Stefan Caspari
AGCO CORP /DEAbout Stefan Caspari
Stefan Caspari is Senior Vice President, Customer Success and Business Effectiveness at AGCO (since October 2023), age 46, with a background in agricultural engineering (University of Bonn) and executive education via Harvard Business School’s Advanced Management Program . Tenure includes strategy and technology leadership and transformation of Grain & Protein into a leaner, higher-performing division; his remit spans Product & Brand Management, Distribution, Parts, Customer Support, Customer Experience and Enterprise Business Solutions . As context for pay-for-performance and execution assessments, AGCO’s FY2024 net sales were ~$11.7B (down ~19.1% YoY), adjusted operating margin was 8.9% (vs. 12.0% FY2023), and adjusted EPS was $7.50 (vs. $15.55 FY2023), while the company advanced portfolio reshaping (PTx Trimble JV) and cost controls during an industry downturn .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| AGCO | SVP, Customer Success & Business Effectiveness | Oct 2023–present | Leads end-to-end customer experience, parts, support, brand/ distribution, enterprise solutions |
| AGCO | SVP & GM, Grain & Protein | Jan 2020–Oct 2023 | Led division transformation to leaner, more efficient, higher-performing unit |
| AGCO | VP & GM, Grain & Protein | Apr 2019–Dec 2019 | Managed global operations and product for G&P |
| AGCO | VP, Fuse Connected Services & Technology | 2017–Apr 2019 | Drove connected fleet, telemetry, smart farming tech implementation |
| AGCO | VP, Global Strategy & Integration | 2015–2017 | Led global strategy, performance improvement, growth, and M&A initiatives |
| AGCO | Director, Strategy & Integration (EME); Director, Multi‑Brand Strategy & Governance (EME) | 2014–2016 | Strategy and governance for Europe/Middle East, multi‑brand alignment |
| Zurich Financial Services; Arthur D. Little | Various leadership roles in sales, marketing, operations | Pre‑2014 | Industry experience in insurance and consulting; operational and strategic skill development |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| German American Chamber of Commerce South | Board of Directors | Not disclosed | External network and industry ties |
Fixed Compensation
AGCO targets executive total compensation around market median, with increasing variable mix at higher responsibility levels . For 2024, annual cash incentives (AIP) for all NEOs and senior vice presidents were based 100% on corporate goals (no individualized goals), aligning SVP incentives (including Caspari) to company performance . Stock ownership requirements: CEO 6× salary; other executive officers (including SVPs) 3× salary; non‑employee directors 5× retainer; compliance required within five years of appointment/promotion. As of December 31, 2024, all directors and executive officers were compliant or within the transition period . Hedging and pledging by directors and officers are prohibited under AGCO policy (subject to a narrowed exception unrelated to Caspari), reinforcing alignment .
Performance Compensation
AGCO’s incentive architecture emphasizes operating quality and capital efficiency, normalized for industry cyclicality via sliding scale targets.
| Program | Period | Metric | Weighting | Targeting Approach | 2024 Achievement | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIP (Annual cash) | 1 year | Adjusted Operating Margin | 40% | Sliding scale vs 10‑yr industry sales average | Met threshold (9.2%) | Cash payout factor determined by total achievement |
| AIP (Annual cash) | 1 year | Return on Net Assets (RONA) | 40% | Sliding scale; excludes designated items (e.g., JV year‑1 effects) | Below threshold (32.4% vs 42.8% target) | Cash payout factor determined by total achievement |
| AIP (Annual cash) | 1 year | Customer Satisfaction (Net Promoter Score) | 10% | NPS index | 66% vs 65% threshold | Included in payout factor |
| AIP (Annual cash) | 1 year | Employee Engagement | 10% | Engagement index | 67% vs 72% target | Included in payout factor |
| 2024 AIP Total | 1 year | Aggregate corporate score | — | — | 27.5% payout factor | SVPs’ AIP were based on this corporate factor |
| PSP (Performance shares) | 3 years | Revenue Growth | 50% | Year-over-year growth, FX/acquisition/pricing‑adjusted | 2.8% actual for 2022–2024 cycle | Shares earned per matrix; subject to TSR modifier |
| PSP (Performance shares) | 3 years | RONA | 50% | Sliding scale targets vs industry conditions | 34.8% actual for 2022–2024 cycle | Shares earned per matrix; subject to TSR modifier |
| PSP TSR Modifier | 3 years | Relative TSR vs MVIS Global Agribusiness Index | +/-20% | Quartile‑based | 63rd percentile (no adjustment) | Final payout unadjusted |
| PSP 2022–2024 Payout | 3 years | Aggregate | — | — | 126.2% of target (NEO cycle results) | Program design applies broadly; individual SVP awards not separately disclosed |
Notes:
- RSUs vest ratably over three years; PSP units’ performance converts to earned shares at period end, subject to relative TSR modifier .
