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Hui Chen

Hui Chen

Chief Executive Officer at Yotta Acquisition
CEO
Executive
Board

About Hui Chen

Hui Chen is Chief Executive Officer and Director of Yotta Acquisition Corporation (YOTA), serving since December 2021; he is 52 years old as of the 2024 proxy record date, with a background spanning computer science and law, including founding a law firm and adjunct teaching roles . As a SPAC, YOTA reports no operating revenue or EBITDA and disclosed that no executive officer has received cash compensation, so traditional pay-for-performance metrics (revenue/EBITDA growth, TSR-linked pay) are not applicable at this stage . Chen beneficially controls YOTA through Yotta Investment LLC (controlled by Ms. Chen, his spouse), holding 84.4% of common stock as of September 22, 2025 (3,107,700 shares), which underscores control and alignment but also heightens related-party and independence considerations .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Yotta Acquisition CorporationCEO and DirectorDec 2021–presentLeads SPAC strategy; oversees extensions and governance actions .
Quetta Acquisition Corporation (Nasdaq: QETA)CEO and DirectorMay 2023–presentParallel SPAC leadership; network for deal sourcing .
Law Offices of Hui Chen & Associates, PCFounder/Principal2012–presentIP-focused legal practice; expertise in patent and copyright matters .
Hofstra UniversityAdjunct ProfessorSep 2019–presentCS instruction (Visual C++); technical credentials .
eBay, IBM Global Services, MultiPlan, PepsiEngineering/Developer/Analyst roles1998–2015 (various)Back-end systems, forecasting applications, enterprise IT delivery .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleCommittee/FunctionNotes
Quetta Acquisition Corporation (Nasdaq: QETA)CEO and DirectorN/AActive concurrent SPAC leadership .
Academia (Hofstra; prior adjunct posts)Adjunct facultyComputer ScienceOngoing adjunct professor role since 2019 (Hofstra); prior colleges 2000–2018 .
Law Offices of Hui Chen & Associates, PCFounderIP Legal ServicesLegal practice since 2012 .

Fixed Compensation

ElementAmount/TermsSource
Base salaryNone paid to executive officers to date
Target/Actual bonusNone paid
Director/insider feesNone prior to a business combination (no cash, finder, consulting or similar fees to existing stockholders, including directors)

Performance Compensation

MetricWeightingTargetActualPayoutVesting/Notes
Not applicable (no executive compensation program in place at SPAC stage)N/AN/AN/AN/A“No executive officer has received any cash compensation” and no equity incentive program disclosed pre-business combination .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

MetricFY 2024FY 2025Notes
Hui Chen beneficial ownership (shares)3,198,600 3,107,700 Majority held via Yotta Investment LLC (sponsor), controlled by Ms. Chen (spouse) .
Hui Chen beneficial ownership (%)81.17% 84.4% Reflects concentrated control.
Shares outstanding (context)3,944,835 3,682,604 For ownership % context.
Founder Shares (insider class)2,871,666 2,874,999 Insider lock-up and release terms apply.
Private Placement Units (Sponsor)343,500 343,500 No redemption rights; expire if no business combination.
  • Founder share economics: Sponsor and officers paid an aggregate $25,000 (~$0.0087/share) for 2,874,999 Founder Shares; at a $10 reference valuation, these could be worth $28,749,990, implying substantial upside even if post-combination public investors experience losses . Lock-up: 50% of Founder Shares restricted until the earlier of six months post-business combination or achieving $12.50 share price for 20 of 30 trading days; remaining 50% restricted for six months post-combination (subject to earlier liquidity events) .
  • Forfeiture adjustment: Sponsor agreed to surrender any shares in excess of 5% of Yotta’s outstanding common stock at closing per Forfeiture Agreement, potentially mitigating some dilution .

Pledging/Hedging/Ownership guidelines:

  • No pledging or hedging policy, ownership guidelines, or compliance status disclosed in the cited proxies .

Board Governance (Service History, Committees, Independence)

  • Board service: Chen has served as CEO and Director since December 2021; he is not listed as independent (independent directors named are Brandon Miller, Daniel M. McCabe, and Qi Gong in 2024) .
  • Committee structure and updates:
    • As of July 24, 2024: Audit Committee (Miller – Chair; McCabe; Gong), Nominating (Gong – Chair; Miller; McCabe), Compensation (McCabe – Chair; Miller; Gong); all members independent .
    • April 29, 2025 changes: Brandon Miller passed away; Qi Gong appointed Audit Chair; Ping Zhang appointed as an independent director and member of Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees .
  • Attendance: In FY 2023, the Board held 4 meetings; no director attended fewer than 75% of meetings/committees served .
  • Dual-role implications: Chen is CEO and a Director; independence considerations arise given sponsor control by his spouse (Ms. Chen) and resulting 80%+ voting control, potentially concentrating influence over key governance decisions .

