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Benjamin Lucas

Principal Executive Officer at Verona Pharma
Executive
Board

About Benjamin Lucas

Benjamin Lucas was appointed Principal Executive Officer and a director of Verona Pharma plc on October 7, 2025 following Merck’s acquisition of Verona; he signed subsequent post-effective amendments as “Principal Executive Officer and Director” . The company was delisted from Nasdaq at closing, and governance/reporting now follow a wholly owned subsidiary structure under Merck, limiting publicly available biographical, age, education, and performance disclosure for Lucas .

Past Roles

No prior-role biography for Benjamin Lucas is disclosed in Verona’s 2025 DEF 14A (pre-acquisition) or subsequent 8-K filings announcing his appointment; available filings identify the appointment at closing but do not include past employment history .

External Roles

No public-company or other external directorships for Benjamin Lucas are disclosed in the appointment 8-K or related closing documentation; the filings are silent on external roles .

Fixed Compensation

  • Post-closing, Verona became an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Merck; the ADSs were delisted and reporting obligations are being terminated, so executive compensation details for Lucas are not publicly disclosed in SEC filings .

Performance Compensation

Verona’s pre-acquisition incentive framework (FY2024), for context:

ComponentStructureFY2024 Outcomes
Annual cash incentivesDiscretionary bonus tied to corporate objectives (FDA approval and launch of Ohtuvayre; Phase 2 starts; budget compliance; no individual weights) Aggregate attainment at 110% of target for NEOs
Equity LTIMix of RSUs (25%) and PRSUs (75%); PRSUs earned quarterly vs revenue targets (linear schedule: 90%→50%, 95%→75%, 100%→100%, 110%→106.25%, 120%→112.5%; +12.5% kicker if all quarters met) with partial immediate vesting and 2-year tail Program design as disclosed; specific quarterly results not provided in proxy

Detailed metric table (FY2024 program design):

MetricWeightingTargetActualPayout
Ohtuvayre FDA approvalNot weighted individually Achieve approval Achieved Contributed to 110% aggregate payout
Ohtuvayre commercial launchNot weighted individually Launch post-approval Achieved Contributed to 110% aggregate payout
Phase 2: ensifentrine/glycopyrrolate FDCNot weighted individually Initiate trial Achieved Contributed to 110% aggregate payout
Phase 2: nebulized ensifentrine in NCF bronchiectasisNot weighted individually Initiate trial Achieved Contributed to 110% aggregate payout
Budget compliance and BDNot weighted individually Operate within approved budget; advance partnering Not itemized in proxy Included in 110% aggregate payout

Note: Lucas was appointed after FY2024; the above describes Verona’s incentive architecture immediately preceding the acquisition .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Anti-hedging/pledging: Directors and officers are prohibited from hedging or pledging company stock under Verona’s Insider Trading Compliance Policy, enhancing alignment .
  • Clawback: Mandatory recovery of erroneously received incentive compensation for three years preceding a restatement due to fraud or willful misconduct .
  • Director ownership guidelines: The company encouraged director share ownership but did not mandate a minimum level pre-acquisition .
  • Post-closing equity treatment: At closing, options and RSUs fully vested and were settled for cash at $107 per ADS; PRSUs were cashed based on earned amounts, with remaining eligible quarters deemed at or above 100% per the transaction terms. This cash settlement eliminates future insider equity selling pressure from legacy Verona awards .

Transaction consideration and award treatment:

ItemAmount / Treatment
Per ordinary share consideration$13.375 cash
Per ADS consideration (8 ordinary shares)$107 cash
Outstanding optionsVested immediately; in-the-money options paid cash equal to ADS count × (Per ADS Consideration – exercise price); out-of-the-money cancelled for no consideration
Time-based RSUsVested immediately; paid cash equal to ADS count × Per ADS Consideration
Performance RSUsPaid cash equal to earned/vested ADS count × Per ADS Consideration, with performance deemed at maximum for eligible quarters around closing per Verona’s disclosure

Employment Terms

  • Change-in-control severance plan (amended Sept 5, 2025): Extended CIC protection window from 12 to 24 months; updated “Qualifying Resignation” to include declining long-term employment after requested knowledge transfer; increased minimum severance periods (Executive Officer: 12 months; VP+: 9; Director/Senior/Associate: 6; Sr. Manager and below: 6) effective immediately prior to closing (void if deal terminated) .

Severance plan changes:

ProvisionPre-amendmentPost-amendment
CIC protection window12 months 24 months
Qualifying ResignationPrior plan definition Decline long-term offer after reasonable knowledge transfer/admin support
Minimum severance (Executive Officer)3 months 12 months
Minimum severance (VP and above)3 months 9 months
Minimum severance (Director bands)3 months 6 months
Minimum severance (Sr. Manager and below)3 months 6 months
  • Termination fee: The transaction agreement includes a $100,000,000 termination payment in specified circumstances (e.g., recommendation change or superior proposal), underscoring deal certainty economics (company-level, not executive-level) .

Board Governance

  • Appointment and board composition: At closing, all prior directors resigned; Benjamin Lucas and Ebru Can Temucin were appointed as directors, with Lucas serving as Principal Executive Officer .
  • Independence: As an executive officer, Lucas would not be considered independent under Nasdaq rules (Verona’s prior proxy notes that management directors are not independent; post-closing, Verona is delisted) .
  • Committees: Post-acquisition and delisting, committee memberships were not disclosed and may be reconfigured under Merck’s subsidiary governance; no committee roles for Lucas are reported in SEC filings .

Director Compensation

  • Post-closing director compensation is not disclosed in SEC filings due to delisting and termination of reporting obligations; Verona’s prior director compensation framework was detailed in the 2025 proxy for a different board composition .

Compensation Committee Analysis

  • Consultant: Aon Human Capital Solutions advised on benchmarking for executives and directors; committee determined no conflicts under SEC/Nasdaq independence factors .
  • Peer group (selected July 2024 for benchmarking): Agios, Akero, Aurinia, Axsome, BioCryst, Day One, Heron, Immunocore, Krystal, Madrigal, Northwest Bio, Phathom, Rhythm, SpringWorks, Tarsus, TG Therapeutics, Viridian, Xenon (additions/removals noted to align with commercial stage and market cap) .

Performance & Track Record

  • Verona achievements pre-closing: FDA approval and launch of Ohtuvayre; initiation of multiple Phase 2 programs; these underpinned 110% cash bonus attainment for 2024 NEOs prior to Lucas’s appointment .

Related Party Transactions and Risk Indicators

  • Policies: Audit/Risk Committee oversees related party transactions; prohibition on hedging/pledging; adoption of clawback policy reduce governance risk .
  • Delisting and change of control: ADS trading suspended and deregistered at closing; Verona became a wholly owned subsidiary of Merck .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment signals: Strong anti-hedging/pledging policy and clawback framework remain positive for pay-for-performance alignment .
  • Retention/transition risk: CIC severance protections were expanded to 24 months ahead of closing, likely reducing near-term attrition risk during integration; details apply by employee category, with executive-level minimums at 12 months .
  • Insider selling pressure: Legacy VRNA equity awards were cashed out at $107 per ADS at closing, eliminating future selling overhang from unvested awards .
  • Governance: Lucas holds dual roles (PEO and director) in a delisted, Merck-controlled subsidiary; independence concerns typical for combined roles are mitigated by parent control and private subsidiary governance, though the lack of disclosed committee structures reduces transparency for public investors .