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Anton Dibowitz

Anton Dibowitz

President and Chief Executive Officer at Valaris
CEO
Executive
Board

About Anton Dibowitz

Anton Dibowitz, 53, is President & CEO of Valaris (appointed CEO Dec 2021 after serving as interim CEO since Sept 2021; joined the Board July 2021). He is a CPA with BBA, MPA and MBA from the University of Texas at Austin, and has 20+ years of offshore drilling experience including CEO of Seadrill (which filed for bankruptcy in Sept 2017). Valaris’ recent performance context: 2024 net income $369.8M; cumulative TSR since May 3, 2021 translates a $100 investment to $186.70 as of year-end 2024; stock closed 2024 at $44.24. “Compensation actually paid” to the CEO was negative in 2024 due to equity value declines, indicating sensitivity of pay to stock performance .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Valaris LimitedPresident & CEO; Director; Strategy Committee ChairCEO since Dec 2021; Director since 2021Leadership through upcycle positioning; board-level strategy oversight .
Seadrill Ltd.AdvisorNov 2020 – Mar 2021Advisory role post-CEO tenure .
Seadrill Ltd.Chief Executive OfficerJul 2017 – Oct 2020Led company during restructuring; Seadrill filed for bankruptcy in Sep 2017 .
Seadrill ManagementExecutive Vice PresidentJun 2016 – Jul 2017Senior operating leadership .
Seadrill Ltd.Chief Commercial OfficerJan 2013 – Jun 2016Commercial strategy and contracting .
Transocean Ltd.; Ernst & Young LLPVarious roles (tax, process, marketing)Not specifiedEarly career across finance/operations disciplines .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
No other current public company directorships disclosed in Valaris’ 2025 proxy biography .

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Notes
2024950,000 As of Dec 31, 2024.
2023950,000
2022950,000

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Incentive (VCIP) – 2024

ExecutiveTarget Bonus (% of Salary)Target ($)Company Weighted Payout (%)Actual Bonus ($)
Anton Dibowitz115% 1,092,500 107% 1,168,975

2024 VCIP performance framework and results:

Performance MeasureThresholdTargetMaximum2024 ActualResulting % of TargetWeightingWeighted %
Personal Safety (TRIR)1.50 1.40 0.90 1.03 174.0% 12.5% 22.0%
Process Safety0.15 0.10 0.05 0.09 120.0% 12.5% 15.0%
Spill Prevention0.60 0.40 0.20 0.41 98.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Adjusted EBITDA ($M)413.0 548.0 654.0 520.2 90.0% 20.0% 18.0%
Operating Free Cash Flow ($M)154.9 313.5 446.4 261.2 84.0% 20.0% 17.0%
Downtime (Jackup)2.20% 1.77% 1.30% 2.24% 0.0% 5.0% 0.0%
Downtime (Floater)5.00% 4.75% 3.00% 2.55% 200.0% 5.0% 10.0%
Strategic Team Goals50% 100% 200% 99% 99.0% 20.0% 20.0%
Total107.0%

Notes: 2024 metrics include safety and sustainability, Adjusted EBITDA (with specified adjustments), Operating FCF, downtime, and strategic goals. The overall payout was certified at 107% of target .

Long-Term Equity Incentives

2024 annual equity awards (granted March 5, 2024):

Award TypeGrant DateTarget/Granted (#)Maximum (#)Grant Date Fair Value ($)Vesting / Performance
TSR PSUs3/05/2024 71,090 142,180 4,456,632 3-year performance period (1/1/2024–12/31/2026); payout 0–200% based on absolute and relative TSR matrix vs 21-company peer group .
RSUs3/05/2024 17,775 1,160,174 Time-based; vest in three equal annual installments on 3/5/2025, 3/5/2026, 3/5/2027 .

Key design: 80% PSUs (TSR-based) and 20% RSUs for NEOs; no stock options outstanding; PSUs valued via Monte Carlo (expected vol 49%, risk-free 4.31%, fair value $62.69 per PSU) .

Emergence PSUs (granted 2021/2022) – final outcomes:

ComponentPayout
Share Price PSUs (hurdles at $45, $55, $75)100% for $45 and $55 achieved; $75 not achieved .
Relative ROCE PSUs (3-yr)100% (ranked 5/9) .
Strategic PSUs (Year 3)81% .
Total Emergence PSUs earned (Anton)484,519 shares (aggregate of components) .

Realized vesting and value (2024):

NameShares Acquired on Vesting (#)Value Realized ($)Shares Withheld for Taxes (#)
Anton Dibowitz526,746 30,488,114 207,277

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership (as of Apr 15, 2025)203,310 shares; less than 1% of 71,041,023 shares outstanding .
Outstanding unvested awards at 12/31/20243/10/2023 RSUs: 6,964 ($308,087 MV); 3/10/2023 PSUs (target): 41,779 ($1,848,303 MV); 3/05/2024 RSUs: 17,775 ($786,366 MV); 3/05/2024 PSUs (target): 71,090 ($3,145,022 MV); valued at $44.24/sh .
Ownership/holding policyCEO must hold 6x base salary; minimum holding until in compliance; all NEOs currently within initial 5-year accumulation period .
Hedging/pledgingHedging and pledging prohibited; annual affirmations required; none of officers/directors have pledged shares .