Director Compensation

ComponentAmount/Policy
Cash retainers/meeting feesNot paid prior to a business combination (no fees to existing stockholders/directors) .
Equity grants/DSUsNone disclosed .
Committee chair/member feesNone disclosed .
Ownership guidelinesNot disclosed .

Employment Terms

  • Employment agreements: No executive employment contracts, severance arrangements, or change-of-control terms were disclosed in the cited proxy and 8-K filings; the SPAC stated no executive cash compensation to date .
  • Clawbacks, non-compete, non-solicit, garden leave, post-termination consulting: Not disclosed in the cited materials .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • No executive or director pay prior to business combination; all officers/directors compensated only via potential sponsor economics (Founder Shares/Private Placement Units), aligning upside to completion of a deal but creating risk of misalignment with public holders if deal quality is weak .
  • Lock-up and $12.50 share-price release condition may delay near-term insider selling, but founder economics can be highly favorable even at depressed post-combination prices, an overhang risk for public shareholders .

Related Party Transactions and Potential Conflicts

  • Sponsor loans/notes: Unsecured promissory notes totaling $825,000 (Jan 20 and Feb 5, 2023), plus four notes of $120,000 each (Apr–Jul 2023) for $480,000 related to extension payments; approximately $250,000 deposited into trust for monthly extensions since Aug 2024; these notes are non-interest bearing, payable upon business combination, and reduce post-combination cash .
  • Extension/Trust amendments: 2025 proxy removed fixed monthly deposit requirements, extending the timeline to April 22, 2027 without additional trust deposits, potentially reducing redemption value accretion for non-redeeming public holders; Sponsor can contribute up to $7,500/month as interest-free loans for extensions .
  • Share purchases around redemptions: Sponsor and affiliates may purchase public shares (at or below redemption price) and agree not to vote them for extension proposals, potentially reducing float and altering redemption dynamics; company to disclose such purchases via 8-K .

Performance & Track Record

  • Operating metrics: As a SPAC, YOTA has no operating revenues/EBITDA; trust account data and extension history disclosed instead .
  • Extensions/trust status: Trust held ~$8.15 million as of July 18, 2024 (est. redemption ~$11.22/share); ~$5.7 million as of Aug 31, 2025 (est. redemption ~$12.27/share); stock closed $11.08 on 7/18/24 and $11.52 on 9/22/25 on OTC, indicating limited trading liquidity .
  • Governance actions: Multiple extensions approved (to Oct 22, 2025 and later to Apr 22, 2027), with Chen signing related proxies and trust amendments .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Concentrated control: 80%+ beneficial ownership via sponsor controlled by Chen’s spouse raises independence and related-party concerns .
  • Sponsor economics: Low-cost founder shares/PPUs and lockup dynamics can incentivize deal completion over deal quality; potential for public-holder dilution and misalignment .
  • Regulatory risks: Potential CFIUS review risk for U.S. targets and possibility of being deemed an “investment company,” which could force liquidation; IRA 1% excise tax may apply to redemptions (not payable from trust) .
  • Float/liquidity: Sponsor’s ability to purchase public shares near redemption price may reduce public float and complicate listing/trading dynamics .

Compensation & Incentive Mechanics (Vesting and Selling Pressure)

  • Founder share release: 50% subject to $12.50/share price condition (20/30 trading days) or six months post-combination; remaining 50% restricted for six months post-combination; PPUs have no redemption rights and expire if no combination .
  • Selling pressure: If price conditions are achieved post-combination, release of founder shares can add supply to market; note that sponsor may still be economically positive even if public investors are not, intensifying exit incentives .

Compensation Committee & Governance Process

  • Compensation Committee (independent-only): Reviews and approves CEO/CFO goals/comp, but SPAC policy states no pay prior to a business combination; Committee chaired by Daniel M. McCabe as of 2024 . Independent directors confirmed per Nasdaq standards .
  • Use of consultants/peer groups: Not disclosed; no peer group or say-on-pay results disclosed in SPAC stage .

Employment Terms

TermDisclosure
Employment start dateCEO/Director since Dec 2021 .
Contract term/auto-renewalNot disclosed .
Severance/Change-of-controlNot disclosed .
Non-compete/Non-solicit/Garden leaveNot disclosed .
Clawbacks/Tax gross-upsNot disclosed .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment vs control: Chen’s effective control through the sponsor (84.4% stake as of 9/22/25) tightly aligns him with completion of a transaction but heightens governance and independence risks; public holders must underwrite sponsor economics and potential dilution .
  • Liquidity and redemption dynamics: Sponsor share purchases and extension amendments can reduce public float and alter redemption outcomes; trust balances declined with redemptions over time (from ~$8.15M to ~$5.7M), suggesting limited cash for a merger absent PIPE/financing .
  • Incentive fragility: Absence of cash comp pre-deal combined with highly levered founder-share optionality can bias toward deal certainty over quality; lock-up release at $12.50 introduces potential selling pressure post-close .
  • Regulatory overhang: CFIUS/investment-company risks and excise tax considerations could delay or impair a deal or change its economics, a material factor for timing and structure .