Jeffrey R. Stewart
Executive Vice President, Chief Commercial Officer at ABBV
Executive
About Jeffrey R. Stewart
Executive Vice President, Chief Commercial Officer of AbbVie; age 56; serving as EVP since 2021 after succeeding the prior CCO in a planned transition. Previously led AbbVie’s U.S. Commercial Operations (2018–2020) and served as President, Commercial Operations (2013–2018); joined Abbott in 1992 and was first appointed as an AbbVie corporate officer in 2018 . Company performance under the current leadership delivered 2024 total net revenues of $56.3B, Growth Platform revenues of $47.3B, operating cash flow of $18.8B, and multi‑year top‑tier TSR (+19% 1‑yr; +47% 3‑yr; +149% 5‑yr; +311% 10‑yr), underpinning pay‑for‑performance structures across the executive team .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| AbbVie | EVP, Chief Commercial Officer | 2021–present | Executive leadership of global commercial strategy and execution |
| AbbVie | SVP, U.S. Commercial Operations | 2018–2020 | Led U.S. commercial operations across key franchises |
| AbbVie | President, Commercial Operations | 2013–2018 | Oversaw commercial operations post‑separation from Abbott |
| Abbott | Vice President, Proprietary Pharmaceutical Division (U.S.) | pre‑2013 | Senior commercial leadership in U.S. pharma |
External Roles
None disclosed .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 1,106,458 | 1,188,500 | 1,277,404 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 120% (PIP) | 120% (PIP) | 120% (PIP) |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | 1,654,208 | 2,525,000 | 2,900,000 |
| Financial Planning Stipend ($) | 10,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 |
| Vehicle/Transportation Perqs ($) | — | — | 32,920 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (PIP) – Structure and 2024 Outcomes
| Component / Metric | Weight (Stewart) | 2024 Target | 2024 Actual | Outcome/Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Platform Revenue | 20% | $44.7B | $47.3B | 106% of target; matrix cap governs |
| Income Before Taxes (non‑GAAP) | part of 50% financial goals | $23.5B | $24.6B | 105% of target; matrix cap governs |
| Operating Margin (non‑GAAP) | part of 50% financial goals | $25.3B | $26.2B | 104% of target; matrix cap governs |
| Adjusted ROA | part of 50% financial goals | 20.7% | 22.2% | 107% of target; matrix cap governs |
| ESG Goal | 10% | Qualitative targets | Achieved | Committee assessment |
| Other Strategic/Leadership Goals | 20% | Set at year‑start | Achieved | Committee assessment |
| Payout Governance | — | Plan max 200% | Matrix result | 2024 payout capped at 190% of target |
Stewart’s 2024 PIP target was $1,545,000 (120% of salary), and the final award paid was $2,900,000 within the 190% cap .
Long‑Term Incentives (2024 Grants)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Units (Target) | Range (Thresh/Max) | Fair Value ($) | Key Terms/Results |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares (EPS + Relative TSR modifier) | 2/15/2024 | 14,148 | 5,305 / 35,370 | 2,686,139 | 2024 EPS banked at 200%; TSR modifier applied at cycle end (2026) |
| Performance‑Vested RSUs (Relative ROIC) | 2/15/2024 | 14,148 | 7,074 / 28,296 | 2,479,791 | One‑third vested 2/28/2025 at 200% based on 92nd percentile ROIC |
| Non‑Qualified Stock Options | 2/15/2024 | 39,085 | — | 1,232,350 | 10‑yr term; vest 1/3 annually over 3 yrs at $175.28 strike |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Shares Beneficially Owned | 87,704 shares |
| Percent of Shares Outstanding | ~0.00496% (87,704 / 1,768,978,278) |
| Options Exercisable (within 60 days) | 207,999 options |
| Unexercisable/Unvested Equity | Includes 39,085 options (2024 grant; vest over 3 yrs); ongoing PS/RSU tranches per schedule below |
| Ownership Guidelines | 3x base salary for NEOs; Stewart in compliance |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited; anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging policy in effect |
| Clawback | Mandatory recoupment on restatement; discretionary clawback for Code breaches |
2025 Vesting Schedule (selected tranches)
| Instrument | 2025 Vest Date(s) | Shares |
|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares (2023 award; banked 150%) | 2/15/2025 | 13,029 |
| Performance‑Vested RSUs (2023 award) | 2/15/2025 | 9,267 |
| Performance Shares (2022 award; vested on 2/28/2025 at 162.5%) | 2/28/2025 | One‑time vest per footnote (a) |
| Performance‑Vested RSUs (2022 award; one‑third) | 2/28/2025 | One‑third at 200% |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreements | None for NEOs |
| Change‑in‑Control (CIC) | Double‑trigger; lump sum up to 2.99x salary + bonus (higher of target or 3‑yr avg); plus benefits and pension accruals; options remain exercisable per plan |
| CIC Economics (Stewart; assumed 12/31/2024) | Cash payments: $10,058,069; Additional Supplemental Pension Plan benefits: $6,011,693; Welfare/fringe benefits: $97,514 |
| Tax Gross‑Ups | None on CIC payments |
| Clawback / Insider Trading | Mandatory clawback, anti‑hedging/pledging, blackout and pre‑clearance controls |
Vesting & Insider Selling Pressure
| Activity (2024) | Shares/Options | Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Options Exercised | 26,110 | 3,067,873 |
| Stock Vested (PS/RSU) | 58,960 | 10,494,880 |
These realized events and the 2025 tranche vestings could contribute to periodic selling needs (tax withholding, diversification), though AbbVie’s policies bar hedging/pledging and require guideline compliance before discretionary sales .
Pension, Deferred & Other Benefits
| Plan / Item | 2024 Amounts |
|---|---|
| AbbVie Pension Plan – Present Value | $1,102,549 |
| Supplemental Pension Plan – Present Value | $13,812,654 |
| 2024 Distributions to Grantor Trust (Supplemental Pension) | $3,737,798 |
| Deferred Compensation – Aggregate Balance | $153,448; 2024 earnings $6,818 |
| Company‑provided Transportation (non‑business) | Included in perqs; Stewart: $32,920 |
Compensation Benchmarking & Governance
- Health Care Peer Group includes Amgen, BMS, Eli Lilly, Gilead, GSK, J&J, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer; relative metrics (EPS, ROIC, TSR) underpin PS/RSU designs .
- Independent consultant (Semler Brossy) advises the Compensation Committee; no conflicts; robust risk oversight and clawback regime .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay support: 91.8% .
- 2025 say‑on‑pay vote counts: For 1,196,778,926; Against 78,389,723; Abstain 10,481,152; Broker non‑votes 242,314,197 .
Investment Implications
- Strong alignment: Stewart’s cash compensation is modest vs equity; majority of pay is at‑risk, tied to Platform Revenue, margin, ROA, EPS and relative ROIC/TSR, with 2024 payout capped at 190% amid outperformance on financial goals .
- Upcoming vesting tranches (including 200% ROIC RSU vesting and banked EPS PS) and realized exercises/vests in 2024 suggest periodic supply from executive equity mechanics, though hedging/pledging are prohibited and stock ownership guidelines must be maintained .
- CIC protections are sizable (indicative cash ~$10.1M plus pension enhancements), but double‑trigger and no tax gross‑ups mitigate governance risk; clawback breadth further supports alignment .
- Company performance (revenues, Growth Platform expansion, OCF, TSR) provides supportive backdrop for commercial leadership continuity under Stewart, with incentive metrics focused on durable value drivers .