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Ian Pinner

Senior Vice President and President, Nutrition, and Chief Sales and Marketing Officer at Archer-Daniels-MidlandArcher-Daniels-Midland
Executive

About Ian Pinner

Senior Vice President; President, Nutrition; and Chief Sales and Marketing Officer at ADM with 25 years at the company, serving as a named executive officer in 2024 . Company performance context for 2024: Revenue $85.5B, Adjusted EBITDA $4.476B, Adjusted ROIC 8.3%; Company TSR (value of $100 invested at 12/31/2019) at year-end 2024 was $124.60 . ADM emphasizes pay-for-performance via annual cash incentives tied to Adjusted EBITDA and ROIC and long-term PSUs tied to multi-year Adjusted ROIC and cumulative Adjusted EPS with an ESG modifier .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
ADMSenior Vice President; President, Nutrition; Chief Sales & Marketing Officer25 years with ADM2024 results: strong revenue growth in Flavors, record growth in Bioactives, continued improvements in Animal Nutrition turnaround

External Roles

No external directorships or outside board roles for Mr. Pinner are disclosed in the 2025 proxy statement .

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Target Bonus (% of Salary)Actual Annual Cash Incentive ($)Notes
2024700,008 100% 352,800 (50.4% of target) Base salary unchanged in 2024

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Incentive (Design and 2024 Outcome)

  • Formula: 75% Company performance (Adjusted EBITDA with ROIC ±10% modifier) + 25% Individual performance; payout range 0–200% .
  • 2024 Company results: Adjusted EBITDA $4.476B (32.85% factor), Adjusted ROIC 8.3% (0.925x), Company portion payout 30.4% out of 75% target .
  • Applied to NEOs: Company portion for Mr. Pinner = 30.4%; Individual performance factor = 20% (of total incentive) .
Component (2024)WeightTarget/MetricResultPayout/Factor
Adjusted EBITDA75%Plan $5.438B; payout grid applies$4.476B32.85% factor
Adjusted ROIC Modifiern/aTarget 9.8%8.3%0.925x
Company Portion Outcome75%30.4% of total
Individual Performance25%Discretion20% for Pinner
Total Payout vs Target100%50.4% for Pinner

Long-Term Incentives (Grants in 2024)

  • Mix: 60% PSUs (3-year performance; vest after period) and 40% time-based RSUs (1/3 annually) .
  • PSU metrics and weights: 50% 3-year average Adjusted ROIC; 50% 3-year cumulative Adjusted EPS; plus Strive 35 ESG modifier ±10% (water savings and GHG reduction) .
Grant (3/18/2024)InstrumentTarget UnitsGrant Date FV ($)VestingMetric/Targets
2024 Annual LTIPSUs29,797 1,800,037 Cliff vest after 3-year period (2024–2026) Avg Adjusted ROIC: 7.0%/9.0%/10.0%/11.0%/≥12.0% → 0%/50%/100%/150%/200%; Cumulative Adjusted EPS: <$15/$17/$18.5/$19/$19.5 → 0%/50%/100%/150%/200%; ESG ±10%
2024 Annual LTIRSUs19,865 1,200,045 1/3 on each anniversary over 3 years Time-based

Historical PSU Payout (2012 PSU Cycle that ended 2024)

  • Cycle: 2022–2024 PSUs; results determined Feb 5, 2025 .
  • Outcomes: Avg Adjusted ROIC = 11.37% (200% factor); 2024 Adjusted EPS = $4.74 (0% factor); ESG modifier +12% total; net payout 112% of target .
  • Pinner earned PSUs: Target 14,431; Actual 16,163; vested Feb 10, 2025 (no reduction applied to him) .
2022–2024 PSU (determined 2/5/2025)Target (#)Actual Earned (#)Payout %
Ian Pinner14,431 16,163 112%

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership and Unvested Awards (as of 12/31/2024 and 3/21/2025)

ItemValue
Common stock beneficially owned (3/21/2025)61,708 shares; <1% of class
Unvested RSUs (do not vest within 60 days)42,966 units
Outstanding unvested RSUs (market value at 12/31/2024)36,692 units; $1,853,680
Outstanding unearned PSUs (target; 12/31/2024)46,175 units; $2,332,761
Stock optionsNone outstanding for Pinner

Ownership Guidelines and Pledging/Hedging

  • Ownership guideline: 4.0x salary; Pinner actual 5.2x as of March 14, 2025 (meets guideline) .
  • Policy prohibits hedging and pledging by executives; group disclosure notes no shares subject to pledge .

