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Kecia Steelman

Kecia Steelman

President and Chief Executive Officer at Ulta BeautyUlta Beauty
CEO
Executive
Board

About Kecia Steelman

Kecia L. Steelman is President & Chief Executive Officer of Ulta Beauty and a director since January 6, 2025; age 54, with 30+ years in retail operations and strategy and a B.S. in Business Management (Kennedy Western University) . Under Ulta’s current framework, fiscal 2024 saw net sales of $11.3B (+0.8% YoY), operating margin of 13.9%, five-year TSR of 54%, and one-year TSR of (18%), with Incentive EBT below target (annual bonus paid at 60.86% of target) . She previously led store operations (opened 700+ stores), Ulta Beauty @ Target, and international store expansion, and has overseen Strategy since June 2021—experience directly tied to revenue/EBT growth metrics in the incentive plans .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Ulta BeautyPresident & CEO2025–PresentLeads strategy, operations, technology; CEO transition continuity
Ulta BeautyPresident & COO2023–2025Oversaw Operations, Supply Chain, IT, strategy/transformation
Ulta BeautyChief Operating Officer2021–2023Scaled operations; led strategy team since 2021
Ulta BeautyChief Store Operations Officer; SVP Store Operations2014–2021Opened 700+ stores; launched Ulta Beauty @ Target; initiated international expansion
Family DollarGroup VP; VP Project Implementation2009–2014Multi-unit retail leadership and execution
Home DepotVP/GM Expo Design Center; Dir. New Store Innovations2005–2009New format innovation; general management
TargetVarious store/merch roles up to Lead Store Merchant1993–2005Field and merchandising foundation; operational expertise

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYears
World Business ChicagoDirector2025–Present
The Bay ClubDirector2019–Present
Adler PlanetariumDirector2016–Present

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2024Notes
Base Salary ($)1,136,115 5% merit to $1,118,291 in Mar-2024; increased to $1,350,000 on CEO promotion (Jan 6, 2025)
Target Annual Incentive (% of base)180% (prorated for promotion) Increased from 115% with CEO promotion; FY24 payout 60.86% overall based on Incentive EBT
LTIP Target (% of base)380% Increased to 710% with CEO promotion (effective 1/6/25)

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive (Cash)

MetricWeightFY 2024 Target/RangeFY 2024 Actual
Incentive EBT100% Threshold 87%→40% payout; Target 100%→100%; Max 110%→200% Paid at 60.86% of target; her non-equity incentive paid $836,236

Long-Term Incentive (Equity Mix and Performance Conditions)

  • Mix for NEOs (including Steelman): 50% PBS (performance-based RSUs), 30% stock options, 20% RSUs; PBS earned on two-year Revenue (50%) and EBT (50%) growth; 3-year TSR modifier; PBS require third-year time vesting .
  • FY 2024 LTIP target: 380% of base for Steelman; no add’l promotion equity in FY24; options vest over 4 years; RSUs 3-year cliff .
  • 2023 PBS (2-year fiscal 2023–2024): Company achieved 84% of target on Revenue and 84% on EBT; vests March 2026; TSR ≥10% could lift payout to 100% of target .
  • 2022 PBS (2 one-year periods, subj. 3-year TSR modifier): Vested at 200% of target for revenue and EBT on Mar 15, 2025 (3-year TSR positive) .
LTIP ComponentWeightKey TermsFY 2023/2024 Outcomes
PBS50% 2-yr Rev & EBT goals; 3rd-year vest; TSR modifier 2023 grant tracking to 84%/84% (vest Mar-2026)
Stock Options30% FMV strike; 10-yr term; 25%/yr vest Ongoing vest; see option table below
RSUs20% 3-year cliff vest Ongoing vest; see ownership table

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Ownership guidelines: CEO 6x base salary; executives must retain 50% of net after-tax shares until met; all executives ≥5 years in role are in compliance .
  • Hedging/pledging prohibited; no margin accounts .
  • Clawback: SEC-compliant mandatory restatement recovery; plus misconduct and restrictive covenant breaches (incl. non-compete) .
  • Related party transactions: none in FY 2024 .

Beneficial Ownership and Vesting Status (as of Apr 14, 2025 / Feb 1, 2025)

ItemAmount
Beneficial Ownership (shares)22,144 (<1% of SO)
Unvested time-based RSUs (#; value $)16,131; $6,648,392
PBS target unearned (#; value $)7,480; $3,082,882
Options exercised in FY 2024 (shares; value realized $)13,587; $3,348,200
RSUs vested in FY 2024 (shares; value realized $)8,224; $4,407,900

Outstanding Stock Options (as of Feb 1, 2025)

Grant (expiration)Exercise Price ($)Exercisable (#)Unexercisable (#)
3/25/2031306.591,577
3/24/2032395.843,522
3/31/2033545.671,3934,180
3/29/2034522.888,087
  • Steelman’s vesting schedule includes annual option tranches through 3/15/2028; RSUs cliff in 2027; PBS certify/vest 2026/2027 per grants .

