Ross L. Creasy
Ameris BancorpAbout Ross L. Creasy
Ross L. Creasy (age 51) serves as Corporate Executive Vice President and Chief Information Officer of Ameris Bancorp (ABCB) and Ameris Bank, a role he has held since July 2019. Prior to Ameris, he was Chief Information Officer of Fidelity Bank beginning July 2018 and previously held roles at E*TRADE, Capital One, and the Federal Reserve . Company performance context during 2020–2024 shows cumulative TSR rising from $91.70 to $158.80 (value of initial $100), net income of $358.7M in 2024, and TBV Growth of 14.71% in 2024, providing a backdrop for pay-for-performance assessment .
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSR (Value of $100) | 91.70 | 121.06 | 116.42 | 133.04 | 158.80 |
| Peer TSR (Value of $100) | 91.29 | 124.74 | 116.10 | 115.64 | 130.90 |
| Net Income ($M) | 262.0 | 376.9 | 346.5 | 269.1 | 358.7 |
| TBV Growth | 13.84% | 10.85% | 13.94% | 12.43% | 14.71% |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ameris Bancorp / Ameris Bank | Corporate EVP & Chief Information Officer | Since Jul 2019 | Led technology function post-Fidelity acquisition |
| Fidelity Bank | Chief Information Officer | From Jul 2018 | Oversaw Technology and Operations |
| E*TRADE | Various positions | Not disclosed | Technology/operations experience prior to Fidelity |
| Capital One | Various positions | Not disclosed | Financial services technology/operations |
| Federal Reserve | Various positions | Not disclosed | Regulatory/financial system exposure |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not disclosed in proxy | — | — | No current external directorships disclosed for Creasy |
Fixed Compensation
| Component (2024) | Detail |
|---|---|
| Base Salary (paid) | $431,500 |
| Base Salary used for STI calculation | $435,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of salary) | 65% |
| Actual Annual Incentive (STI) Payout | $427,660 |
| All Other Compensation (breakout below) | $47,369 total |
| 2024 “All Other Compensation” Detail | Amount |
|---|---|
| Dividends | $12,050 |
| Employer 401(k) Match | $13,800 |
| Health & Welfare | $20,691 |
| Life Insurance | $828 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (STI) – 2024
- Formula: Base Salary × Target % × Company Achievement × Individual Performance .
- Company metrics and results:
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Quality | 33% | 0.40%–0.35% (Target band) | 0.42% | 90.00% |
| ROA | 34% | 50th–60th percentile | 1.38% | 170.00% |
| Efficiency Ratio | 33% | 56.00%–55.00% (Target band) | 53.88% | 138.67% |
| Total Weighted Payout | — | — | — | 133.26% |
- Individual Performance Adjustment: Creasy received 113.5% (vs 110% baseline applied to most NEOs), resulting in the $427,660 payout below .
| NEO | Base Salary | Target (% of Salary) | Company Achievement | Individual Performance | Actual Incentive Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ross L. Creasy | $435,000 | 65.00% | 133.26% | 113.50% | $427,660 |
Long-Term Incentives (LTI)
- LTI Target Opportunity (2024): $500,000 .
| Grant Date | Award Type | Shares/Units (Target) | Grant Date Fair Value | Vesting/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/21/2024 | RSA | 4,311 | $200,030 | Vests in equal installments over 3 years |
| 2/21/2024 | TBV PSU | 3,232 (Target) | $153,132 | Based on relative TBV Growth vs KRX peer group; TSR modifier; vests 12/31/2026 |
| 2/21/2024 | ROTCE PSU | 3,233 (Target) | $153,180 | Based on relative ROTCE vs KRX peer group; TSR modifier; vests 12/31/2026 |
-
PSU Performance Definitions: TBV PSUs based on relative TBV Growth (ex-AOCI) vs KRX with TSR modifier; ROTCE PSUs based on relative ROTCE vs KRX with TSR modifier; Monte Carlo used for fair value .
-
Option Awards: None disclosed for Creasy in 2024 (Option Awards column blank) . 2024 grants consisted of RSAs and PSUs .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership and Guidelines
- Beneficial Ownership (as of Mar 27, 2025): 33,433 shares; <1% of class .
- Stock Ownership Guidelines: NEOs must hold 3× base salary; executives and non-employee directors were determined to be in compliance during 2024 review; must retain 50% of net shares from equity awards until compliant; hedging prohibited for all officers/employees .