Upcoming Vesting Schedule (RSUs as of 12/31/2024)

Vest DateShares
02/09/20253,603
02/10/20259,621
03/18/20256,755
02/09/20263,603
03/18/20266,555
03/18/20276,555

Note: 2022–2024 PSUs (16,163 earned) vested on 02/10/2025 .

Employment Terms

  • Employment agreements: None; employment at-will. Severance program exists as a guideline (no contractual right); severance typically requires non-compete/non-solicit agreements .
  • Change-in-control: Double-trigger equity vesting; if awards not assumed or upon qualifying termination within 24 months post-CIC, RSUs vest in full; PSUs vest at greater of target or truncated-period performance. No separate CIC cash severance, continued benefits, or tax gross-ups for NEOs .
  • Clawback: NYSE-compliant Compensation Recovery Policy adopted Oct 2, 2023; 2024 restatements of segment information did not trigger recovery; equity award agreements also include forfeiture/clawback for cause and specified prohibited conduct; agreements include non-compete and non-solicit restrictions .
  • Insider trading policy: Filed as an exhibit to the 2024 Form 10-K; prohibits certain transactions; combined with explicit anti-hedging/pledging policy for executives .

Retirement, Deferred Compensation, and Perquisites

Program/ItemDetail
Pension (Present Value at 12/31/2024)ADM Retirement Plan: $222,918; ADM Supplemental Retirement Plan: $344,792; 25 years credited service .
Nonqualified Deferred CompensationAggregate earnings in 2024: $808,505; Aggregate balance at 12/31/2024: $5,426,233 .
Perquisites/Other (2024)Health/life insurance paid: $26,566; executive healthcare services provided; dividend equivalents on unvested RSUs/PSUs: $149,589; 401(k) company contribution: $17,250 .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Emphasis on at-risk pay: In 2024, ADM delivered 60% PSUs/40% RSUs in LTI; annual bonus tied primarily to Adjusted EBITDA with ROIC modifier; 2024 company payout factor 30.4% reflected lower profitability vs plan .
  • Performance metric calibration: PSU grids emphasize sustained returns (avg Adjusted ROIC) and earnings power (cumulative Adjusted EPS); ESG modifier simplifies to two measurable goals (+/–10%) .
  • Discretion and accountability: Board applied negative discretion on 2024 annual company performance and 2022 PSU payouts for certain NEOs tied to the period under the Nutrition segment investigation; Pinner’s payouts in the tables were not reduced (company portion for him at 30.4%; 2022 PSU payout at 112%) .
  • Say-on-pay support: 87% approval in 2024 provides external validation of compensation approach .
  • Peer benchmarking: S&P 100 used as broad-market talent and performance reference (includes Bunge) .

Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure

  • Time-based RSUs vest through 2027 (see schedule above), creating periodic liquidity events; 2022 PSUs vested on 02/10/2025, potentially adding near-term supply .
  • Policy constraints (no pledging/hedging; ownership guidelines) mitigate misalignment and may moderate selling behavior until guideline thresholds are met; Pinner exceeds guideline at 5.2x salary .

Equity Ownership & Alignment (Snapshot)

MetricValue
Beneficial Ownership61,708 shares; <1% of outstanding
Skin-in-the-GameMeets ownership guideline (4x) at 5.2x salary
Pledging/HedgingProhibited by policy; no shares subject to pledge at group level

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Nutrition segment accounting investigation: Drove use of negative discretion for certain NEOs; internal controls remediation and restatements did not trigger clawback under NYSE policy due to no impact on financial reporting measures used for incentive awards in the lookback period .
  • Governance safeguards: Double-trigger CIS vesting; robust clawback/forfeiture provisions; prohibition on hedging/pledging; strong ownership requirements .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and retention: Exceeding stock ownership guidelines (5.2x) and meaningful unvested equity (RSUs and PSUs) support alignment and retention through 2027; absence of pledging mitigates downside-alignment risk .
  • Near-term supply: RSU tranche vesting and the 2022 PSU vest on 02/10/2025 present identifiable windows for potential insider sales; monitoring Form 4 filings around these dates can inform trading signals .
  • Pay-for-performance balance: 2024 cash bonus at 50.4% of target reflects plan underperformance; maintained PSU discipline (112% payout) tied to superior ROIC offset by EPS miss, consistent with long-term return focus .
  • Governance posture: Strong say-on-pay support, explicit clawback, and no CIC cash severance reduce compensation-related headline risk; however, continued attention to internal control remediation and Nutrition segment execution remains warranted for assessing execution risk .