David J. Lee
About David J. Lee
David J. Lee, 53, is WEBTOON Entertainment Inc.’s Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer (since November 2023) and a Class III director (since April 2024) overseeing global corporate, finance and operations teams across WEBTOON and subsidiaries Wattpad Corp. and Wattpad WEBTOON Studios Corp. . He holds a BA in Government from Harvard College and an MBA from the University of Chicago . Company performance metrics used in 2024 compensation include revenue ($1,349M), Adjusted EBITDA ($68M), and “Rule of %” (+18%), alongside reported total stockholder return of 59.04 on a $100 initial investment from IPO to year-end 2024 and net loss of $152.9M .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| AppHarvest, Inc. | President; later director | Jan 2021–Nov 2022 | Led transformation at AgTech indoor farming operator; served on its board through Nov 2022 |
| Impossible Foods Inc. | CFO; COO | Dec 2015–Jan 2021 (CFO); Dec 2015–Mar 2019 (COO) | Scaled business from pre‑revenue to hyper‑growth with global sales and manufacturing/supply chain capability |
| Zynga Inc. | CFO | Apr 2014–Dec 2015 | Led finance and corporate development during public gaming company turnaround period |
| Best Buy Co. Inc. | SVP Corporate Finance & Strategy | Dec 2012–Apr 2014 | Managed finance/strategy in large-scale retail transformation |
| Del Monte Foods Inc. | SVP Consumer Products and other roles | Feb 2004–Dec 2012 | Ran global food business and earlier strategy/operations roles |
| PG&E | Director of Strategic Planning | Early career | Helped turnaround during California Energy Crisis |
| McKinsey & Company | Strategy Consultant | Early career | Advised on growth/operations; foundational strategy toolkit |
| Leo Burnett Worldwide | Advertising roles | Early career | Marketing/branding foundations |
| EPVC | Venture capital investor | Early career | Early-stage investment experience |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inevitable Tech, Inc. (private) | Founder & Board Chair; CEO (prior) | Dec 2022–present (Chair); Dec 2022–Oct 2023 (CEO) | Builds technology and plant science innovations |
| Zevia PBC | Director | Since Jul 2022 | Public beverage company governance |
| Benson Hill, Inc. | Director | Since Jan 2021 | Food technology company governance |
| Council of Korean Americans; Network of Korean American Leaders | Fellow | Ongoing | Civic leadership and network engagement |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | FY2024 Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $500,000 | Established pre‑IPO and unchanged in 2024 |
| Annual Target Bonus | $500,000 | 100% of base; min guaranteed 50% of base ($250,000) |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid | $450,000 | 90% payout of target based on FY2024 results |
| All Other Compensation | $42,601 | Comprised of $20,688 commuting reimbursements, $350 gift card, $21,563 401(k) match |
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Design and Results (FY2024)
| Metric | Target | Actual | Payout Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $1,434 | $1,349 | 94% of target |
| Monetized Users (Users, M) | 19.38 | 19.91 | 103% of target |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | $75 | $68 | 91% of target |
| Rule of % (YoY rev growth + Adj. EBITDA margin) | +15% | +18% | 120% of target |
| Individual Objectives (Lee) | IPO readiness and listing; upgrade finance and legal to GAAP standard | Achieved | Contributed to overall 90% payout |
| Named Executive Officer | Target Bonus ($) | Payout (%) | Actual Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| David J. Lee | $500,000 | 90 | $450,000 |
Equity Awards and Vesting
| Award Type | Grant Date | Quantity | Vesting | Strike/Expiration | Grant Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSU | Apr 12, 2024 | 228,420 | 1/12 each quarter over 12 successive 3‑month periods post Apr 12, 2024; contingent on IPO (satisfied) | — | $5,139,450 |
| RSU | Nov 22, 2023 | 71,162 (47,442 unvested at 12/31/24) | 1/12 each quarter over 12 successive 3‑month periods post Nov 1, 2023; contingent on IPO (satisfied) | — | — |
| Options | Nov 22, 2023 | 593,009 (197,669 exercisable; 395,340 unexercisable at 12/31/24) | 1/12 each quarter post Nov 1, 2023 | $20.34 / 11-22-2031 | — |
| Stock Vested in FY2024 | Shares | Value Realized |
|---|---|---|
| David J. Lee | 61,790 | $1,054,390 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Detail (as of Apr 11, 2025) | Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Common Shares Owned | 78,227 | Direct/indirect beneficial ownership |
| Awards Vested or Vesting within 60 Days | 321,470 | 296,504 options + 24,966 RSUs |
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 399,697 | Less than 1% of outstanding shares |
| RSUs Unvested (12/31/24) | 190,350 ($2,584,953 MV) | Apr 12, 2024 grant; market value at $13.58 on 12/31/24 |
| RSUs Unvested (12/31/24) | 47,442 ($644,262 MV) | Nov 22, 2023 grant; market value at $13.58 on 12/31/24 |
| Options Exercisable/Unexercisable (12/31/24) | 197,669 / 395,340 | Strike $20.34; expiry 11/22/2031 |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited | Policy bans hedging, margin accounts and pledging by officers/directors |
| Ownership Guidelines | Not disclosed | No stock ownership guideline disclosure found in proxy |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Agreement Date/Role | Oct 14, 2023; serves as CFO & COO |
| Term | Indefinite; terminable by either party; 60 days’ notice for resignation without “good reason” |
| Base Salary | $500,000 |
| Bonus | Minimum 50% of base guaranteed; eligible up to 100% based on performance |
| Sign‑On Bonus | $600,000 lump sum; clawback if employment ends before Jan 1, 2026 (except Co. without cause or resignation with good reason) |
| Equity Grants | Options representing 0.5% FD shares and RSUs 0.06% FD at grant |
| Severance (no CIC) | 12 months salary; target bonus prorated; earned but unpaid bonus; 12 months COBRA reimbursement |
| Severance (CIC within 12 months) | Full acceleration of unvested RSU/option awards granted on Nov 22, 2023 |
| Non‑Compete/Non‑Solicit | Non‑compete and non‑solicitation of customers during employment; employee non‑solicitation for 12 months post‑termination; perpetual confidentiality/assignment/non‑disparagement |
| Commuting Reimbursement | Up to $50,000 per six‑month period for SF Bay Area–LA commute through Dec 31, 2026 |
| 401(k) | Company matches 100% of deferrals up to 7% of compensation; immediately vested |
| Clawback Policy | Nasdaq/Exchange Act 10D-compliant recoupment for three prior fiscal years upon restatement; applies to incentive-based comp |
| Options Policy | Post‑IPO, company does not intend to grant new option-like instruments |
Board Governance (Director Service, Committees, Independence)
- Board Service: Class III director since 2024; term expires at the 2027 annual meeting .