Deferred Compensation and Perquisites (FY 2024)

ItemAmount ($)
Deferred comp contributions (exec)34,520
Deferred comp match (company)33,180
Long-term disability premiums33,081
Other perqs (e.g., health screening, life insurance)600
Aggregate deferred balance at FY-end1,297,244

Employment Terms

  • No individual employment agreements; compensation governed by plans/policies .
  • Executive Change in Control and Severance Plan (double-trigger): CEO 3.0x (salary+bonus); other NEOs 2.0x; pro rata bonus; 18 months COBRA; accelerate time-vested equity; performance equity vests at ≥ target or actual-to-date at CoC (subject to TSR modifier); “best net” cutback—no excise gross-ups .
  • Retirement treatment (continued vesting for awards granted 2022+ upon “qualified retirement”); restrictive covenants apply .

Estimated Potential Payments (as of Feb 1, 2025)

ScenarioAmount ($)
Change in Control (equity component at target/actual-to-date)3,082,882
Involuntary Termination in Connection with CoC (cash + benefits + equity)11,682,060
Total – CoC plus Qualifying Termination14,764,942
Death/Disability (equity vesting)8,228,690
Qualified RetirementN/A for Steelman

Board Governance

  • Board service: Director since 2025; no committee assignments .
  • Independence: CEO is not independent; Board separates CEO and Chair; independent, non-executive Chair leads Board and executive sessions .
  • Committees comprised of independent directors; Board/committees met regularly; no director <75% attendance in FY 2024 .
  • Non-employee director pay (not applicable to Steelman): $125k cash retainer post-6/11/24 and $175k in RSUs; additional chair retainers .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix skews to at-risk pay: annual bonus (EBT-only) and multi-year equity (PBS/options/RSUs) .
  • FY 2024 bonus plan paid 60.86% of target on lower-than-expected EBT—demonstrates downside sensitivity; no downward discretion applied .
  • Long-term: performance PBS payout calibration (2023 grants tracking at 84% per metric) with TSR modifier; 2022 PBS vested at 200% on strong results (TSR positive), signaling realized upside on multi-year performance .
  • Governance protections: double-trigger CIC, robust clawback, no option repricing, no tax gross-ups; anti-hedging/pledging .
  • Peer benchmarking and say-on-pay: uses a retail peer set; 89% approval in 2024 .

Performance & Track Record

  • Company outcomes during Steelman’s senior leadership: FY 2024 net sales $11.3B (+0.8% YoY); operating income $1.6B (13.9% margin); loyalty members +3% to 44.6M; 60 net new stores and 100 new Ulta Beauty at Target locations .
  • Five-year TSR 54%; one-year TSR (18%) amid slower growth in beauty category .
  • Strategic initiatives executed: ERP and data platform transitions; distribution network retrofits; digital store architecture rebuild .
  • Execution background: opened 700+ stores; launched Ulta Beauty @ Target; initiated international store expansion .

Compensation Peer Group (for benchmarking)

AutoZone, Bath & Body Works, Burlington Stores, Dick’s Sporting Goods, Foot Locker, Lululemon, O’Reilly Auto Parts, PVH, Ross Stores, Tractor Supply, Under Armour, VF, Williams-Sonoma; periodic refresh to maintain size/industry relevance .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

Say-on-pay approval ~89% at 2024 annual meeting; Committee cites alignment and ongoing investor engagement on comp, governance, and ESG .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Hedging/pledging prohibited; robust clawback including misconduct and covenant breaches .
  • No related party transactions in FY 2024 .
  • Executive equity grant timing policy avoids grants near material disclosures .
  • CEO pay ratio for FY 2024: ~1,130:1 (context provided in proxy) .

Board Service Dual-Role Implications

Steelman serves as CEO and director; however, Ulta separates Chair and CEO with an independent Chair, enhancing oversight and mitigating concentration of power; committees remain fully independent .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Large unvested equity (RSUs, PBS, options) and CEO ownership guideline (6x salary) tightly couple outcomes to multi-year performance; anti-hedging/pledging and clawback strengthen alignment .
  • Near-term selling pressure: 2024 saw significant option exercises and RSU vesting; FY 2026–2027 cliff/PBS vests (and ongoing annual option vests) could create periodic liquidity events, though retention features and guidelines promote holding .
  • Retention/CIC risk: Double-trigger CIC with 3x cash multiple for CEO plus accelerated equity is market-consistent but sizable; stability risk appears mitigated by multi-year vesting and lack of employment contract guarantees .
  • Execution: Steelman’s operations track record (store growth, Ulta @ Target, supply chain/IT modernization) aligns with comp metrics (Revenue/EBT, TSR modifier), suggesting incentives support continued profitable growth focus .