Blake McCarthy
About Blake McCarthy
Blake McCarthy (age 40) is Chief Financial Officer of Atlas Energy Solutions (AESI), appointed May 13, 2024. He has 15+ years across oilfield services operations/finance, public company leadership, principal investing, and energy investment banking; he holds an A.B. from Princeton University . Under his tenure year, AESI highlighted 2024 total shareholder return (TSR) of 34.6%, multiple dividend increases, authorization of a $200M buyback, and completion of the 42‑mile Dune Express; 2024 STI (annual bonus) paid at 73.3% of target based on scorecard outcomes . McCarthy’s pay design is performance‑oriented: $450k base, 100% target bonus, and $1.4M target LTI (50% PSUs linked to relative TSR/ROCE; 50% RSUs), plus a $650k new‑hire RSU inducement vesting over three years .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| NOV, Inc. (NYSE: NOV) | President, NOV Grant Prideco; VP Corporate Development & Investor Relations; other operational/financial roles | ~7 years | Public company leadership across operations, BD/IR; exposure to oilfield equipment cycles and capital allocation |
| Citadel Global Equities | Principal investor covering global oil & gas (focus: oilfield services) | Not disclosed | Buy‑side perspective on value creation, returns, and competitive positioning |
| Simmons & Company International | Investment banker | Not disclosed | Energy M&A/financing; transaction execution and sector coverage |
External Roles
- No external public company directorships or committee roles were disclosed in the Company’s proxy biography for Mr. McCarthy .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 detail |
|---|---|
| Base salary | $450,000 as of 12/31/24 |
| Target bonus | 100% of salary ($450,000 target) |
| 2024 actual bonus | $216,888 paid for 2024 performance (prorated; overall STI 73.3% of target) |
| Other compensation | $258,001 (includes $250,213 relocation; $7,788 401(k) match) |
Performance Compensation
2024 STI scorecard and payout
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Result | Payout contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow ($mm) | 50% | 270 | 300 | 345 | 251.3 | 23.3% (interpolated) |
| Dune Express – Timing | 10% | 2/28/25 | 12/31/24 | 11/1/24 | Commissioning 12/20/24 | 10% |
| Dune Express – On Budget ($mm) | 10% | 450 | 400 | 350 | 396 | 10% |
| Discretionary evaluation | 30% | — | 30% | — | 30% | 30% |
| Total | 100% | 73.3% |
Notes: Executive Chairman excluded from STI; NEOs (incl. CFO) capped at 150% of target; McCarthy’s payout prorated for hire date .
Long‑term incentives (structure and 2024 grants)
- LTI mix (CFO/other NEOs): 50% PSUs, 50% RSUs; Executive Chairman: 100% PSUs .
- PSU metrics and vesting: 3‑year cliff; 75% relative TSR vs compensation peer group (30th/60th/90th percentiles for 50%/100%/200% payout; capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative), 25% ROCE (15%/20%/25% for 50%/100%/200%) .
- RSUs: 3‑year ratable vest; align ownership/retention .
2024 McCarthy equity awards
| Grant date | Award | Units (#) | Vesting | Grant date fair value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5/15/2024 | PSUs (target) | 30,251 | 3‑yr cliff, perf‑based (TSR/ROCE) | 937,781 |
| 5/15/2024 | RSUs (annual) | 30,251 | 1/3 each on 5/15/25, 5/15/26, 5/15/27 | 698,193 |
| 5/15/2024 | RSUs (inducement) | 28,090 | 1/3 each on 5/15/25, 5/15/26, 5/15/27 | 648,317 |
Total 2024 stock awards reported for McCarthy: RSUs $1,346,510 and PSUs (probable) $937,781 .
