Regina Jones
About Regina Jones
Regina Bynote Jones is Senior Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Corporate Secretary of ADM, overseeing global Legal, Government Relations, Regulatory and Scientific Affairs, Compliance/Integrity initiatives, and Global Security Operations; she joined ADM effective September 5, 2023 . She holds a BBA (Sam Houston State University) and a JD (South Texas College of Law) with emphasis in computer and technology law; her career includes extensive technology and cybersecurity exposure and international assignments in Europe and Southeast Asia . In 2023, ADM delivered adjusted EPS of $6.98, adjusted segment operating profit of $6.2B, and adjusted ROIC of 12.2%, framing a pay-for-performance context for NEO incentives that year . For 2024, ADM’s annual incentive company component paid at 30.4% out of 75% target; 2022–2024 PSUs vested at 112% of target, with negative discretion applied to select participants amid the Nutrition-segment investigation, underscoring governance discipline .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baker Hughes | Chief Legal Officer | 2020–2023 | Led global legal function at energy technology leader; multi-country team leadership |
| Delek US Holdings & Delek Logistics Partners | EVP, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary | Pre-2020 | Public company GC/Corp Sec roles; boardroom governance and energy downstream expertise |
| Schlumberger | Senior legal leadership incl. GC for Land Rigs (12+ years) | 12+ years | Extensive international legal leadership; assignments in Paris and Kuala Lumpur |
| Dynegy Marketing & Trade; Shell Oil; El Paso Energy | Legal and IT leadership roles | — | Early career spanning legal, supply chain, and IT in large-cap energy companies |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Status/Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| National Association of Manufacturers | Board of Directors | Current | External industry leadership; policy and manufacturing ecosystem engagement |
| Economic Club of Chicago | Member | Current | Senior business network participation |
| South Texas College of Law | Board (prior) | Prior | Legal education governance and alumni leadership |
| March of Dimes (Houston); Girl Scouts (Houston); Child Advocates; State Bar of Texas | Director/Board roles (prior) | Prior | Non-profit and professional service |
Fixed Compensation
| Element | Detail | Period | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary | $725,004 (initial annual rate) | Effective 9/5/2023 | |
| Target annual cash incentive | 100% of base salary (prorated for 2023 service) | 2023 | |
| Actual annual cash incentive | 120.9% of target applied to prorated base ($241,668) = $292,237 | FY2023 (paid Q1’24) | |
| One-time sign-on (cash) | $630,000 (paid March 2024) to replace forfeited prior-employer bonus | 2024 payment | |
| Relocation assistance | $200,000 lump sum | 2023 | |
| Summary Compensation (SCT) totals | Salary $236,091; Bonus $630,000; Stock awards $5,620,122; Non-Equity Incentive $292,237; Change in Pension Value $7,047; All Other $248,340; Total $7,033,837 | 2023 |
Performance Compensation
- Program design
- Annual Incentive (2023): Company performance 75% (Adjusted EBITDA, Strategic goals, ROIC +/-10% modifier) + Individual 25%; EBITDA goal table published; ROIC modifier at 10% threshold bands .
- Annual Incentive (2024): Simplified to Adjusted EBITDA (75%) + ROIC +/-10% modifier; Company component paid at 30.4% out of 75% target; ADM 2024 Adjusted EBITDA was $4.476B (43.8% of goal) with ROIC target 9.8% .
- Long-term Incentives: 60% PSUs, 40% RSUs. PSU metrics: 50% average adjusted ROIC; 50% cumulative adjusted EPS; ESG/“Strive 35” modifier updated in 2024 to two-goal +/-10% .
| Incentive component | Metric/terms | Weighting | Targets (illustrative from plan) | Actual/payout (context) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 Annual Cash Incentive | Adjusted EBITDA | 50% (of Company portion) | Plan $5.85B = 100%; 200% at ≥$7.1B; 0% at ≤$4.49B | Company-wide payout contributed to 120.9% aggregate bonus result applied to NEOs; Jones prorated to $292,237 |
| 2023 Annual Cash Incentive | Strategic goals (productivity, 1ADM systems, innovation/decarbonization) | 25% (of Company portion) | Goal sets detailed with threshold/target/max and 50–200% payout curve | Incorporated into 2023 Company performance outcome |
| 2023 Annual Cash Incentive | Adjusted ROIC modifier | +/-10% | 10.0% target; 12.0%+ = 1.1x; ≤8.0% = 0.9x | Applied as modifier to Company component |
| 2024 Annual Cash Incentive | Adjusted EBITDA | 75% (of Company portion) | Plan targets published; 100% at $5.438B; 200% at ≥$6.602B | 32.85% factor from EBITDA; overall Company component 30.4%/75% |
| 2024 Annual Cash Incentive | Adjusted ROIC modifier | +/-10% | 9.8% target; 11.8%+ = 1.1x; ≤7.8% = 0.9x | Applied as modifier |
| 2023–2026 PSU structure | Average adjusted ROIC | 50% | Three-year prospective goals | PSU earns 0–200%; dividend equivalents paid on earned PSUs |
| 2023–2026 PSU structure | Cumulative adjusted EPS | 50% | Three-year prospective goals | As above |
- Regina Jones 2023 LTI grants and vesting
- Annual LTI: ~$2,300,000 (60% PSUs; 40% RSUs vesting ratably over 3 years from 9/5/2023) .