Vesting schedule visibility (supply/pressure signals):

  • RSUs: 5,925 shares scheduled to vest annually in 2025, 2026, 2027 from the 2024 grant (subject to continued service) .
  • PSUs: 2023 TSR PSUs performance period ends 12/31/2025; 2024 TSR PSUs end 12/31/2026 (0–200% payout) .

Employment Terms

Core CEO agreement economics:

  • Severance (without Cause / for Good Reason): 2x base salary + target annual bonus; pro‑rated target bonus for year of termination; 18 months subsidized health coverage; up to 12 months outplacement; reimbursement of certain legal fees; customary confidentiality, non‑compete, non‑solicit, non‑disparagement; death/disability = pro‑rated target bonus .
  • Change‑in‑Control (CIC) equity treatment: RSUs fully accelerate upon CIC; PSUs vest to extent earned based on performance through CIC; pro‑rata eligibility upon certain qualifying terminations (no single‑trigger cash severance) .

Potential payments (assumes event on 12/31/2024; $44.24/share):

ScenarioSalary+Bonus Severance ($)Benefits/Other ($)Accelerated Equity ($)Total ($)
Death/Disability1,092,500 2,349,940 3,442,440
Termination w/o Cause or Good Reason (No CIC)5,177,500 60,824 2,349,940 7,588,264
Termination w/o Cause or Good Reason (In connection with CIC)5,177,500 60,824 6,087,778 11,326,102
CIC (no termination)N/AN/A6,087,778 6,087,778

Clawback and other protections:

  • NYSE 303A.14/Rule 10D‑1 compliant clawback for restatements; VCIP disqualification for misconduct; strict insider trading policy; no hedging, no pledging; no excise tax gross‑ups; no single‑trigger cash severance on CIC .

Board Governance and Director Service

  • Director since 2021; not independent; currently serves on the Board and chairs the Strategy Committee (other standing committees—Audit, Compensation, N&G, Safety & Sustainability—are fully independent and chaired by non‑executive directors). Board leadership is separated with an independent Chair (Elizabeth D. Leykum) .
  • Director compensation: Executive director (CEO) receives no additional board compensation .
  • Governance highlights: majority vote standard; regular executive sessions; robust ownership guidelines for executives/directors; prohibition on hedging/pledging; average independent director tenure <4 years .

Performance & Track Record

Measure2024 Outcome
Net income$369.8M .
Adjusted EBITDA$485.4M (non‑GAAP; reconciliation provided) .
Year‑end stock price$44.24 .
Cumulative TSR since 5/3/2021 (company-selected period)$100 → $186.70; peer group $155.10 (Dow Jones U.S. Select Oil Equipment & Services Index) .
2024 operationsRevenue efficiency 97%; TRIR -20%, LTIR -55% YoY; reactivated DS‑7; ~$1.6B of new awards/extensions; $125M buybacks (2.2M shares, ~3% of shares) .

Director Compensation (context for dual-role)

Item2024
Executive director feesNone paid to Mr. Dibowitz for director service .
Say‑on‑Pay outcome97% FOR at 2024 AGM .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment with rigorous mix (80% PSUs/20% RSUs; annual VCIP at 107% driven by safety outperformance and mixed financials) suggests strong linkage to operational and TSR outcomes; “compensation actually paid” turning negative in 2024 underscores sensitivity to share price movements .
  • Retention and supply overhang: Significant remaining unvested PSUs (201/2024 cycles) and RSUs with scheduled vests in 2025–2027, plus potential PSU cliffs in 2025 and 2026, create identifiable liquidity windows (noting 2024 vesting realized $30.5M; tax withholding absorbed 207,277 shares) .
  • Alignment and risk controls: 6x salary ownership guideline for CEO, mandatory holding until compliant, and prohibition on hedging/pledging (with annual certifications) mitigate misalignment and downside moral hazard .
  • Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger cash severance (2x salary+target bonus) is within market norms; however, single-trigger full acceleration for RSUs and performance-to-date vesting for PSUs at CIC can be shareholder-unfriendly and could influence strategic optionality in a consolidation upcycle .
  • Governance/dual-role: Independent Chair structure mitigates CEO/Chair concentration, but CEO chairing the Strategy Committee centralizes strategic agenda-setting; nonetheless, key oversight committees remain fully independent .
  • Execution track record: 2024 achievements (net income, EBITDA, safety, reactivation, backlog build, buybacks) bolster credibility; prior experience includes leading Seadrill during a bankruptcy period—relevant to capital-cycle navigation but a potential perception risk .

Data Appendix

  • Summary Compensation Table (CEO): | Year | Salary ($) | Share Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:| | 2024 | 950,000 | 5,616,806 | 1,168,975 | 19,140 | 7,754,921 | | 2023 | 950,000 | 4,314,482 | 1,005,100 | 18,390 | 6,287,972 | | 2022 | 950,000 | 692,457 | 655,500 | 14,090 | 2,312,047 |

  • Ownership snapshot: | Holder | Shares | % | |---|---:|---:| | Anton Dibowitz | 203,310 | —% (<1%) | | Shares outstanding (4/15/2025) | 71,041,023 | — |

  • Related‑party transactions: None requiring disclosure since the beginning of 2024; policy requires Audit Committee approval for related‑person transactions .