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Audrey Tillman

Senior Executive Vice President and General Counsel at AFLACAFLAC
Executive

About Audrey Tillman

Senior Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Aflac Incorporated; promoted to Senior EVP effective January 1, 2025 after serving as EVP and General Counsel in 2024 . Company context: Aflac delivered a three-year total shareholder return of +90.0% and returned $3.9B to shareholders in 2024 via $2.8B repurchases and dividends, with adjusted ROE ex-FX of 17.7% and 2024 net income of $5.443B .

Company revenues and EBITDA (context for performance; USD):

MetricFY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Revenues ($)$20,913,000,000*$18,557,000,000*$17,934,000,000*$17,556,000,000*
EBITDA ($)$5,491,000,000*$5,140,000,000*$5,496,000,000*$6,654,000,000*

*Values retrieved from S&P Global.

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Aflac IncorporatedExecutive Vice President, General Counsel–2024 (end) Led legal function; member of NEO team tied to enterprise MIP/LTI metrics, aligning legal priorities with capital strength (AROE, RBC/SMR) and operating performance

Fixed Compensation

Item202220232024
Base Salary ($)740,000 740,000 750,000
Target MIP (% of salary)120% 120%
Actual MIP Earned (% of salary)164%
Non-Equity Incentive Paid ($)1,045,629 1,254,524 1,229,625
Stock Awards (Grant-Date Fair Value, $)2,025,875 1,979,004 2,215,530
All Other Compensation ($)20,435 27,508 355,096

2024 perquisites and benefits detail:

Perquisite/Benefit2024 ($)
Personal use of aircraft11,555
Other (guest travel, etc.)18,997
Total Perquisites30,552
Company 401(k) Contribution27,600
Company EDCP Contribution296,944

Performance Compensation

2024 MIP metric weighting (Audrey B. Tillman):

MetricWeighting
Corporate: Adjusted EPS ex-FX37.50%
U.S.: New Annualized Premium15.625%
U.S.: Net Earned Premium15.625%
Japan: New Annualized Premium15.63%
Japan: Net Earned Premium15.63%
Total100%

2024 MIP performance outcomes (company/segment pool):

  • Corporate adjusted EPS ex-FX: 200% of target; MIP modifier +5% for sustainability achievements .
  • U.S.: New annualized premium 0%, net earned premium 80.26%, expense ratio 157%, pretax adjusted earnings 130.13% .
  • Japan: New annualized premium 121.76%, net earned premium 150.74% .
  • Global Investments: Net investment income 200%, credit losses/impairments 88.80% .

2024 LTI (PBRS) design and targets (NEOs excluding Mr. Miller):

MetricThresholdTargetMaximumWeight
3-yr avg AROE (ex-FX)11.0%13.0%16.0%70%
3-yr avg RBC350%400%500%15%
3-yr avg SMR/ESR500%600%700%15%
RTSR vs peers (modifier)0.80x (≤25th pct)1.00x1.20x (≥75th pct)±20%
  • 2024 LTI target opportunity: 300% of base salary for Ms. Tillman .
  • 2/15/2024 PBRS grant: Threshold 14,033; Target 28,066; Max 56,132 shares; 3-year cliff vesting subject to AROE, RBC, SMR/ESR with RTSR modifier .
  • Prior cycle payout: 2022–2024 PBRS paid at 200% of target (cap applied; RTSR in 80th percentile yielded 1.2x before cap) .

Option awards and 2024 realizations:

ItemDetail
2024 Vested Stock Awards80,314 shares; $6,282,964 value realized
2024 Options Exercised41,024 shares; $2,542,299 value realized
Legacy Option Outstanding19,314 options at $28.965 expiring 2/09/2026

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership (2/25/2025)377,945 shares; 0.1% of outstanding
Voting Rights551,846 votes (includes voting of certain unvested shares)
Options Exercisable within 60 days19,314
Unvested PBRS at 12/31/202462,938 (2022 grant cycle), 57,751 (2023 cycle, shown at max), 57,310 (2024 cycle, shown at max)
Ownership GuidelinesSection 16 officers: 3x base salary; each current NEO exceeds or is working toward compliance
Hedging/Pledging/10b5‑1Hedging prohibited for all; executive officers prohibited from pledging; 10b5‑1 plans require Compensation Committee approval
Pledged SharesNone for any Director or executive officer

Employment Terms

Key provisions and quantified scenarios:

  • Agreement status and term: Employment agreement in place; if terminated without “good cause” or by Ms. Tillman for “good reason,” compensation/benefits continue for the remaining scheduled term (29 1/3 months as of 12/31/2024); equity fully vests, but performance-based awards remain subject to performance .
  • Double-trigger change in control: Lump sum severance of 3x (salary in effect immediately prior to CIC + higher of prior-year or pre-CIC year non-equity incentive award) .
  • Non-compete: Upon voluntary termination without good reason or termination for good cause, a two-year non-compete applies .
  • Death/Disability: Terminal pay equal to base plus non-equity incentive over prior 36 months paid over 36 months (for death, per plan); all outstanding equity awards vest upon death or disability .

2024 quantified potential payments (assuming termination on 12/31/2024):

ScenarioSalary ($)Non-Equity Incentive ($)Severance Cash ($)Equity Awards ($)Retirement/Other ($)Health & Welfare ($)Total ($)
Co. termination w/o Cause or by Employee for Good Reason (pre-CIC)1,833,333 3,001,633 18,412,033 10,655,004 65,866 33,967,868
Voluntary w/o Good Reason12,483,981 10,587,537 23,071,518
Voluntary with Competition12,483,981 12,483,981
Death2,230,000 3,400,853 18,412,033 5,016,824 29,059,710
Disability1,125,000 1,229,625 18,412,033 11,074,353 40,418 31,881,428
CIC termination (double trigger)6,013,572 18,412,033 10,587,537 377,779 35,390,921

Governance protections: Double-trigger CIC; no excise tax gross-ups; clawback policy updated to Dodd-Frank/SEC/NYSE requirements .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 say-on-pay support: 96.4%; five-year average support: 96.6% .
  • Program emphasizes pay-for-performance, rigorous caps (200% of target), multi-metric MIP and 100% performance-based LTI with RTSR modifier .

Investment Implications

  • Strong pay-for-performance alignment: 100% performance-based LTI tied to capital and profitability (AROE, RBC, SMR/ESR) with a market-based RTSR modifier; MIP weightings for legal/GC role emphasize enterprise profitability and segment growth, limiting discretionary risk-taking .
  • Limited governance red flags: No pledging; hedging banned; 10b5‑1 plans require committee approval; robust clawback; no CIC excise tax gross-ups; double-trigger CIC .
  • Retention and selling pressure: Upcoming large PBRS cliffs in Q1 2026 (2023–2025 cycle) and Q1 2027 (2024–2026 cycle) could prompt Rule 10b5‑1 sales around vest dates; 2024 realized $6.28M on vesting and $2.54M on option exercises indicate meaningful liquidity events to monitor near vesting windows .
  • Change-in-control economics: 3x salary+bonus cash severance is meaningful but within market norms; equity fully vests, sustaining alignment but creating potential short-term selling incentives upon CIC termination .
  • Performance backdrop supportive: Three-year TSR +90% and high AROE (17.7%) provide a constructive context for incentive payouts, reducing optics risk on pay-for-performance .