- Make-whole equity: ~$3,320,000 RSUs vesting 50% at 1-year and 50% at 2-year anniversaries of 9/5/2023 (to replace forfeited unvested equity) .
| Award | Grant value/units | Vesting schedule | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Make-whole RSUs | ~$3.32M | 50% on 9/5/2024; 50% on 9/5/2025 | Intended to replace forfeited equity from prior employer |
| Annual RSUs (40% of $2.3M) | Part of $2.3M LTI | One-third on each of 9/5/2024, 9/5/2025, 9/5/2026 | Standard NEO RSU schedule |
| Annual PSUs (60% of $2.3M) | Target units per plan | Cliff vest after 3-year performance (2023–2025), subject to metrics | 0–200% payout; dividend equivalents on earned units |
- Outstanding/vesting detail (as of 12/31/2023)
- Unvested RSUs: 53,754; market value $3,882,114 at $72.22 per share; scheduled vestings include 25,011 (9/5/24), 24,894 (9/5/25), 3,849 (9/5/26) .
- Unearned PSUs: 17,495 target units; indicative payout value $1,263,489 at $72.22 (subject to performance) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Measure | Value | As of | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Common stock beneficially owned | — | April 4, 2024 | |
| Unvested RSUs (do not count for ownership if performance-based; time-based count) | 70,308 RSUs (unvested) | April 4, 2024 | |
| Unvested PSUs (target) | 17,495 (as of 12/31/2023) | Dec 31, 2023 | |
| Percent of class | Less than 1% | April 4, 2024 | |
| Stock ownership guideline | 4x salary | Policy | |
| Actual ownership vs guideline | 6.1x multiple (exceeds guideline) | April 4, 2024 | |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for executives | Policy | |
| Shares subject to pledge | None among directors and current executive officers as a group | March 21, 2025 |
Notes:
- Executives may not sell Company securities until the ownership guideline is met; time-based RSUs count toward compliance; options and PSUs do not .
- ADM discloses no shares are subject to pledge at the group level and prohibits pledging and hedging company stock .
Employment Terms
- Start date and role: Appointed SVP, General Counsel and Secretary effective September 5, 2023; signature authority evidenced in 8-K filings .
- No employment contract; severance governed by a general severance program (non-contractual), often contingent on non-compete/non-solicit covenants; no CIC cash severance, no tax gross-ups .
- Equity treatment on separation/CIC:
- RSUs: Standard vest ratably over 3 years; accelerate upon death; continue vesting on disability/retirement; double-trigger acceleration upon CIC if not assumed/replaced or upon qualifying termination within 24 months .
- PSUs: Vest at target upon death; double-trigger CIC acceleration with payout equal to greater of target or earned-to-date on truncated period; continue vesting on disability/retirement; subject to forfeiture and clawback for cause or covenant breach .
- Clawback: NYSE-compliant Compensation Recovery Policy covering incentive-based compensation of current/former executive officers .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and pay-for-performance: Jones’s package is heavily at-risk with 60% of annual LTI in PSUs tied to multi-year adjusted ROIC and cumulative adjusted EPS, aligning compensation with returns and earnings quality measures; stringent stock ownership, hedging/pledging bans, and a robust clawback enhance alignment and downside accountability .
- Near-term vesting/selling pressure: Make-whole RSUs vest 50% on 9/5/2024 and 50% on 9/5/2025, with additional annual RSUs vesting on 9/5/2024/2025/2026; these dates could concentrate potential tax-related sales/withholding, though guideline restrictions and blackout policies may limit discretionary selling .
- Retention risk: Multi-year PSU cycles and double-trigger CIC protection, coupled with non-compete/non-solicit conditions embedded in awards, temper near-term departure risk despite front-loaded make-whole awards .
- Governance signals: Board exercised negative discretion on 2024 payouts amid an ongoing Nutrition-segment accounting investigation, indicating willingness to enforce accountability even absent individual misconduct findings; this can dampen windfalls and support investor confidence in pay outcomes .