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Laura Alber

Laura Alber

Chief Executive Officer at WILLIAMS SONOMAWILLIAMS SONOMA
CEO
Executive
Board

About Laura Alber

Laura Alber is President and CEO of Williams-Sonoma, Inc., age 56, and has served as CEO since 2010 and Director since 2010; she has 29 years at the Company and holds a B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania . Fiscal 2024 performance under her leadership included diluted EPS of $8.50 excluding a $0.29 out-of-period freight adjustment, operating income of ~$1.38B excluding the adjustment, operating margin 17.9%, and comparable brand revenue of -1.6% . TSR was 106% over 1 year and 191% over 3 years, and ROIC reached 54% (non-GAAP) . The Board structure separates CEO and Chair, with an independent Chair and fully independent Board committees .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Williams-Sonoma, Inc.Chief Executive Officer2010–presentLed digital-first, design-led strategy; record margins/TSR; global expansion; sustainability and associate engagement initiatives
Williams-Sonoma, Inc.President2006–presentEnterprise leadership across brands and channels
Pottery Barn BrandsPresident2002–2006Implemented growth strategies (Pottery Barn Kids/Teen, Bed + Bath)
Pottery BarnEVP2000–2002Merchandising/operations leadership
Pottery Barn Catalog & Pottery Barn Kids RetailSVP1999–2000Catalog and retail execution

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Salesforce, Inc.Director2021–presentTechnology and omnichannel expertise for enterprise CRM
Fitbit, Inc.Director2016–2021Consumer hardware/health-tech insights pre-acquisition
University of PennsylvaniaTrustee, Board of Trustees2018–presentGovernance and network with academic stakeholders

Board Governance

  • Board service history: Director since 2010; independence status “Not Independent” as CEO .
  • Leadership: Independent Board Chair; CEO and Chair roles separated; all committees independent .
  • Committee roles: Alber does not serve on Board committees; Compensation Committee chaired by Scott Dahnke; Audit and Finance chaired by Frits van Paasschen; Nominations chaired by Anne Finucane .
  • Attendance: Board held 4 meetings in fiscal 2024; average Board/committee attendance 87%; executive sessions led by the independent Chair .
  • Governance practices: Majority voting for directors, proxy access, director 12-year term limit for non-employees, stock ownership requirements for directors, regular independent director sessions .

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Base Salary ($)$1,592,307 $1,600,000 $1,600,000
Target Bonus % of Salary200% 200% 200%
Non-Equity Incentive Paid ($)$3,700,000 $8,000,000 $10,000,000
Other Annual Compensation ($)$30,032 $96,662 $92,684

Perquisites in FY 2024 included life insurance ($10,063), 401(k) match ($10,350), car allowance ($6,000), financial services ($12,000), and personal aircraft usage ($54,271) under a Board-approved cap of $100,000 incremental cost per year .

Performance Compensation

Annual Bonus (FY 2024)

ComponentThresholdTargetMaximumActualOutcome
Adjusted EPS (pool funding) ($)$6.90 $7.72 $8.57 $8.50 Pool funded 161% then reduced to 151% via negative discretion
Eligibility TriggerPositive CFO (Operating Cash Flow) Achieved Pool eligible
CEO Bonus Payout200% of salary target $10,000,000 313% of target

Notes: “Adjusted EPS” excludes the $0.29 out-of-period freight adjustment; Company applied negative discretion to align pay and performance .

PSU Cycle (FY 2022–FY 2024 performance period; vested March 21, 2025)

MetricWeightingTargetActualPayout (% of Target)Vesting
Revenue Growth (3-year CAGR)20% 5% -2.2% 0% Cliff vest at 3 years
EPS (3-year CAGR)20% 5% 9.8% 245% Cliff vest at 3 years
Operating Cash Flow (3-year avg)30% $800M $1,408M 300% Cliff vest at 3 years
ROIC (3-year avg)30% 33.5% 51.5% 300% Cliff vest at 3 years
Total211% Vested on Mar 21, 2025

CEO earned 154,219 PSUs from a target grant of 73,090 PSUs; value at $211.37 closing price on Jan 31, 2025 was $32,597,270 .

