Alessandro Silva
ACI WORLDWIDEAbout Alessandro Silva
Alessandro Silva is Executive Vice President and Chief Revenue Officer (CRO) at ACI Worldwide. As of February 27, 2025, he is 48 years old. He joined ACI in 2021 to lead international markets before becoming CRO, with responsibility for global commercial strategy and sales/customer success across Latin America, Europe, APAC, Middle East and Africa. He holds a BBA from Universidade Mackenzie (São Paulo) and an MBA from USP–Universidade de São Paulo; he also completed executive education at INSEAD, Harvard Business School, and Chicago Booth . Under the company’s current compensation design, performance metrics emphasize Revenue Net of Interchange Growth, Adjusted EBITDA, and multi‑year gross revenue growth with an rTSR modifier; in 2024, ACI reported revenue of $1,594.3M (vs. $1,452.6M in 2023) and Adjusted EBITDA of $465.7M (vs. $395.4M in 2023) . ACI’s Pay vs. Performance table shows a cumulative TSR index value of 137 for 2024 (base=100 at 12/31/2019) and highlights gross revenue as the “company‑selected” measure for 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| ACI Worldwide | Head of International Markets; later EVP & CRO | 2021–present | Drove global go‑to‑market and customer success across LATAM, Europe, APAC, MEA; advanced international growth agenda . |
| Western Union; GE Capital; The Carlyle Group; Credicard | Various sales and general manager roles across U.S., Canada, LATAM, Europe | Not disclosed | Built multi‑geography commercial leadership experience; multilingual (EN/ES/PT) . |
External Roles
- None disclosed (no public company directorships listed for Silva in filings). If any appear, they are not identified in ACIW’s 10-K/proxies reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $440,000 | $460,000 |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 100% (split 50% STIP/50% Sales Incentive Plan) | 100% (split 50% STIP/50% Sales Incentive Plan) |
| Target Bonus $ (STIP) | $230,000 | $230,000 |
| Target Bonus $ (Sales Incentive) | $210,000 | $230,000 |
Notes: In 2023 and 2024, Silva’s target annual cash incentive was structured as 50% corporate STIP and 50% sales incentive plan tied to commercial metrics .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentives – Structure and Outcomes
- STIP metrics: Adjusted EBITDA (40%) and Revenue Net of Interchange Growth (60%); individual +/-10% discretion (none applied to Silva in 2024). 2024 company performance yielded a 155.03% payout of target; 2023 yielded 120.5% of target (including +10% critical incidents modifier) .
- Sales Incentive Plan (SIP): Commercial metrics (ARR, license revenue from sales and services, total revenue). 2023 payout ~80% of target; 2024 payout ~150% of target .
| Year | STIP Payout (% of Target) | STIP $ | SIP Payout (% of Target) | SIP $ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 120.5% | $277,000 | ~80% | $169,035 |
| 2024 | 155.03% | $356,569 | ~150% | $345,637 |
Long‑Term Incentives (LTI) – RSUs and PSUs
Design and metrics:
- 2024 PSU: Three-year performance period; annual gross revenue growth goals (100% weighting) with an Adjusted EBITDA gate at or above 2023 level ($396.3M), plus +/-20% rTSR modifier vs S&P SmallCap 600; vests at end of period. RSUs vest quarterly over 3 years for NEOs .
- 2023 PSU: Annual Revenue Net of Interchange Growth (60%) and Net Adjusted EBITDA Margin (40%), with +/-20% rTSR modifier vs S&P MidCap 400; 3‑year performance period; RSUs vest quarterly over 3 years .
Silva’s 2023–2024 equity awards:
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Target Shares/Units | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSU | 5/11/2023 | 29,964 | $749,999 |
| PSU (2023 LTIP Tranche 1) | 5/11/2023 | 9,988 target | $269,077 |
| PSU (2023 LTIP Tranche 2 – 2024 goal set) | 2/23/2024 | 9,988 target | $333,799 |
| RSU | 3/4/2024 | 23,482 | $750,015 |
| PSU (2024 LTIP) | 3/4/2024 | 23,482 target | $811,773 |
Vesting and realized:
- RSUs (NEOs) vest in equal quarterly installments over three years; 2024 vestings for Silva totaled 32,547 shares; no option exercises in 2024 .
Performance Compensation Details (STIP)
| Metric | Weight | 2024 Targeting & Result | 2024 Payout |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 40% | $423.5M target; actual $466.8M; 110.22% attainment → 200% payout for this metric | 200% |
| Revenue Net of Interchange Growth | 60% | $1,122.0M target (FX‑adjusted); actual $1,130.4M; 100.75% attainment → 125.04% payout for this metric | 125.04% |
| Overall STIP (weighted) | — | Weighted result across metrics | 155.03% of target |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership (3/31/2025): 14,364 shares directly owned; less than 1% of outstanding (105,321,684 shares) .
- Outstanding/unvested equity at 12/31/2024:
- Unvested RSUs: 17,611; 14,982; 7,249; 3,155 (multiple grants) .
- Unearned PSUs (on‑target): 23,482 (2024 LTIP); 9,988 (2023 Tranche 2); 9,988 (2023 Tranche 1); 6,978 (2022 rTSR) .
- 2024 stock vested: 32,547 shares (value realized $1,349,903); no option exercises .
- Hedging/pledging: Company prohibits short sales, derivatives, and pledging; equity awards cannot be transferred until vested .
