Val Blavatnik

About Val Blavatnik

Valentin (“Val”) Blavatnik, age 27, has served on Warner Music Group’s Board since April 27, 2023; he is currently Special Advisor to WMG’s CEO and a member of Access Industries’ Executive Committee, with prior experience at LionTree (media/tech investments), Eden Productions (film/TV), and artist management. He holds a B.A. in Cinematic Arts from USC and is pursuing an MBA at Harvard University . He is not considered independent under Nasdaq rules and serves on WMG’s Executive and Compensation Committees .

Past Roles

External Roles

Board Governance

• Independence: Not independent; Access-affiliated and son of Len Blavatnik (Access founder, Vice Chairman) .
• Committee assignments: Executive Committee member; Compensation Committee member (committee also includes two independent directors) .
• Committee meeting cadence FY2024: Audit (4); Compensation (3); Nominating & Governance (1); Executive (0); Finance (0, acted by unanimous written consent) .
• Board attendance: Each director attended at least 75% of Board and committee meetings in FY2024; directors are expected to attend annual meetings .
• Board leadership: Independent Chairman (Michael Lynton) .
• Controlled company: Access holds >50% voting power; WMG utilizes controlled-company exemptions for committee independence, though Audit remains fully independent per rules .

Fixed Compensation

Performance Compensation

Other Directorships & Interlocks

Expertise & Qualifications

• Media/entertainment investments and production: LionTree, Eden Productions .
• Music industry operating exposure and artist management experience .
• Academic credentials: USC B.A.; MBA candidate (Harvard) .

Equity Ownership

Director Compensation Program (FY2024)

Related-Party Transactions (Governance-Relevant)

Governance Assessment

• Positive signals:

  • Independent Chairman; majority-independent Board overall despite controlled status .
  • Audit Committee fully independent and financially literate, with three “financial experts” designated .
  • Formal related-party transaction policy with Audit Committee review/approval .
  • Regular executive sessions; structured committee charters and annual evaluations .

• Red flags and conflict risks:

  • Val is not independent, is Access-affiliated, and simultaneously holds an employee role at WMG while serving on the Compensation Committee—an atypical structure that can impair perceived independence of pay oversight in a controlled company context .
  • Access’s extensive consent rights (M&A, capital actions, auditor changes, senior officer appointments, board size/committee authority) concentrate control and can constrain Board autonomy; nomination rights ensure Access-designated Chair while ≥35% voting power .
  • Multiple related-party arrangements with Access affiliates (major leases, Deezer licensing) and interlocks with Mattel increase the potential for perceived conflicts; large related-party economics (e.g., ~$41m from Deezer) magnify diligence needs .
  • Pledging of Class B shares by an Access affiliate under a loan facility introduces collateralization risk; while not Val’s personal pledge, it underscores control concentration and financing dependencies .

• Engagement and attendance:

  • Meets minimum attendance threshold (≥75% FY2024), but detailed per-meeting attendance is not disclosed; annual meeting attendance is expected .

Investor implications: In a controlled company, governance risk centers on independence and related-party oversight. Val’s dual role (employee + Compensation Committee) and Access’s structural rights warrant heightened scrutiny of incentive design, consultant use, and recusals on matters involving Access/Blavatniks. Mitigants include independent Audit oversight and an independent Chairman; however, the compensation governance profile is below typical best practice for widely held issuers .

Appendix: Committee & Meeting Summary (FY2024)