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Shares Beneficially Owned | 33,433 (<1%) |
| Ownership Policy | 3× salary for NEOs; 50% net share retention until met |
| Compliance Status | All executives met policy in 2024 review |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging prohibited by policy; hedging/short sales barred |
Outstanding Unvested/Unearned Equity (as of 12/31/2024; $62.57/share reference)
| Award Type | Shares/Units | Market Value | Fully Vests |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSA | 1,437 | $89,913 | 2/21/2025 |
| RSA | 3,477 | $217,556 | 2/24/2025 |
| TBV PSU (2023 grant) | 3,106 (target incl.) | $194,342 | 12/31/2025 |
| ROTCE PSU (2023 grant) | 3,106 (target incl.) | $194,342 | 12/31/2025 |
| RSA | 1,437 | $89,913 | 2/21/2026 |
| RSA | 1,380 | $86,347 | 2/24/2026 |
| TBV PSU (2024 grant) | 3,232 (target) | $202,226 | 12/31/2026 |
| ROTCE PSU (2024 grant) | 3,233 (target) | $202,289 | 12/31/2026 |
| RSA | 1,437 | $89,913 | 2/21/2027 |
Notes: RSAs vest in equal installments over 3 years for 2022–2024 award cycles . PSU targets shown; payout subject to performance and TSR modifier .
Employment Terms
- Agreement Type: Severance Protection and Restrictive Covenants Agreement (May 7, 2019) covering Creasy (and other NEOs) .
- Severance (No Cause/Good Reason): 2× (base salary + target cash bonus) paid over 2 years; pro‑rata bonus based on goal achievement; up to 18 months COBRA reimbursement; if within 12 months post‑Change of Control (CoC), severance is paid in lump sum .
- Change of Control – Equity: Awards under the 2021 Plan become fully vested (and options, if any, fully exercisable) upon CoC, independent of termination (single-trigger for equity) .
- Death/Disability: Pro‑rata bonus; equity accelerated per plan; amounts per table below .
- Restrictive Covenants: 2‑year non‑compete and non‑solicit post‑termination .
- Clawback: Mandatory policy compliant with SEC/NYSE; recovery of erroneously awarded incentive comp in restatement scenarios .
| Estimated Benefits (hypothetical event on 12/31/2024) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Qualifying Termination within 12 months after CoC | $1,896,958 |
| CoC only (equity acceleration, no termination) | $2,160,042 |
| Voluntary with Good Reason or Involuntary Without Cause | $1,896,958 |
| Death | $1,789,225 |
| Disability | $1,789,225 |
Note: Components for Creasy include base salary $870,000, cash bonus $565,500, pro‑rata bonus $427,660, health & welfare $33,798; equity acceleration amounts vary by scenario as shown in the proxy table . With respect to awards under the 2021 Plan, employment termination is not required to receive applicable benefit in a CoC .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 STI metrics (ROA, efficiency, credit quality) drove a 133.26% company achievement factor; Creasy’s payout also reflected a positive individual adjustment (113.5%), indicating differentiation by contribution. Company TSR outpaced the peer group in 2024 (158.80 vs 130.90), with robust TBV Growth and net income, supporting incentive realizations tied to financial outcomes .
- Retention and risk: Substantial multi-year vesting of RSAs and PSUs through 2027 and a 2‑year non‑compete/non‑solicit strengthen retention. However, equity fully accelerates upon CoC, potentially elevating event-driven value realization; cash severance is 2× salary+target bonus, with lump-sum if within 12 months post‑CoC .
- Alignment safeguards: Ownership guidelines (3× salary for NEOs) with 50% net‑share retention until compliance, explicit hedging prohibitions, and a compliant clawback policy mitigate misalignment and risk-taking incentives .
- Equity mix and leverage: No options were granted; long-term incentives rely on RSAs and performance-based PSUs tied to relative TBV Growth and ROTCE with a TSR modifier, emphasizing total shareholder return and balance‑sheet profitability versus regional peers (KRX) .
- Ownership: Creasy beneficially owns 33,433 shares (<1%), and management collectively met ownership policy requirements as of 2024 review; this supports skin-in-the-game, though the position size (relative to outstanding shares) remains modest at the individual level .