- Ownership guidelines: Executives must hold shares equal to 3x base salary (CEO 6x); continuing NEOs either meet the requirement or are within the 5‑year compliance period .
Employment Terms
- Severance (non‑CIC): Under ACI’s Severance Pay Plan, NEOs (including Silva) receive one year of base salary + target bonus, 1‑year benefits continuation, and outplacement if terminated without cause .
- Change in Control (CIC): Double‑trigger required. If terminated without cause or for good reason during the CIC employment period, NEOs receive lump sum of 2x (CEO 3x) base salary + target bonus, 2 years (CEO 3) of benefits continuation, outplacement (up to $50,000), and full vesting of equity awards; no excise tax gross‑up (best‑net provision applies) .
- Non‑compete/non‑solicit: During employment period and for 1 year post‑termination, restrictions on competition and solicitation apply (with standard exceptions) .
- Clawback: NASDAQ‑compliant clawback policy adopted in 2023 covering incentive compensation tied to financial reporting measures; legacy recoupment policy also in place .
- STIP must be employed on payment date unless otherwise provided (e.g., CIC agreements) .
Potential payments (illustrative, assuming termination on 12/31/2024):
| Scenario | Cash Severance | Pro‑Rata Bonus | RSUs | PSUs (target) | Benefits | Outplacement | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without Cause | $920,000 | $0 | $0 | $1,515,383 | $34,340 | $10,275 | $2,479,998 |
| Death/Disability | $0 | $0 | $2,231,974 | $1,515,383 | $0 | $0 | $3,747,357 |
| Involuntary/Good Reason After CIC | $1,840,000 | $460,000 | $2,231,974 | $3,136,610 | $59,299 | $50,000 | $7,777,883 |
Performance & Track Record
- Company operating performance (context for CRO incentives):
- Revenue: $1,594.3M in 2024 vs. $1,452.6M in 2023 (company reported) .
- Adjusted EBITDA: $465.7M in 2024 vs. $395.4M in 2023 .
- Pay vs. Performance: ACI’s 2024 “company‑selected” measure was Gross Revenue; TSR index value was 137 (base 100 at 12/31/2019) in 2024; net income $203.1M; Gross Revenue $1,594.3B .
- Commercial achievements (management commentary): Silva highlighted strong global pipeline, renewal acceleration, and new wins in real‑time payments central infrastructure (e.g., Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Nepal; contract with Colombia’s central bank) during Analyst Day 2024 .
- Transition risk: ACI disclosed elimination of the CRO role effective September 30, 2025, with Silva departing and receiving benefits under the severance policy—elevated retention/continuity risk for commercial leadership during transition .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix: Significant “at‑risk” pay via STIP and PSUs; RSUs vest quarterly (NEOs), supporting retention but creating a regular vesting cadence that can contribute to supply overhang if shares are sold upon vest .
- Metric shifts: LTI metrics shifted from revenue net of interchange and EBITDA margin (2023) to gross revenue growth (2024) with EBITDA gate and rTSR modifier—tightening the linkage to top‑line growth while retaining profitability guardrails .
- Shareholder alignment: Robust stock ownership guidelines, prohibition on hedging/pledging, and formal clawback policy reduce governance risk and align incentives with long‑term TSR .
- Say‑on‑pay support: 2024 approval at ~91.9% indicates broad investor acceptance of pay design and outcomes .
Equity Overhang and Vesting Schedules (Selling Pressure Indicators)
| Category | Detail |
|---|---|
| 2024 RSU Vesting Realized | 32,547 shares vested for Silva in 2024; no options exercised . |
| Unvested RSUs at 12/31/2024 | 17,611; 14,982; 7,249; 3,155 units across grants (quarterly vesting over 3 years for NEOs) . |
| Unearned PSUs (on‑target) | 23,482 (2024 LTIP); 9,988 (2023 Tranche 2); 9,988 (2023 Tranche 1); 6,978 (2022 rTSR)—payout contingent on performance and rTSR . |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited for executives; reduces risk of forced selling or misalignment . |
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay vote: ~91.9% approval; management cited ongoing outreach and no significant investor concerns regarding program design .
- Compensation consultant and independent committee oversight in place; double‑trigger CIC; no excise tax gross‑ups .
Employment Status Update
- ACI filed that, effective September 30, 2025, the CRO position will be eliminated; Silva will depart with severance under company policy. This implies succession/redistribution of responsibilities to segment GMs and regional sales leaders .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and performance linkage: Silva’s incentive mix is tightly coupled to revenue growth and EBITDA, with a three‑year PSU structure and rTSR modifier. 2024 results (revenue and Adjusted EBITDA growth) supported above‑target STIP and strong SIP payouts, reinforcing pay‑for‑performance integrity .
- Overhang/flow risk: Quarterly RSU vesting and a sizeable PSU pipeline create a predictable vesting cadence and potential future share supply; however, hedging/pledging prohibitions and ownership guidelines mitigate alignment risks .
- Retention/transition: The announced elimination of the CRO role and Silva’s planned departure (effective 9/30/2025) elevate near‑term execution risk in global commercial leadership and pipeline conversion; monitor sales governance, regional leader performance, and large renewal/central infrastructure deal flow during transition .
- Downside protections/governance: Double‑trigger CIC, robust clawback, and no tax gross‑ups indicate shareholder‑friendly policies, reducing governance red flags despite potential severance magnitudes in a CIC scenario .