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Mark D. Morelli

Mark D. Morelli

President and Chief Executive Officer at VontierVontier
CEO
Executive
Board

About Mark D. Morelli

Mark D. Morelli is President & Chief Executive Officer of Vontier, serving since January 2020 and a director since October 2020 . He is 61 years old . External board role: director at Xylem Inc. since February 2022; he chairs Xylem’s Leadership Development & Compensation Committee and sits on its Audit Committee . Pay-versus-performance disclosures show Vontier’s TSR value rising from $99.70 in 2020 to $110.24 in 2024 alongside Net Income of $342.0MM in 2020 to $422.2MM in 2024 and Adjusted Operating Profit of $579.0MM in 2020 to $638.7MM in 2024 . 2024 CEO pay ratio: 233:1 ($9,943,569 vs. $42,731) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Columbus McKinnon CorporationPresident & CEOFeb 2017 – Jan 2020Led operational transformation and growth initiatives
Brooks Automation, Inc.President & COOJan 2012 – Mar 2016Drove operations and portfolio execution
Energy Conversion DevicesCEOPrior to Brooks; ceased serving >1 year before ECD’s voluntary Chapter 11 filingAlternative energy leadership; company filed Chapter 11 within one year after his tenure ended
United Technologies CorporationVarious roles (product management, marketing, strategy, general management)Jun 1993 – Sep 2007Progressive general management across global industrial businesses
U.S. ArmyOfficer & helicopter pilotEarly careerLeadership foundation

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsCommittees / Notes
Xylem Inc. (NYSE: XYL)DirectorSince Feb 2022Chair, Leadership Development & Compensation; Member, Audit

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Target Annual Incentive (% of Base)Target Annual Incentive ($)Corporate Financial Factor (CFF)Personal Performance Factor (PPF)Actual ICP Payout ($)
20241,112,400 150% 1,668,600 74% 1.0 1,234,764

Summary Compensation (multi-year):

Metric202220232024
Salary ($)1,037,500 1,072,500 1,112,857
Stock Awards ($)4,197,627 5,953,567 6,923,752
Option Awards ($)476,100
Non-Equity Incentive ($)945,000 2,106,000 1,234,764
All Other Compensation ($)178,300 192,856 196,096
Total ($)6,358,427 9,324,923 9,943,569

Perquisites (2024):

ItemAmount ($)
Company 401(k) Contributions24,096
EDIP Contributions162,000
Tax/Financial Planning & Executive Physical10,000

Performance Compensation

Annual ICP design and outcome:

ComponentMetric/DesignTargetActualPayoutVesting
ICP (cash)Corporate Financial Factor74% factor Applied to target1,234,764 Cash (annual)
ICP (modifier)Personal Performance Factor0–150% scale 1.0No adjustment N/A

Long-term equity mix and metrics:

Award TypeMix/ValueMetricsModifierVesting
PSUs (2024 grant)$3,175,000 target (54% of LTIP) 50% Total Adjusted Operating Profit Margin Expansion; 50% 3-Year Core Revenue Growth rTSR vs S&P 500 ±15% Earned over 3 years
RSUs (2024 grant)$2,675,000 (46% of LTIP) Time-basedN/AMulti-year vesting
Stock Options (initial 2024 grant)30,000 options; $476,100 grant-date fair value; Black-Scholes $15.87 Value realized only via stock price appreciationN/A50% vest at 1st anniversary; 25% at 2nd/3rd anniversaries

Option eligibility program (2025 contingent grant):

EPS Threshold (2024 performance)Eligible Options
< $3.000% of target
$3.00 ≤ $3.1075% of target
> $3.10100% of target
OutcomeEPS below threshold; no 1Q25 grant

Historic PSU outcome:

PSU CohortMetricrTSREarned
2022 PSU awards3-year EPS (2022–2024)61st percentile 0% (EPS below threshold)

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership and outstanding awards:

ItemDetail
Beneficially owned common shares848,739
Options (exercisable)422,673 at $31.46; exp. 2/20/2030
Options (unexercisable)57,641 (2020 grant) at $31.46 exp. 2/20/2030; 30,000 (2024 grant) at $41.10 exp. 2/19/2034
Unvested RSUs195,614; market value $7,134,043 at $36.47
Unearned PSUs (target)197,320; market/payout value $7,196,260 at $36.47

Policies and guidelines:

  • Pledging prohibited for executives and directors .
  • Hedging prohibited (short sales, derivative transactions) except awards under the stock plan .
  • Clawback/recoupment policy compliant with NYSE/SEC; mandatory recoupment for restatements and discretionary in certain scenarios .
  • Ownership guidelines: CEO must hold 5x base salary; all NEOs compliant as of 12/31/2024 or within allowed time .

Vesting and potential selling pressure:

  • 2024 options vest schedule: 50% on 2/19/2025, 25% on 2/19/2026, 25% on 2/19/2027, creating periodic liquidity events .
  • 2020 options include tranches vesting 20% annually over five years and a separate 33.3% over three years structure .

Employment Terms

Executive Letter Agreement:

  • Agreement entered Dec 6, 2019; effective Jan 13, 2020 .
  • Eligible for EDIP participation and standard employee benefits; $10,000 annual cash stipend for financial services/counseling; Executive Physical program participation .