2024 company performance highlights (context)
- TSR 34.6% for 2024; multiple dividend increases; $200M buyback authorization; Dune Express completed in December 2024 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 19,444 shares (<1% of outstanding as of 3/18/25) |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/24) | 30,251 RSUs ($670,967) + 28,090 RSUs ($623,036) = 58,341 RSUs ($1,294,003) |
| Unvested PSUs (12/31/24) | 60,502 PSUs (representing 200% presentation per SEC rule; payout depends on performance) – $1,341,934 |
| Hedging/pledging policy | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited above 15% of market value of pledged AESI securities |
Notes: No option awards; Company does not currently grant stock options . Ownership guidelines not disclosed in proxy (no mention found) .
Key vesting and potential selling‑pressure dates (RSUs)
- Inducement RSUs and annual RSUs vest 1/3 on each of: 5/15/2025, 5/15/2026, 5/15/2027 (subject to trading windows/10b5‑1) .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms for McCarthy |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | None; NEOs not party to employment agreements |
| Severance plan | Management Change in Control Severance Plan; cash multiple on salary+target bonus, pro‑rated or full target bonus, COBRA stipend, accrued benefits; RSU acceleration; PSU treatment per timing |
| Multiples | Non‑CIC: 1.5x; CIC: 2.0x (salary+target bonus). Pro‑rated target bonus for Non‑CIC; full target bonus for CIC. COBRA: 18 months (Non‑CIC) / 24 months (CIC) |
| Equity treatment | RSUs accelerate upon CIC, death/disability, or Qualifying Termination; PSUs: if Qualifying Termination in first 2 years, deemed at 100% target; if in year 3, settle at actual performance; upon CIC during performance period, committee assesses performance to date and deems service satisfied |
| Clawback | Dodd‑Frank compliant clawback adopted Oct 2, 2023; restatement‑triggered recovery of erroneously awarded incentive comp (unless impracticable) |
| Options | No stock options granted in 2024; company does not currently grant options |
Potential payments to McCarthy if terminated as of 12/31/2024
| Scenario | Cash severance | Target bonus | COBRA (lump sum) | Unvested RSUs | Unvested PSUs | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualifying Termination (Non‑CIC) | $1,350,000 | $450,000 | $29,798 | $1,294,003 | $670,967 | $3,794,768 |
| Qualifying Termination (CIC) | $1,800,000 | $450,000 | $39,730 | $1,294,003 | $670,967 | $4,254,701 |
Compensation Committee/Benchmarking (context)
- Compensation peer group includes: Cactus, Helmerich & Payne, Select Water, ChampionX, Liberty, Solaris Oilfield Infrastructure, Core Labs, Oil States, U.S. Silica, Dril‑Quip, Patterson‑UTI, Expro, ProPetro .
- 2024 LTI PSUs measured vs this peer group for relative TSR; RSUs vest ratably over three years .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: High equity weighting with PSUs tied to three‑year relative TSR and ROCE should motivate capital discipline and shareholder return focus; 2024 STI scorecard emphasized Adj. FCF and on‑time/on‑budget Dune Express delivery, with total STI at 73.3% of target .
- Retention and selling‑pressure signals: Material unvested equity (≈58k RSUs and 60.5k PSUs at 12/31/24) plus three‑year vesting cadence and new‑hire inducement support retention; watch for RSU tranches around 5/15/2025/2026/2027 for potential liquidity events (subject to windows/10b5‑1) .
- Downside/CIC economics: Severance is moderate (1.5x Non‑CIC; 2.0x CIC on salary+bonus), with RSU acceleration and PSU target treatment if separation occurs in first two years—reasonable but not excessive golden‑parachute risk; notable dollarized outcomes as of 12/31/24 shown above .
- Governance/hedging/pledging: Clawback policy in place; hedging prohibited and pledging tightly limited—positive alignment features; no options (reduces repricing risk) .
- Ownership: Beneficial ownership is <1%; alignment therefore relies primarily on unvested equity and future performance vesting; no ownership‑multiple guidelines disclosed in proxy .
Overall: Incentives emphasize multi‑year TSR/ROCE and cash generation, with clear milestone‑based STI and sizeable unvested equity to retain a newly hired CFO. Monitor Adj. FCF delivery vs STI targets, TSR relative to peers into the PSU performance window, and vesting dates for potential trading flow .