2024 LTI Grants (effective Mar 22, 2024)

Grant TypeTarget Equity ValueUnits GrantedVesting
RSUs$7,000,000 44,708 25% annually, 2025–2028; dividend equivalents at vest
PSUs$9,000,000 57,484 target (up to 172,452 max) Performance period FY 2024–FY 2026; cliff vest Mar 22, 2027

Program design: PSUs weights 63% for CEO beginning 2025 (vs. 56% in 2024), RSUs 37%—emphasizing performance-based pay; no stock options granted .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership1,051,693 common shares; 17,378 RSUs vesting within 60 days; total 1,069,071; <1% of class (122,939,912 shares outstanding)
Ownership GuidelinesCEO required to hold 5x base salary; retention of at least 50% of net shares until guideline met
ComplianceHeld stock worth over 129x base salary at FY 2024 end; over 95x as of Apr 14, 2025—well above guideline
Hedging/PledgingExplicitly prohibited for officers/directors; no margin purchases; trading only in compliance windows or 10b5-1 plans
OptionsCompany ceased options in 2012; no repricing; no SARs; no underwater option cash-outs without shareholder approval
Vested in FY 2024294,144 shares vested; value realized $42,606,739

Outstanding equity awards (selected):

  • RSUs: 44,708 (3/22/2024; vest annually through 2028); 75,580 (3/21/2023; vest through 2027); 36,546 (3/21/2022; vest through 2026); 17,378 (4/15/2021; final vest 4/15/2025) .
  • PSUs: 57,484 target (3/22/2024; max shown 172,452); 3/21/2023 PSU grant with max 403,086 depicted; 154,219 earned from 3/21/2022 PSU cycle (211% payout) .

Employment Terms

ProvisionCEO Terms (Employment Agreement)Change-of-Control (Double Trigger)
Agreement TermExtended through Sept 7, 2033
Severance (no CoC)24 months base salary; 200% of average bonus (36 months lookback); $3,000/month for 18 months in lieu of benefits; time-based RSU acceleration up to 18 months; PSUs remain outstanding to performance certification; non-compete and non-disparagement conditions
Severance (CoC)Base salary $3.2M; bonus $12.966M (200% of average bonus); health benefits in lieu $36,000; accelerated vesting of RSUs and PSUs per plan Equity awards vest; PSUs deemed at target for CoC treatment per plan; vesting terms align to time-based RSUs for severance calculations
TriggersTermination without cause or resignation for good reason; “good reason” defined (salary reduction, diminution of duties, reporting changes, relocation >50 miles) Termination within 18 months following CoC; “cause,” “good reason,” and CoC defined
ClawbackCompensation Recovery Policy adopted Sept 2023 for restatements under Dodd-Frank; applies to current/former executive officers

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and emphasis: CEO target long-term incentives increased to $16M in FY 2024; strong tilt to PSUs with multi-year scorecard; PSUs increased further to 63% weighting in 2025—raising at-risk, performance-contingent pay .
  • Metrics and rigor: Annual bonus funded by Adjusted EPS and requires positive operating cash flow; PSU targets set above peer median historically; FY 2022–2024 PSU payouts 211% driven by EPS CAGR, OCF, ROIC performance despite revenue CAGR -2.2% .
  • Governance safeguards: No golden parachute excise tax gross-ups; no hedging/pledging; no options; robust stock ownership and retention requirements; clawback policy in place .
  • Peer benchmarking: Retail-focused peer group; compensation not fixed to specific percentiles; reviewed annually with independent consultant (Pay Governance LLC) .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • Say-on-Pay support was ~94% in 2024; committee maintained pay-for-performance design; increased PSU weighting for CEO in 2025 based on feedback and best practices .
  • Outreach: Management requested meetings with holders of ~35% of shares and met with holders of ~18% to discuss compensation, governance, and sustainability .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • CEO pay ratio: 1,062:1 (including seasonal/temporary workers); 534:1 when excluding certain employees, which may draw scrutiny despite strong TSR and ROIC .
  • Related party transactions: None disclosable under Item 404 in fiscal 2024 to present .
  • Cybersecurity oversight: No material incidents in last three fiscal years; Board/Audit receive regular briefings .
  • Trading policies: Hedging/pledging prohibited; blackout windows and 10b5-1 permitted; no timing of option grants (none granted) around MNPI .

Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)

Companies (FY 2024 peer group)
Bath & Body Works; Capri Holdings; eBay; The Gap; Levi Strauss; Lululemon; PVH; Ralph Lauren; RH; Tapestry; Ulta Beauty; V.F. Corporation; Wayfair

Selection criteria updated for FY 2025 (rev/market cap ranges); no changes to peer composition YoY .

Equity Overhang and Vesting Schedule (Insider Selling Pressure)

AwardUnitsVesting TimingMarket Value Reference
RSUs (3/22/2024)44,708 25% per year: 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028 $9,449,930 at $211.37
PSUs (3/22/2024)57,484 target; up to 172,452 max Cliff on 3/22/2027 (FY 2024–2026 performance) $36,451,179 shown at max scenario
RSUs (3/21/2023)75,580 25% per year through 2027 $15,975,345 at $211.37
PSUs (3/21/2023)up to 403,086 (max depiction) Cliff on 3/21/2026 $85,200,288 at max scenario
RSUs (3/21/2022)36,546 25% per year through 2026 $7,724,728 at $211.37
PSUs (3/21/2022)154,219 earned (211%) Vested on 3/21/2025 $32,597,270 at $211.37
RSUs (4/15/2021)17,378 Final vest 4/15/2025 $3,673,188 at $211.37

Large scheduled RSU releases annually and PSU cliffs can create periodic supply overhangs, though retention requirements and prohibitions on hedging/pledging moderate misalignment risk .

Employment Contracts & Severance Economics (Detail)

Scenario (as of Feb 2, 2025)Base SalaryBonusEquity AccelerationBenefits
Termination without Cause / Good Reason (No CoC)$3,200,000 (24 months) $12,966,667 (200% avg bonus) $87,725,314 (RSUs+PSUs per terms) $54,000 ($3,000/mo for 18 months)
Termination without Cause / Good Reason (CoC)$3,200,000 $12,966,667 $92,822,713 $36,000 ($3,000/mo for 12 months)

Non-compete condition applies to severance receipt, along with confidentiality and non-disparagement obligations; “better after-tax” provision addresses 280G excise tax optimization .

Director Compensation (Executive Director)

As CEO and employee director, Alber does not receive non-employee director cash/equity retainers; non-employee director compensation program emphasizes RSUs with fixed grant values, no performance-based equity, and ownership guideline of $400,000 in stock within five years .

Performance & Track Record

  • Financial outcomes: Gross margin 45.8% (ex-adjustment), operating income ~$1.38B (ex-adjustment), EPS $8.50 (ex-adjustment); profitability doubled vs pre-pandemic per Compensation Committee letter .
  • Capital returns: ~$4.1B returned via dividends and buybacks over last five years .
  • Strategic initiatives: Digital-first platform, retail optimization, supply chain efficiencies, pricing power, and brand portfolio execution .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Education: B.A., University of Pennsylvania .
  • Skills: Retail, merchandising, e-commerce, supply chain, sustainability; Board skills matrix highlights growth strategy, marketing/brand building, financial, technology .

Compensation Committee & Consultant

  • Committee: Independent members; chaired by Scott Dahnke; interlocks/insider participation not present .
  • Consultant: Pay Governance LLC; no conflicts; assisted on design, risk assessment, peer analysis, and disclosure .
  • Risk oversight: Programs assessed not reasonably likely to have material adverse effect .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and retention: High stock ownership multiples versus guideline, strict anti-hedging/pledging, and multi-year PSU emphasis support strong alignment and reduce retention risk; severance/change-of-control structures are competitive, double-triggered, and conditioned on non-compete and releases—limiting windfalls .
  • Performance-contingent pay: PSU payouts tied to EPS/OCF/ROIC delivered outsized vesting despite top-line softness; forward design increases PSU weighting, reinforcing sensitivity to long-term financial drivers (earnings quality and capital efficiency) .
  • Trading signals: Significant scheduled RSU releases and PSU cliffs into 2026–2028 can add periodic supply overhang; however, retention/ownership rules and absence of options mitigate opportunistic selling risk; monitor Form 4 activity around vest dates and blackout windows for timing signals .
  • Governance: Separate Chair/CEO, strong say-on-pay (94%), robust shareholder outreach, and absence of related party transactions lower governance risk; CEO pay ratio is elevated and could invite external scrutiny, but performance and returns have been strong .