Anthony Blasquez
About Anthony Blasquez
Anthony Blasquez is Executive Vice President — Rent‑A‑Center at Upbound Group and has been with the company for 25 years, serving in every field operations role before becoming Divisional VP of Operations (2015–2020) and EVP effective June 1, 2020; age 49 . In 2024, Upbound delivered 8.2% YoY consolidated revenue growth to $4.3B, Adjusted EBITDA of $473.2M (+3.8% YoY) and GAAP diluted EPS of $2.21, while Rent‑A‑Center achieved 1.5% same‑store sales growth, 26% e‑commerce revenue mix, and optimized its store footprint to 1,728 locations (-6% YoY) . Long-term incentives are tied to relative TSR versus the S&P 1500 Specialty Retail Index; the 2022 PSU grant vested at 75% based on a 45th percentile TSR rank (29/52) for 2022–2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Upbound Group (Rent‑A‑Center) | Executive Vice President — Rent‑A‑Center | 2020–present | Leads omni‑channel performance across e‑commerce and store network |
| Upbound Group (Rent‑A‑Center) | Divisional Vice President of Operations | 2015–2020 | Oversaw field operations; prepared transition to EVP role |
| Upbound Group | Various field operations positions | Prior to 2015 | Ground‑level execution across store operations |
External Roles
No external directorships or outside roles disclosed for Blasquez in the proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (actual paid) | $422,931 | $444,554 | $469,231 |
| Base Salary Rate (approved) | — | — | $475,000 (5.6% raise vs 2023) |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 60% (program design; unchanged through 2024) | 60% | 60% |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid (Non‑Equity Incentive) | — | $388,800 | $285,000 |
| All Other Compensation | $27,295 | $33,236 | $32,778 |
Breakdown of 2024 “All Other Compensation”:
- Company 401(k) match: $3,623
- Insurance premiums: $22,077
- Executive physical exam and other: $7,078
Performance Compensation
Long-Term Incentives (2024 grants and design)
- Mix: 75% PSUs (relative TSR over 3 years); 25% RSUs (time-based, vest one‑third per year over 3 years) .
- 2024 RSU grant: 5,973 units (grant date: 02/26/2024) .
- 2024 PSU grant: Target 17,918 units; Max 35,836 units (grant date: 02/26/2024) .
- PSU payout curve (relative TSR vs S&P 1500 Specialty Retail Index): 0% below 25th percentile; 100% at 50th; up to 200% at 90th percentile .
- 2022 PSU outcome: 75% vested based on 45th percentile TSR rank (29/52), measurement period ended 12/31/2024 .
| Metric (Annual Incentive) | Weight | Target | Actual 2024 | Payout vs Target | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA | 50% | $500M (threshold < $425M; max ≥ $575M) | $489M | 97.7% | Cash, paid per plan |
| Rent‑A‑Center Segment Revenue | 25% | $1,897M (thr < $1,821M; max ≥ $1,973M) | $1,863M | 98.2% | Cash, paid per plan |
| Acima Segment Revenue | 25% | $2,165M (thr < $2,035M; max ≥ $2,295M) | $2,261M | 104.5% | Cash, paid per plan |
Notes:
- Committee adjusted Adjusted EBITDA to exclude the annual cash incentive expense, consistent with past practice .
- 2024 bonus plan paid at 100% of target for all named executives .
2024 Equity Grant Values (as % of base salary)
| Executive | PSU+RSU Target Equity (% of base) |
|---|---|
| Anthony Blasquez | 170% |
Option Exercises and Stock Vested (2024)
| Category | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Options Exercised | 12,485 | $91,066 |
| Stock Awards Vested | 7,655 | $261,342 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 22,983 shares (less than 1%) |
| Shares Outstanding (record date) | 57,825,534 |
| Ownership % (calc.) | ~0.04% (22,983 / 57,825,534) |
| Vested vs Unvested | RSUs and PSUs vest on schedules; none vestable within 60 days as of 4/8/2025 |
| Pledging/Hedging | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited unless securities treated as non‑marginable by broker |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Executives (including EVPs) are subject to equity ownership guidelines; specific EVP multiples not disclosed |
Employment Terms
Executive Transition Agreements (General terms for named executives other than CEO)
- Without cause: unpaid but earned base; Pro Rata Bonus (if termination after April 1); 1.5x salary (and for Blasquez, 1.5x average annual bonus for prior two years); up to 18 months medical benefits; subject to release; non‑compete and non‑solicit for 1.5–2 years post‑employment .