- Committee Memberships: Committees comprise Audit, Compensation, and Nominating & Corporate Governance; members listed do not include Mr. Lee (employee director) .
- Independence: Controlled company (NAVER ~61.73% ownership); only two independent directors (Winkles, Dubuc); CEO is also Chairman; no Lead Independent Director; independent directors met in executive session once in 2024 .
- Attendance: All directors attended at least 75% of board/committee meetings in 2024 .
- Director Compensation: Non‑employee directors receive cash retainers and initial RSU grants (~$450,000 FV) vesting quarterly; only non‑employee directors Winkles and Dubuc were compensated in 2024; employee directors (including Mr. Lee) did not receive separate director fees in that table .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Shift toward RSUs: Company states it does not intend to grant new option-like instruments post‑IPO, signaling increased reliance on RSUs and service-based vesting for retention, reducing risk relative to options .
- Guaranteed bonus component: 50% guaranteed minimum reduces at-risk cash portion, though actual payout was performance determined at 90% of target for 2024 .
- Pay-for-performance link: Corporate component metrics (Revenue, Monetized Users, Adj. EBITDA, Rule of %) directly tie payouts to growth and profitability; individual objectives included IPO readiness and GAAP upgrades for Lee .
- Clawback/No gross-ups: SEC-compliant clawback policy in place; company does not provide excise tax gross-ups under 280G/4999 .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Dual role/Controlled company governance: CFO/COO serving on the board alongside CEO/Chairman and controlling shareholder representatives; limited independent oversight and no lead independent director present governance risk .
- Insider selling pressure: Quarterly RSU vesting and options vesting schedule create regular potential supply; 321,470 awards vested/vesting within 60 days of Apr 11, 2025 (296,504 options; 24,966 RSUs) .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited by policy, mitigating alignment risk from collateral pledging or hedging .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
| Peer Companies (Late FY2024, used for FY2025 compensation) |
|---|
| Bumble Inc.; Fastly, Inc.; fuboTV Inc.; Grindr Inc.; Lionsgate Studios Corp.; PLAYSTUDIOS, Inc.; Playtika Holding Corp.; Pinterest, Inc.; Reddit, Inc.; Roblox Corporation; Squarespace, Inc.; Unity Software Inc.; Vimeo, Inc.; Ziff Davis, Inc. |
Equity Ownership Details
| Beneficial Owner | Common Stock | Awards Vested/Vesting ≤60 Days | Total | % Ownership |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| David J. Lee | 78,227 | 321,470 | 399,697 | <1% |
Employment & Contracts Snapshot
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Start Date with Company | Nov 2023 (CFO & COO); Director since Apr 2024 |
| Contract Expiration | Indefinite, terminable by either party |
| Non‑Compete/Non‑Solicit | During employment; 12 months employee non‑solicit post‑termination |
| Severance Multiple | 1x salary + prorated target bonus (no CIC); double‑trigger equity acceleration for Nov 22, 2023 awards with CIC |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Quarterly RSU and option vesting schedules support retention but create predictable selling windows; hedging/pledging ban helps maintain alignment with shareholders .
- Pay-for-performance calibration: 2024 bonus outcomes (90% payout) reflected mixed corporate results (Revenue 94% target; Adj. EBITDA 91% target) with strong “Rule of %” (120% target), indicating balanced incentive design tied to growth and margin .
- Governance overhang: Controlled company status, CEO as Chair, no lead independent director, and CFO/COO as director may limit independent oversight—important for investors monitoring capital allocation, risk management, and executive pay decisions .
- Change-of-control economics: Double‑trigger acceleration for specific awards increases potential payout sensitivity in M&A scenarios; absence of tax gross-ups limits shareholder-unfriendly parachute provisions .