Dana Escobar
About Dana Escobar
Dana Escobar, age 57, is Chief Licensing Officer & General Manager, Semiconductor at Adeia Inc. He joined the company in 2020 and previously led Semiconductor IP licensing at Xperi Holding Corporation; he holds a J.D. from UCLA School of Law and a B.A. in political science from UCLA . Company incentive design ties executive pay to TSR and revenue, with TSR identified as a most important measure and 2024 revenue used in both annual bonuses and PSUs; 2024 revenue was $376.0 million versus a $400 million target (70% payout via linear interpolation), while Non-GAAP operating expenses excluding litigation achieved $130.1 million (200% payout), with the corporate factor capped at 100% due to missing revenue target .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adeia Inc. | Chief Licensing Officer & GM, Semiconductor | — | Leads semiconductor licensing portfolio; accountable for revenue and long-term IP strategy . |
| Xperi Holding Corporation | SVP & GM, Semiconductor IP | — | Oversaw semiconductor IP licensing business prior to Adeia’s separation . |
| Adeia Inc. | VP of IP Licensing | 2020– | Built licensing programs; foundation for later GM role . |
| GE | Vice President of IP Licensing | — | Scaled corporate IP monetization initiatives . |
| Sharp Laboratories of America / Sharp Corp. U.S. IP Center | Chief IP Counsel; Director | — | Led IP strategy and enforcement for U.S. operations . |
| LSI Corporation/Avago | Senior Director of IP Licensing | — | Executed licensing deals; contributed to portfolio value creation . |
| Discovision Associates | Licensing & Litigation Attorney | — | Managed licensing and litigation matters . |
| Los Angeles County | Deputy District Attorney | — | Trial and litigation experience; foundation for negotiation/execution . |
External Roles
No current external public company board roles for Escobar are disclosed in the 2025 proxy .
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year summary for Dana Escobar (Amounts in USD):
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $324,931 | $375,000 | $401,250 |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | — | — | 60% |
| Approved Salary for Bonus Calc | — | — | $410,000 |
| Approved Target Bonus (Calculated) | — | — | $246,000 |
| Actual Bonus Paid (Non-Equity Incentive) | $310,640 | $189,956 | $236,160 |
Notes:
- Corporate performance weighting: 80% of payout; individual factor: 20%; corporate capped at 100% due to revenue target miss; Escobar’s individual factor approved at 80% for 2024 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Compensation Plan (ICP) – 2024 structure and outcomes:
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 50% | $400 million | $376.0 million | 70% (linear interpolation) | Cash bonus; no vesting |
| Non-GAAP Operating Expenses (ex-litigation) | 30% | $137 million | $130.1 million | 200% | Cash bonus; no vesting |
| Strategic & Business Goals | 20% | Defined goals (strategy, engagement, governance, patent filings) | Approved outcomes achieved | 100% | Cash bonus; no vesting |
| Corporate Factor Cap | — | — | — | Corporate factor capped at 100% if revenue below target | — |
2024 Grants of Plan-Based Awards (Escobar):
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Shares/Units | Grant Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash ICP | 3/1/2024 | $123,000 | $246,000 | $492,000 | — | — |
| PSUs (3-year performance; stock price appreciation + long-term revenue, TSR modifier) | 3/1/2024 | 34,595 shares | 69,190 shares | 138,380 shares | As shown | Included in total grant fair value below |
| RSUs (25% annual vest over 4 years) | 3/1/2024 | — | — | — | 69,190 | $1,732,414 |
Long-term equity design and weighting:
- RSUs: 4-year time-based, 25% per year; align with shareholders via share price .
- PSUs: 3-year cliff vesting; earned based on stock price appreciation with relative TSR modifier and long-term revenue performance; for non-CEO NEOs, PSUs targeted at 50% of annual equity value .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and outstanding equity (as of March 11, 2025 / December 31, 2024):
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (Shares) | 136,853; 0.1% of 108,444,911 shares outstanding |
| Insider Policy | Prohibits hedging, pledging, derivatives trading, margin accounts |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Executives must hold stock equal to 1x base salary; 5-year grace period; all Executives in compliance or within grace as of 12/31/2024; unvested RSUs count; PSUs excluded until performance certified |
| 2024 Change-in-Control PSU Acceleration Value (consummation) | $1,358,433 for Escobar (unvested PSUs) at $13.98 share price |
Outstanding equity awards for Escobar (market value uses $13.98 close on 12/31/2024; PSU valued at 50% of target) :
| Grant Date | Unvested RSUs (#) | RSUs Market Value ($) | Unvested PSUs (#, at target) | PSUs Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3/9/2021 | 1,875 | $26,213 | — | — |
| 3/22/2022 | 3,750 | $52,425 | — | — |
| 5/16/2022 | 10,000 | $139,800 | — | — |
| 10/19/2022 | 26,640 | $372,427 | — | — |
| 3/1/2023 | 33,081 | $462,472 | 22,054 | $308,315 |
| 5/9/2024 | 69,190 | $967,276 | 34,595 | $483,638 |
Employment Terms
Severance & Change-in-Control (CIC) agreements:
- Agreement term: Initial 3 years with automatic one-year renewals; term automatically extends 12 months following a CIC if otherwise expiring .
- Outside CIC: If terminated without cause more than 3 months prior to a CIC or more than 12 months after, Escobar receives Accrued Obligations; lump-sum cash equal to 100% of base salary plus prorated target annual bonus; and up to 12 months of health benefits .
- Within CIC window (3 months prior to or 12 months post CIC): Accrued Obligations; lump-sum cash equal to 100% of base salary plus 100% of target annual bonus; continuation of health benefits; equity award acceleration per award terms (value shown below) .
2024 potential payments upon termination/CIC (assumes 12/31/2024 at $13.98 share price) :
| Triggering Event | Cash Severance | Stock Award Acceleration | Health Benefits | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination Other Than for Cause (outside CIC window) | $656,000 | $— | $34,357 | $690,357 |
| Good Reason Resignation or Termination Other Than for Cause (within CIC window) | $656,000 | $3,379,047 | $34,357 | $4,069,404 |
Governance and protections:
- No single-trigger cash severance; no executive employment contracts; no tax gross-ups; no repricing of options/SARs; hedging/pledging prohibited; clawback policy aligned with SEC Rule 10D-1 and Nasdaq .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Escobar’s 2024 variable pay was explicitly tied to revenue and cost discipline plus strategic goals; corporate payouts capped at 100% when revenue missed target, signaling disciplined compensation governance .
- Retention and selling pressure: Meaningful unvested RSUs and PSUs across 2021–2024 awards with scheduled vesting over the next 1–3 years reduce near-term selling pressure; hedging and pledging bans further mitigate alignment risk .
- CIC economics: Double-trigger cash severance equal to 1x salary plus 1x target bonus and full equity acceleration in CIC scenarios create potential event-driven value realization for Escobar; investors should incorporate ~$3.38 million equity acceleration and $656k cash in CIC modeling .
- Ownership and alignment: Beneficial ownership of 136,853 shares and mandatory ownership guidelines (1x salary) enhance alignment; policy indicates executives were compliant or within grace periods as of year-end 2024 .
- Governance support: 2024 say-on-pay approval exceeded 97%, and Compensia’s involvement plus robust clawback and insider-trading policies suggest low governance risk and reduced controversy probability around executive compensation .