- The Talent & Compensation Committee excludes specified items (e.g., JV first‑year impacts) to normalize calculations .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Ownership guidelines | CEO 6× salary; other executive officers 3× salary; directors 5× retainer; 5‑year compliance window; compliant or within window as of 12/31/24 |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors/officers under corporate policy (with a narrowed exception unrelated to Caspari) |
| Clawback | NYSE‑compliant compensation recovery policy for erroneously awarded incentive comp upon certain restatements |
| Beneficial ownership snapshot | As of Form 3/A filed Jan 24, 2020, Caspari reported common stock and equity awards including: 4,249 common shares; RSUs scheduled to vest on Jan 24, 2020 (136 shares), in two equal annual installments beginning Jan 23, 2020 (408 shares), and in three equal annual installments beginning Jan 22, 2020 (510 shares); PSP minimum shares from 2017–2019 and 2018–2020 cycles; SARs for 375 shares exercisable Jan 26, 2020 at $46.58, and 1,400 shares (four annual installments from Jan 24, 2018) at $63.47 |
| Insider transactions (recent) | Feb 7, 2024: Sale of 2,295 shares at $117.91 ($270,603), plus a transaction coded “JB” for 5,043 shares (per insiderinsights summary, with SEC XML link) |
| Insider filings (2025) | Form 4s filed Jan 21, 2025; Jan 31, 2025; Feb 3, 2025 (AGCO IR and EDGAR indices) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Detail |
|---|---|
| Employment agreements | AGCO maintains employment agreements with NEOs including salary, incentive participation, severance, non‑compete (2 years), non‑solicitation, confidentiality (5 years), stock ownership, and clawback provisions; executive policies (e.g., ownership, hedging/pledging, clawback) apply broadly to executive officers |
| Change‑of‑control equity | Double‑trigger vesting: accelerated vest contingent on change in control and qualifying termination or failure to assume awards; conversion and pro‑rata vesting rules for PSPs/RSUs; SSARs vest per death/disability or pro‑rata for other qualifying terminations within two years |
| Severance (structure reference) | For NEOs: 2× base salary and 2× bonus (three‑year average) for certain terminations within two years post‑CoC; pro‑rata bonus; continued benefits; without CoC: salary continuation (1 year for SVPs/NEOs other than CEO), pro‑rata bonus, pro‑rata vesting of 2024+ RSU/PSP tranches subject to release . Caspari’s specific severance terms are not separately disclosed. |
Performance & Track Record
- Business execution: Led G&P transformation; previously drove connected fleet/telemetry and smart farming tech, plus global strategy and integration — consistent with AGCO’s pivot toward precision agriculture and customer experience .
- Corporate performance context impacting incentives: 2024 industry downturn led to a 27.5% AIP payout factor, reflecting pay-for-performance calibration; 2022–2024 PSP paid at 126.2% of target, supporting longer-term retention despite short-term headwinds .
- Strategic initiatives: AGCO completed PTx Trimble JV in April 2024 and instituted restructuring to reduce structural costs and streamline operations .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Variable weighting: High proportion of variable pay via AIP and LTI aligns SVP compensation with margin and capital returns; 2024 low AIP payout demonstrates downward sensitivity in downturns .
- Sliding scale targets: Normalizes operating margin and RONA against industry cyclicality, mitigating incentives to chase volume at the expense of returns .
- Equity mix shift: Balanced PSP/RSU design (60% PSP, 40% RSU) combines long-term performance with retention; double-trigger CoC vesting reduces single-trigger windfalls .
- Risk controls: Clawback, hedging/pledging ban, capped payouts, multi-metric design reduce excessive risk taking .
Equity Ownership & Alignment Details
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Ownership guideline | 3× base salary for executive officers; compliance or within window as of 12/31/24 |
| Vested vs unvested (historical snapshot) | RSU schedules and SAR holdings as of Form 3/A in Jan 2020 detailed above; current breakdown not disclosed |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited for directors/officers; pledged shares do not count toward ownership requirements |
| Insider selling pressure | February 2024 sale (2,295 shares) indicates some liquidity activity; multiple Form 4s in Jan/Feb 2025 suggest routine vest/withholding or transactions; specifics per filings |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Caspari’s incentives are tightly linked to operating margin, RONA, and multi-year revenue growth with a relative TSR modifier, reinforcing disciplined execution and capital efficiency through cycles .
- Retention risk vs. long-term balance: The 2024 AIP payout factor (27.5%) signals near-term pressure on cash incentives during downturns, but above-target PSP outcomes (126.2% over 2022–2024) and RSU vesting cadence support retention among senior leaders .
- Governance safeguards: Ownership requirements, clawback policy, and hedging/pledging prohibitions mitigate misalignment and reduce governance risk; double-trigger CoC equity terms discourage windfall-only outcomes .
- Trading signals: Documented insider activity (2024 sale; 2025 Form 4s) appears consistent with routine vesting/withholding and portfolio management rather than outsized disposal; monitor upcoming filings for pattern changes around grant/vest cycles .
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