Sign in

You're signed outSign in or to get full access.

Audrey Tillman

Senior Executive Vice President and General Counsel at AFLACAFLAC
Executive

About Audrey Tillman

Senior Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Aflac Incorporated; promoted to Senior EVP effective January 1, 2025 after serving as EVP and General Counsel in 2024 . Company context: Aflac delivered a three-year total shareholder return of +90.0% and returned $3.9B to shareholders in 2024 via $2.8B repurchases and dividends, with adjusted ROE ex-FX of 17.7% and 2024 net income of $5.443B .

Company revenues and EBITDA (context for performance; USD):

MetricFY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Revenues ($)$20,913,000,000*$18,557,000,000*$17,934,000,000*$17,556,000,000*
EBITDA ($)$5,491,000,000*$5,140,000,000*$5,496,000,000*$6,654,000,000*

*Values retrieved from S&P Global.

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Aflac IncorporatedExecutive Vice President, General Counsel–2024 (end) Led legal function; member of NEO team tied to enterprise MIP/LTI metrics, aligning legal priorities with capital strength (AROE, RBC/SMR) and operating performance

Fixed Compensation

Item202220232024
Base Salary ($)740,000 740,000 750,000
Target MIP (% of salary)120% 120%
Actual MIP Earned (% of salary)164%
Non-Equity Incentive Paid ($)1,045,629 1,254,524 1,229,625
Stock Awards (Grant-Date Fair Value, $)2,025,875 1,979,004 2,215,530
All Other Compensation ($)20,435 27,508 355,096

2024 perquisites and benefits detail:

Perquisite/Benefit2024 ($)
Personal use of aircraft11,555
Other (guest travel, etc.)18,997
Total Perquisites30,552
Company 401(k) Contribution27,600
Company EDCP Contribution296,944

Performance Compensation

2024 MIP metric weighting (Audrey B. Tillman):

MetricWeighting
Corporate: Adjusted EPS ex-FX37.50%
U.S.: New Annualized Premium15.625%
U.S.: Net Earned Premium15.625%
Japan: New Annualized Premium15.63%
Japan: Net Earned Premium15.63%
Total100%

2024 MIP performance outcomes (company/segment pool):

  • Corporate adjusted EPS ex-FX: 200% of target; MIP modifier +5% for sustainability achievements .
  • U.S.: New annualized premium 0%, net earned premium 80.26%, expense ratio 157%, pretax adjusted earnings 130.13% .
  • Japan: New annualized premium 121.76%, net earned premium 150.74% .
  • Global Investments: Net investment income 200%, credit losses/impairments 88.80% .

2024 LTI (PBRS) design and targets (NEOs excluding Mr. Miller):

MetricThresholdTargetMaximumWeight
3-yr avg AROE (ex-FX)11.0%13.0%16.0%70%
3-yr avg RBC350%400%500%15%
3-yr avg SMR/ESR500%600%700%15%
RTSR vs peers (modifier)0.80x (≤25th pct)1.00x1.20x (≥75th pct)±20%
  • 2024 LTI target opportunity: 300% of base salary for Ms. Tillman .
  • 2/15/2024 PBRS grant: Threshold 14,033; Target 28,066; Max 56,132 shares; 3-year cliff vesting subject to AROE, RBC, SMR/ESR with RTSR modifier .
  • Prior cycle payout: 2022–2024 PBRS paid at 200% of target (cap applied; RTSR in 80th percentile yielded 1.2x before cap) .

Option awards and 2024 realizations:

ItemDetail
2024 Vested Stock Awards80,314 shares; $6,282,964 value realized
2024 Options Exercised41,024 shares; $2,542,299 value realized
Legacy Option Outstanding19,314 options at $28.965 expiring 2/09/2026

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership (2/25/2025)377,945 shares; 0.1% of outstanding
Voting Rights551,846 votes (includes voting of certain unvested shares)
Options Exercisable within 60 days19,314
Unvested PBRS at 12/31/202462,938 (2022 grant cycle), 57,751 (2023 cycle, shown at max), 57,310 (2024 cycle, shown at max)
Ownership GuidelinesSection 16 officers: 3x base salary; each current NEO exceeds or is working toward compliance
Hedging/Pledging/10b5‑1Hedging prohibited for all; executive officers prohibited from pledging; 10b5‑1 plans require Compensation Committee approval
Pledged SharesNone for any Director or executive officer

Employment Terms

Key provisions and quantified scenarios:

  • Agreement status and term: Employment agreement in place; if terminated without “good cause” or by Ms. Tillman for “good reason,” compensation/benefits continue for the remaining scheduled term (29 1/3 months as of 12/31/2024); equity fully vests, but performance-based awards remain subject to performance .
  • Double-trigger change in control: Lump sum severance of 3x (salary in effect immediately prior to CIC + higher of prior-year or pre-CIC year non-equity incentive award) .
  • Non-compete: Upon voluntary termination without good reason or termination for good cause, a two-year non-compete applies .
  • Death/Disability: Terminal pay equal to base plus non-equity incentive over prior 36 months paid over 36 months (for death, per plan); all outstanding equity awards vest upon death or disability .

2024 quantified potential payments (assuming termination on 12/31/2024):

ScenarioSalary ($)Non-Equity Incentive ($)Severance Cash ($)Equity Awards ($)Retirement/Other ($)Health & Welfare ($)Total ($)
Co. termination w/o Cause or by Employee for Good Reason (pre-CIC)1,833,333 3,001,633 18,412,033 10,655,004 65,866 33,967,868
Voluntary w/o Good Reason12,483,981 10,587,537 23,071,518
Voluntary with Competition12,483,981 12,483,981
Death2,230,000 3,400,853 18,412,033 5,016,824 29,059,710
Disability1,125,000 1,229,625 18,412,033 11,074,353 40,418 31,881,428
CIC termination (double trigger)6,013,572 18,412,033 10,587,537 377,779 35,390,921

Governance protections: Double-trigger CIC; no excise tax gross-ups; clawback policy updated to Dodd-Frank/SEC/NYSE requirements .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 say-on-pay support: 96.4%; five-year average support: 96.6% .
  • Program emphasizes pay-for-performance, rigorous caps (200% of target), multi-metric MIP and 100% performance-based LTI with RTSR modifier .

Investment Implications

  • Strong pay-for-performance alignment: 100% performance-based LTI tied to capital and profitability (AROE, RBC, SMR/ESR) with a market-based RTSR modifier; MIP weightings for legal/GC role emphasize enterprise profitability and segment growth, limiting discretionary risk-taking .
  • Limited governance red flags: No pledging; hedging banned; 10b5‑1 plans require committee approval; robust clawback; no CIC excise tax gross-ups; double-trigger CIC .
  • Retention and selling pressure: Upcoming large PBRS cliffs in Q1 2026 (2023–2025 cycle) and Q1 2027 (2024–2026 cycle) could prompt Rule 10b5‑1 sales around vest dates; 2024 realized $6.28M on vesting and $2.54M on option exercises indicate meaningful liquidity events to monitor near vesting windows .
  • Change-in-control economics: 3x salary+bonus cash severance is meaningful but within market norms; equity fully vests, sustaining alignment but creating potential short-term selling incentives upon CIC termination .
  • Performance backdrop supportive: Three-year TSR +90% and high AROE (17.7%) provide a constructive context for incentive payouts, reducing optics risk on pay-for-performance .