Douglas D. Strange
Ameris BancorpAbout Douglas D. Strange
Douglas D. Strange, 55, is Corporate Executive Vice President and Chief Credit Officer of Ameris Bancorp (ABCB) and Ameris Bank; he became an executive officer in April 2024 after serving as Managing Director of Credit Administration since 2018. Earlier roles include Regional Credit Officer (2008–2015) and Senior Lender (2005–2008), and he is a certified public accountant, bringing deep lending, underwriting and credit-risk credentials to the role . Company performance context during 2020–2024 shows cumulative TSR rising from $91.70 to $158.80 (value of $100), net income moving from $262.0m to $358.7m, and company-selected TBV growth of 14.71% in 2024 . In his role, Strange has emphasized disciplined credit box updates and model-driven CECL reserving, noting charge-offs are trending within target levels and providing clarity on reserve modeling and fee-income opportunities (including securitization plans) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ameris Bank | Managing Director of Credit Administration | 2018–Mar 2024 | Oversaw credit administration; prepared orderly leadership transition to CCO . |
| Ameris Bank | Regional Credit Officer | 2008–2015 | Led regional credit oversight across diversified lending portfolios . |
| Ameris Bank | Senior Lender | 2005–2008 | Front-line origination and underwriting leadership . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Colquitt Regional Medical Center | Executive Vice President | 2016–2017 | Executive leadership experience outside banking; broadens operational perspective . |
Fixed Compensation
- The 2025 and 2024 proxy statements disclose detailed compensation only for named executive officers (NEOs); Strange is not listed as an NEO, and his base salary and bonus targets are not itemized in these filings .
- Company program context: Ameris targets total NEO pay in the 50th–75th percentile vs peers; maintains a balanced cash/equity mix with strong performance emphasis; perquisites are limited; decisions are made by an independent Compensation Committee with an independent consultant .
Performance Compensation
| Element | Metric | Weighting | Design / Targets | Payout / Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Long-term PSUs | Relative TBV Growth (ex-AOCI), TSR modifier vs KRX | Part of 60% of LTI | 3-year performance period; peer-relative percentile ranking; Monte Carlo valuation | Pays based on achieved percentile with TSR modifier; performance awards accelerate on change of control, death, disability . |
| Long-term PSUs | Relative ROTCE, TSR modifier vs KRX | Part of 60% of LTI | 3-year performance period; peer-relative percentile ranking; Monte Carlo valuation | Pays based on achieved percentile with TSR modifier; acceleration provisions as above . |
| Time-based RSAs | Ownership/retention | 40% of LTI | Granted with voting rights; dividend equivalents accrue and are paid only upon vest | Vest in equal annual installments over 3 years . |
Company-wide plan information is disclosed for NEOs; Strange’s specific grant sizes and PSU targets are not disclosed in the proxy NEO tables .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Initial beneficial ownership (as of Form 3) | 16,661 common shares directly; 205 indirectly via spouse . |
| Ownership guidelines | CEO: 6x base salary; NEOs: 3x base salary; executives and non-employee directors must retain 50% of net shares from awards until requirements are met; 2024 annual review found conditions were being met (note: review references NEOs and directors) . |
| Hedging/short sales | Company Insider Trading Policy prohibits hedging, short sales, and option trading; adheres to Rule 10b5-1 and NYSE standards . |
| Clawback policy | Mandatory recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation in event of accounting restatement, compliant with SEC/NYSE rules . |
| Pledging | No pledging provisions are disclosed; policy emphasizes hedging and short-selling prohibitions . |
| Recent insider filings | Appointment announced Aug 22, 2023; Form 3 filed April 10, 2024. No Strange-specific Form 4 transactions surfaced in our document search set . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Term | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Severance framework (executives) | 2x base salary + target bonus in a termination without cause or for good reason; pro-rata annual bonus; COBRA premium reimbursement up to 18 months; lump-sum if within 12 months of change of control | Severance Agreements entered for specified executives in 2019; Compensation Committee sought similar terms across executive officers; Strange’s specific agreement is not individually disclosed . |
| Non-compete / Non-solicit | 2 years post-termination | Restrictive covenants included in executive Severance Agreements . |
| Change-of-control equity | Unvested equity awards automatically fully vest; options become fully exercisable upon death, disability or change of control | Applies under the 2021 Plan; amounts valued at the applicable share price in illustrative tables for NEOs . |
| Definitions | “Cause,” “Good Reason,” “Change of Control” | Detailed definitions govern triggers and timing; good reason requires notice and cure periods; change of control includes 30% beneficial ownership thresholds (with exceptions) . |
| Clawback / risk oversight | Compensation risk review with CRO; clawback adopted; ownership and incentive structures reviewed annually | Committee concluded arrangements do not encourage excessive risk-taking . |
Performance & Track Record
- Credit discipline and reserving: Strange emphasized model-driven CECL reserving, indicating satisfaction with ~1.60% reserve levels and diversified C&I exposure, with limited stress expected in core C&I and charge-offs in target ranges .
- Fee income and securitization: He outlined plans to securitize a portfolio to increase production while maintaining servicing and related fees; expects about 75% of recent fee income to be recurring going forward .
- Risk positioning and macro inputs: He described reductions to baseline macro weighting following tariff updates in Moody’s economic forecast, demonstrating proactive reserve calibration to changing macro assumptions .
Company Performance Context (for Strange’s tenure backdrop)
| Year | Value of $100 – Total Shareholder Return ($) | Peer Group TSR ($) | Net Income ($ Millions) | TBV Growth (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 91.70 | 91.29 | 262.0 | 13.84% |
| 2021 | 121.06 | 124.74 | 376.9 | 10.85% |
| 2022 | 116.42 | 116.10 | 346.5 | 13.94% |
| 2023 | 133.04 | 115.64 | 269.1 | 12.43% |
| 2024 | 158.80 | 130.90 | 358.7 | 14.71% |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and risk controls: Strange operates within a framework emphasizing performance-based LTI, stock retention, hedging prohibitions, and clawbacks—positive for alignment and governance; however, pledging prohibitions are not explicitly disclosed, warranting monitoring .
- Retention dynamics: Two-year non-compete/non-solicit and standard severance economics across executives suggest retention risk is mitigated; equity accelerates under change-of-control, potentially increasing departure optionality if corporate events arise .
- Trading signals and selling pressure: We observed Strange’s Form 3 disclosure but no subsequent Form 4 sales in our dataset, indicating limited near-term selling pressure signals; watch for vesting events and any future 10b5-1 plans .
- Execution focus: Comments on retooled credit box, CECL modeling discipline, and fee-income securitization plans highlight operational rigor and potential incremental fee streams; investors should track securitization execution and charge-off trends as leading indicators of portfolio credit quality and earnings durability .