- Change in Control (double trigger): unpaid but earned base; Pro Rata Bonus; 2.0x salary (and for Blasquez, average bonus), payable lump sum; up to 24 months medical benefits; double‑trigger vesting of awards per 2021 Plan .
Potential Payments and Benefits — Anthony Blasquez
| Scenario | Cash Severance | Medical Benefits Continuation | Acceleration of Outstanding Awards | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause / for good reason (no CIC) | $1,416,347 | $38,225 | $0 | $1,454,572 |
| Termination without cause / for good reason (with CIC) | $1,793,462 | $50,967 | $2,136,455 | $3,980,884 |
| Death/Disability (no CIC) | $285,000 | $25,483 | $1,254,855 | $1,565,338 |
Other terms:
- 2021 Plan provides double‑trigger vesting upon qualifying termination within two years after a change in control; PSUs deemed earned at greater of target or actual performance through CIC date, continue subject to time‑based vesting unless terminated .
- Clawback: Mandatory recovery of incentive compensation awarded based on financial reporting measures upon a material restatement (effective Dec 1, 2023) .
- No tax gross‑ups (except certain relocation) .
Performance & Track Record
| Segment/Enterprise | 2024 Metric | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Rent‑A‑Center segment | Same‑store sales growth | +1.5% YoY |
| Rent‑A‑Center segment | E‑commerce revenue mix | 26% |
| Rent‑A‑Center segment | Company‑owned store count | 1,728 (−6% YoY footprint optimization) |
| Acima segment | GMV and revenue growth | +17.1% YoY |
| Enterprise | Consolidated revenue | $4.3B (+8.2% YoY) |
| Enterprise | Adjusted EBITDA | $473.2M (+3.8% YoY) |
| Enterprise | Net income | $123.5M (+$128.7M YoY) |
| Enterprise | GAAP diluted EPS | $2.21 (+$2.30 YoY) |
| Enterprise | Non‑GAAP diluted EPS | $3.83 (+7.9% YoY) |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: 2024 total pay of $1.68M comprised salary $469k, bonus $285k, stock awards $891k, other $33k — equity remains a substantial portion via PSU/RSU program .
- Shift to PSUs: PSU weighting increased to 75% in 2024 (from 70% in 2023), stressing relative TSR performance over three years .
- Target rigor: Annual bonus metrics use consolidated Adjusted EBITDA and segment revenues with established threshold/target/max levels; 2024 outcomes paid ~100% .
- Clawback and risk controls: No hedging/pledging, clawback for restatements; no option repricing; limited perquisites; no tax gross‑ups (except relocation) .
Equity Ownership & Insider Selling Pressure
- Beneficial ownership is modest at 22,983 shares (~0.04% of shares outstanding), limiting direct alignment from personally held stock .
- 2024 liquidity events: 12,485 options exercised ($91,066 realized) and 7,655 shares vested ($261,342), suggesting regular programmatic monetization but no Form 4 pledging indicated in proxy .
Governance, Peer Benchmarking, and Shareholder Feedback
- Compensation peer group used for benchmarking includes consumer finance and retail names (e.g., Bread Financial, OneMain, PROG Holdings) .
- Say‑on‑Pay approval ~98% (June 2024), indicating broad investor support for program design .
- No related‑party transactions reported since Jan 1, 2024 .
- No delinquent Section 16 reports for 2024 .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Blasquez’s 60% target bonus tied to Adjusted EBITDA and segment revenues, and PSU weighting at 75% with relative TSR focus, anchor incentives to value creation and segment execution .
- Vesting and supply overhang: Annual RSU tranches and PSU cliff in 2026 could add periodic share sales; 2024 option exercises/vestings demonstrate ongoing liquidity events that may create modest selling pressure around vest dates .
- Retention economics: Executive transition agreement provides 1.5x salary plus 1.5x average bonus (no CIC) and 2.0x (with CIC) with double‑trigger vesting — strong protections reduce near‑term departure risk but raise CIC severance leverage .
- Alignment and risk controls: Hedging/pledging restrictions and clawback policy mitigate misalignment risk; however, low personal ownership (~0.04%) limits “skin‑in‑the‑game” optics versus higher‑ownership peers .
- Segment execution: Rent‑A‑Center’s 2024 SSS growth and e‑commerce mix expansion suggest operational progress under Blasquez’s remit; continued footprint optimization may support margin resilience into 2025 .