Brian Moore
About Brian Moore
Brian D. Moore, age 55, is Executive Vice President and President of Unifi Manufacturing, Inc. (UMI), the primary U.S. operating subsidiary of Unifi, Inc., a role he has held since January 2024. He previously served as SVP, Direct Sales & Operations (Mar 2023–Jan 2024) and VP, Global Brand Sales (Sep 2020–Mar 2023) after initially joining Unifi in 1993 and later leading the Company’s Asian market . Company performance in FY2025: net sales declined 1.9% to $571.3M, gross profit fell to $8.4M amid weak Americas utilization, and Adjusted EBITDA was $(11.6)M; net loss improved to $(20.3)M largely due to asset-sale gains supporting deleveraging . Strategic execution included closing and selling the Madison, NC facility for $45.0M, with expected annual cost savings of ~$20.0M, and a mid-year redesign of incentives to reward completion of this initiative .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unifi, Inc. | EVP & President, UMI | Jan 2024–present | Leads U.S. operations; execution of asset consolidation and manufacturing transitions |
| Unifi, Inc. | SVP, Direct Sales & Operations | Mar 2023–Jan 2024 | Directed commercial operations prior to promotion |
| Unifi, Inc. | VP, Global Brand Sales | Sep 2020–Mar 2023 | Advanced REPREVE® and brand programs globally |
| Unifi, Inc. | Joined Unifi; led Asian market (earlier tenure) | 1993; prior roles | Built international sales footprint |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prym Fashion | Chief Executive Officer | 2018–2020 | Led global fastening systems manufacturer |
| Scovill Fasteners Ltd. | Managing Director, Asia Pacific; VP Global Sales, Marketing, Asian Operations | 2005–2018 | Ran Asia operations and global commercial strategy |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | 375,462 | Base salary increased 7% effective Jan 26, 2025 |
| FY2024 | 344,385 | Transition into EVP/President UMI; NEO not paid annual incentive in FY2024 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan – Structure and Outcome (FY2025)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout (% of Salary) | Payout ($) | Rationale/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (Company) | 100% | $32.0M (USD) | $(11.6)M (USD) | — | — | Original plan; below threshold by April 2025 |
| One-time Objective (Sale of Madison Facility) | 100% | ≥$40M net proceeds | $45.0M proceeds; ~$20.0M expected annual savings | 75% of target → 45% of salary (for Moore) | 168,997 | Award approved June 2025; paid Aug 29, 2025 |
Notes:
- FY2025 annual incentive opportunities: Threshold 30%, Target 60%, Max 100% of base salary for Moore; metric initially 100% Adjusted EBITDA .
- The Compensation Committee made a mid-year discretionary adjustment to link payout to successful strategic execution (Madison sale), setting a one-time payout below target (75% of target) .
Long-Term Incentives – Grants (FY2025 awards on Oct 28, 2024)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Units (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) | Oct 28, 2024 | 13,260 | 92,555 | 25% 30 days after 1st anniversary; 25% at 2nd; 50% at 3rd anniversary |
| FY25 Leadership RSUs (special retention) | Oct 28, 2024 | 22,000 | 153,560 | 50% 30 days after 1st anniversary; 25% at 2nd; 25% at 3rd anniversary |
| Performance Share Units (PSUs) | Oct 28, 2024 | 13,260 (target) | 92,555 | Vest on Adjusted Free Cash Flow performance over FY2025–FY2027 (50–200% payout) |
Additional PSU context:
- FY2023 PSUs (3-year cumulative adjusted EPS) paid 0% at cycle end (threshold not met) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | Ownership % |
|---|---|---|
| Brian D. Moore | 8,882 (includes 3,960 currently exercisable options) | <1% |
Outstanding Equity Awards at FY2025 Year-End (June 29, 2025)
| Instrument | Status | Quantity | Key Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Options | Exercisable | 3,960 | $15.91 strike; exp. 10/28/2030 |
| RSUs | Unvested | 44,430 | Aggregated across 2022, 2023, 2024 grants; standard 25/25/50 schedule |
| PSUs | Unearned (Target/Threshold) | 23,308 | 10,048 (FY2024 grant, below threshold) + 13,260 (FY2025 grant at target progress) |
Ownership Guidelines and Policies
- Officers Stock Ownership Policy: Other executive officers must hold ≥2x annual base salary; compliance tested annually; all covered officers compliant in FY2025 .