Severance and Change-in-Control (CIC) Plan (amended Aug 21, 2024):

  • Without CIC (termination without cause): CEO receives 2x base salary; pro-rata annual cash bonus based on actual performance; pro-rata vesting of equity granted ≥6 months before termination (performance awards based on actual performance); 24 months health benefits .
  • With CIC (within 24 months; termination without cause or good reason): CEO receives 2.5x (base salary + target bonus); pro-rata annual bonus at target; full vesting of all unvested equity awards at target; 30 months health benefits .

Estimated values (as of 12/31/2024):

ScenarioSeverance PaymentAnnual IncentiveBenefits ContinuationAccelerated Options ValueAccelerated PSUs ValueAccelerated RSUs ValueOutplacementForfeitureAccelerated EDIPTotal
Termination without cause2,224,800 1,234,764 45,254 279,162 7,224,191 7,122,518 10,500 18,141,189
Retirement1,234,764 283,972 3,542,728 5,367,983 10,429,447
Death1,668,600 288,771 3,743,408 5,639,538 178,708 11,519,025
CIC termination6,952,500 1,668,600 56,567 288,781 7,224,191 7,134,043 10,500 (883,097) 178,708 22,630,793

Clawback/recoupment: mandatory for restatements; board may require reimbursement for misconduct causing restatement; recoups gains from equity awards within 12 months post original filing .

Board Governance

  • Director since October 2020; committee memberships: none .
  • Morelli is a member of the Board but receives no additional director compensation .
  • Committee composition features independent directors; Compensation and Management Development Committee chaired by Christopher J. Klein; Audit Committee chaired by Andrew D. Miller; Nominating & Governance chaired by Gloria R. Boyland .
  • Director compensation program uses annual retainers and equity grants with options/RSUs for non-employee directors; chair and committee retainers disclosed .

Dual-role implications:

  • Combined CEO and director role with no committee membership concentrates executive authority but avoids CEO/Chair duality; independent committee leadership provides governance counterbalance .

Performance & Track Record

Pay-versus-performance and operating trends:

YearTSR ($100 initial)Peer Group TSRNet Income ($MM)Adjusted Operating Profit ($MM)CEO “Comp Actually Paid” ($)
202099.70 110.78 342.0 579.0 10,693,129
202191.94 134.17 413.0 684.8 5,819,382
202258.08 126.82 401.3 716.2 (110,112)
2023104.16 149.82 376.9 664.3 18,677,596
2024110.24 175.99 422.2 638.7 6,179,460

Strategic execution highlights (2024):

  • Progress on Connected Mobility strategy; robust demand in convenience retail/fueling; headwinds in repair solutions and car wash; ongoing cost optimization and balanced capital allocation with share repurchases .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Engagement

  • Annual advisory vote on NEO compensation; Board and Compensation Committee consider outcomes when making compensation decisions; next say-on-pay in 2026 .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Increased emphasis on performance-based equity for CEO (54% PSUs) in 2024 aligns with long-term value creation; introduction of performance-based stock options heightens at-risk pay .
  • EPS-based contingent stock option program enforces rigorous annual performance gating; no 1Q25 grant due to EPS below threshold .
  • 2022 PSU cohort paid 0% despite 61st percentile rTSR, demonstrating hurdle integrity and payout discipline .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • PSU miss (EPS below threshold) is a performance risk signal; reinforces pay-for-performance integrity but may affect retention if repeated .
  • Prior CEO role at Energy Conversion Devices, which filed Chapter 11 within one year after his tenure ended, is a historical context consideration .
  • Pledging and hedging prohibited; strong clawback policy mitigates misconduct risk .
  • CEO pay ratio 233:1 indicates high pay leverage; evaluation should consider performance outcomes and equity mix .

Equity Ownership & Alignment Details

ElementPolicy / Status
Stock ownership guidelineCEO: 5.0x base salary; compliant as of 12/31/2024 (or within time allowed)
Hedging/PledgingProhibited (short sales; derivatives; pledging)
Director comp for CEONone (no additional compensation for board service)
Equity plan overhang4,056,386 securities to be issued on exercise; 10,580,820 available for future issuance

Employment Contracts & Economics (Severance/CIC Specifics)

  • Without CIC: 2x base salary; pro-rata bonus based on actual; pro-rata equity vesting; 24 months health; release required .
  • With CIC: 2.5x (salary + target bonus); pro-rata bonus at target; full equity vesting at target; 30 months health; release required .
  • Specific values (as of 12/31/2024) detailed above (Total up to $22.6MM under CIC termination) .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: 2024 pay mix increases performance-based equity and introduces options; strong ownership, anti-hedging/pledging, and clawback policies are investor-friendly .
  • Performance sensitivity: EPS gating eliminated 2025 options; 2022 PSU zero payout despite solid rTSR highlights earnings dependence—watch EPS trajectory for future payouts and retention risk .
  • Liquidity/overhang: Significant unvested RSUs/PSUs and option tranches vesting through 2027 suggest periodic selling windows; monitor Form 4 activity and trading plans around vest dates .
  • Downside/CIC protection: Rich CIC terms (2.5x salary+target bonus plus full equity vesting) could create acquisition-related dilution; however, change-in-control is double-trigger and standard for peers .
  • Governance: CEO-director (not Chair) with independent committees and no director pay reduces dual-role conflict; continued say-on-pay feedback loop supports discipline .