PSUs, 50% RSUs (CEO 55% PSUs), maintaining pay-for-performance emphasis .

Grants of plan-based awards (FY2024)

DateAward TypeShares (#)Grant Date Fair Value ($)
4/26/2024PSUs (Target)17,289 $705,737
4/26/2024RSUs17,289 $705,737

Grants of plan-based awards (FY2023)

DateAward TypeShares (#)Grant Date Fair Value ($)
4/28/2023PSUs (Target)21,772 $613,753
4/28/2023RSUs21,772 $613,753

Stock awards vested (FY2024)

MetricFY2024
Shares acquired on vesting (#)20,381
Value realized ($)$871,735

Option awards: UCT does not currently grant options; equity is delivered via RSUs/PSUs with standardized grant timing procedures (no awards granted in anticipation of MNPI; monthly cadence) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership

HolderShares Beneficially Owned (3/1/2024)% (3/1/2024)Shares Beneficially Owned (3/1/2025)% (3/1/2025)
Sheri L. Savage61,506 <1% 49,700 <1%

Shares outstanding basis: 44,659,468 as of 3/1/2024; 45,144,322 as of 3/1/2025 .

Outstanding Equity Awards (as of 12/27/2024; FMV uses $36.53)

GrantTypeUnvested Shares (#)Market Value ($)Vesting Schedule
3/25/2022RSU (Transitional)2,053 $74,996 Vests 3/25/2025
4/29/2022RSU5,543 $202,486 Vests 4/29/2025
4/28/2023RSU14,515 $530,233 50% on 4/30/2025; 50% on 4/30/2026
4/28/2023PSU (2023 cycle)21,772 $795,331 Vests at end of 3-year cycle per performance
4/26/2024RSU17,289 $631,567 3 equal annual installments on/around grant anniversaries
4/26/2024PSU (2024 cycle)17,289 $631,567 Vests at end of 3-year cycle per performance

Ownership policies and alignment:

  • Stock ownership guidelines: Section 16 officers must hold UCT stock valued at least equal to base salary; compliance currently met across Section 16 officers .
  • Hedging/pledging: Insider Trading Policy prohibits hedging, puts/calls, and pledges by directors and executive officers .

Employment Terms

Severance Policy (Termination Without Cause; as of 12/27/2024)

ExecutiveSalary ($)Cash Incentive ($)Health Benefits ($)Accelerated Vesting Value ($)
Sheri L. Savage (CFO)$572,000 $474,455 $2,342 $1,360,560

Policy terms (CFO/COO): 100% of then-current salary; 100% of average annual cash bonus over prior 3 years; COBRA for 12 months; immediate vesting of equity that would vest within 12 months; subject to release; policy cannot be adversely amended within 12 months post-change-in-control .

Change-in-Control (Double Trigger; as of 12/27/2024)

ExecutiveSalary ($)Cash Incentive ($)Health Benefits ($)Accelerated Vesting Value ($)
Sheri L. Savage (CFO)$858,000 $711,682 $4,684 $3,473,638

Agreement terms (CFO): If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason within 12 months following a change in control, receives 150% of then-current salary and 150% of average annual cash bonus, COBRA for 24 months, and 100% acceleration of unvested equity; requires timely execution and non-revocation of release . UCT policy avoids single-trigger change-in-control benefits .

“Good reason” definition includes >10% salary reduction (except broad actions), relocation >50 miles, or material reduction in authority, duties, or responsibilities post-change-in-control; “Cause” includes conviction, fraud/dishonesty, breach, material policy violation, or failure to perform (with cure where applicable) .

Clawback and governance practices:

  • Company maintains ability to claw back incentive payments .
  • No excise tax gross-ups; no stock option repricing; no single-trigger change-in-control; no hedging/pledging .

Other Employment Details

  • CFO certification: Savage certified the FY2024 10-K under SOX 906 .
  • Compensation consultant: Semler Brossy engaged (peer analyses, program design support) .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Cash vs equity mix: FY2024 total compensation for Savage comprised salary $566,077, stock awards $1,411,474, non-equity incentive $514,066, all other $10,499; total $2,502,116, reflecting a heavy equity orientation with PSUs/RSUs .
  • Year-over-year changes: Base salary increased 4.0% to $572,000 in FY2024; target bonus % remained 85% . Stock award grant values increased from $1,227,505 (FY2023) to $1,411,474 (FY2024) .
  • Performance rigor: FY2024 PSUs are driven by relative GAAP revenue growth with EBITDA margin and TSR modifiers; prior 2022 grant paid at 0% based on program calculations, evidencing strict performance alignment .
  • No options: UCT does not currently grant options; grants are standardized monthly with controls against MNPI timing .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and rigor: Savage’s incentive pay is tied to enterprise revenue growth versus a broad semiconductor peer set, with EBITDA margin and TSR modifiers; a 0% payout for the 2022 PSU cycle underscores high bar design and reduces “pay for failure” risk .
  • Upcoming vesting/supply: Multiple vest dates in 2025–2026 (RSUs: 3/25/2025, 4/29/2025, 4/30/2025, 4/30/2026; PSUs vest at cycle end) may create periodic stock supply from net share settlements and tax-related dispositions; monitor April cadence for potential trading pressure .
  • Retention and change-in-control economics: Double-trigger change-in-control terms for the CFO (150% salary/bonus, 24 months COBRA, 100% equity acceleration) and standard severance terms reduce voluntary departure risk but represent meaningful costs in a transaction; no single-trigger mitigates governance concerns .
  • Ownership and policy safeguards: Beneficial ownership is <1% with compliance to stock ownership guidelines; strict bans on hedging/pledging and clawback capabilities support shareholder-friendly governance and reduce misalignment/leveraging risks .
  • Operating momentum: FY2024 revenue growth (+20.9% YoY), margin expansion (non-GAAP operating margin 6.9%), and higher non-GAAP EPS ($1.44) strengthen the link between incentive outcomes and operating execution under Savage’s CFO tenure; FY2025 Q1 guidance frames near-term demand normalization .