- Hedging/short-selling prohibited; pledging/margin purchases prohibited without Audit Committee approval .
- RSU cash settlements apply only to certain Asia-based executives; Moore’s awards settle in stock .
Upcoming Vesting Milestones (Indicative)
- Nov 27, 2025: RSU tranches vesting 30 days post-1st anniversary for FY2025 grants (25% of 13,260; 50% of 22,000) .
- Oct 28, 2026 and Oct 28, 2027: Remaining scheduled tranches per 25/50 patterns .
Deferred Compensation
| Item | FY2025 Amount ($) | Aggregate Balance at FY2025 ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Company Contribution to DCP | 31,058 | 100,357 |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Provides base salary, eligibility for bonuses/equity, reimbursed business expenses, standard benefits |
| Severance (No Cause / Good Reason) | 12 months base salary paid monthly + up to 12 months COBRA reimbursement; subject to release and restrictive covenants |
| Non-Compete / Non-Solicit | 12 months post-termination non-compete/non-solicit covenants |
| Change-of-Control | Single-trigger acceleration of all unvested RSUs and target PSUs; options become fully vested |
| Death/Disability | Full vesting of RSUs; pro rata target PSUs vest based on service during performance period |
| Age 65 Termination (Company without Cause) | Full RSU vesting; pro rata PSUs vest based on actual performance |
| Clawback Policy | Mandatory recovery of incentive compensation for material financial restatements; misconduct recovery up to 3 years |
| Tax Gross-ups | Company does not pay golden parachute excise tax gross-ups |
Hypothetical FY2025 scenario values (illustrative per Proxy, using closing price 6/27/2025):
| Scenario | Severance + Benefits ($) | Accelerated Equity ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Change of Control | — | 354,947 | 354,947 |
| Termination Without Cause / Good Reason | 415,205 | — | 415,205 |
| Termination Due to Death/Disability | — | 291,075 | 291,075 |
| Termination Without Cause After Age 65 | — | 255,974 | 255,974 |
Compensation Structure Signals
- Mix: Annual incentive (at-risk) + RSUs (retention) + PSUs (performance). In FY2025, committee shifted payout criteria mid-year to strategic execution; PSUs now tied to Adjusted Free Cash Flow (50–200% linear) .
- Equity risk profile: Increased use of RSUs vs options, reflecting retention focus; options outstanding for Moore are modest (3,960) with a 2030 expiry .
- Discretion: FY2025 annual incentive adjusted despite EBITDA shortfall; payout below target (75%) to recognize Madison transaction completion and retention needs .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2025 Annual Meeting advisory vote on NEO compensation: For 8,660,846; Against 2,446,592; Abstain 45,223; broker non-votes 3,378,846 .
- 2024 say-on-pay support was ~92% of votes cast (context for philosophy continuity) .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Discretionary mid-year incentive change tied to asset sale (one-time, stated not to be precedent), introduces pay plan discretion risk .
- Low personal share ownership (<1%) reduces direct equity-alignment “skin in the game”, partially offset by stock ownership policy compliance .
- No hedging/pledging permitted; strong clawback; no excise tax gross-ups (mitigates governance risk) .
- Related-party financing support (director pledged assets for revolving facility), though not compensation-related, is a governance consideration for investors .
Investment Implications
- Execution and retention emphasis: FY2025 incentive redesign rewarded strategic asset sale and cost reduction, signaling management focus on balance sheet and cash generation versus near-term EBITDA targets. For Moore, this aligns with operational execution in U.S. manufacturing consolidation .
- Near-term stock supply: Significant RSU tranches vesting around late Nov 2025 may lead to net share settlements; monitor Form 4s for any open-market sales and tax withholding activity .
- Alignment: While personal share ownership is small, ownership policy compliance and performance-tilted PSUs (Adjusted FCF) support alignment; absence of hedging/pledging and robust clawbacks strengthen governance .
- Contract economics: Severance limited to 1x base salary and COBRA support; single-trigger equity acceleration at change-of-control; clawbacks present—balanced risk sharing for investors .