Elizabeth A. Brady
About Elizabeth A. Brady
Executive Vice President, Chief Marketing, Customer and Communications Officer at Allstate Insurance Company; member of Allstate’s Operating Committee. Prior roles include SVP, Global Brand Management at Kohler Co., and senior leadership positions at Publicis and BBDO; BA in Journalism (University of Kansas) and MBA (Maryville University); age 60 and in current role since January 2020 after joining Allstate in August 2018 . Company performance context: 2024 total revenues were $64.1B, +12.3% YoY; net income applicable to common shareholders was $4.6B after a loss in 2023, and the 2022–2024 PSA cycle vested at 62.2% with Relative TSR at the 91st percentile .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kohler Co. | SVP, Global Brand Management | 2013–2018 | Led marketing and communications across four businesses and 33 global brands |
| Publicis | Senior leadership positions | Not disclosed | Led customer-led brand experiences and strategies for major brands |
| BBDO | Senior leadership positions | Not disclosed | Led innovative retail marketing and creative solutions |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Allstate Foundation | Trustee | Not disclosed | Oversees corporate philanthropy initiatives |
| Marwen (Chicago nonprofit) | Board Member | Not disclosed | Supports visual arts programs in under-resourced communities |
| Ad Council | Board Member | Not disclosed | Guides national public service communications |
Fixed Compensation
- Allstate targets executive compensation at the 50th percentile of peers; a majority of long-term incentives are performance-based .
- 2024 say‑on‑pay support was >86% of votes cast, signaling shareholder alignment with program design .
- Committee uses independent consultant (Pay Governance) for benchmarking and program design; no employment agreements or guaranteed bonuses for executive officers .
Performance Compensation
PSA Metrics and Targets
| Performance Cycle | Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023–2025 | Performance Net Income ROE | 50% | 10.0% | 16.0% | 18.0% |
| 2023–2025 | Relative TSR (vs. custom peer group) | 30% | <25th percentile | 55th percentile | 90th percentile |
| 2023–2025 | Transformative Growth | 10% | ND | ND | ND |
| 2023–2025 | Inclusive Diversity & Equity | 10% | ND | ND | ND |
| 2024–2026 | Performance Net Income ROE | 50% | 9.0% | 16.0% | 20.0% |
| 2024–2026 | Relative TSR (vs. custom peer group) | 40% | <25th percentile | 55th percentile | 90th percentile |
| 2024–2026 | Inclusive Diversity & Equity | 10% | ND | ND | ND |
- 2025–2027 PSAs: metrics revised to focus solely on Average Performance Net Income ROE (60%) and Relative TSR (40%) .
PSA Actual Results (Last Completed Cycle: 2022–2024)
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Net Income ROE (50%) | 10.0% | 16.0% | 18.0% | 9.8% | Below target; limited vesting contribution |
| Relative TSR (30%) | <25th pct | 55th pct | 90th pct | 91st pct | Max contribution from TSR |
| Items in Force Growth – Personal P&L (10%) | 0.0% | 2.0% | 4.0% | −0.6% | Below target |
| Items in Force Growth – All Other (10%) | 0.0% | 3.5% | 7.0% | 3.8% | Above target |
| PSA Vesting (cycle total) | — | 100% | 200% | 62.2% | Shares vested as % of target |
Annual Cash Incentive Funding (Corporate)
| Year | Corporate Pool Funding vs Target |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 188.1% of target |
- Positive net income is required for PSAs to vest above target on Average Performance Net Income ROE; cumulative net loss caps vesting at target regardless of ROE outcome .
- Annual cash incentive pool is funded based on Market-Facing Businesses and Investments (70%) and Performance Net Income (30%), with interpolated payouts 0–200% of target .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Metric | Requirement/Status |
|---|---|
| Executive stock ownership guideline | 4x base salary for senior executives; CEO at 8x |
| Counting toward requirement | Personally/beneficially owned shares and shares in Allstate 401(k); excludes unexercised options and unvested PSAs |
| Hold-until-compliant | Must hold 75% of net shares from vesting until guideline met |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for officers, directors, and employees; senior executives/directors may not pledge securities or hold in margin accounts absent Board leadership exception |
| Pledging snapshot | As of March 1, 2025, none of the reported shares were pledged by directors and executive officers |
| Beneficial ownership snapshot | Directors and executive officers as a group: ~1.7% of common stock outstanding as of March 1, 2025 |
Employment Terms
- Change-in-Control (CIC) Plan: Double-trigger severance equals two times base salary plus target annual incentive; LTI awards vest on accelerated basis upon qualifying termination following a CIC; no excise tax gross‑ups or cash pension enhancements .
- Deferred Compensation: Eligible employees (compensation >$345,000 in 2024) may defer up to 80% of salary and up to 100% of annual cash incentive above IRS caps; no company match or guaranteed return .
- Non‑Solicit: Applies during employment and for one year after termination for awards granted after May 19, 2009; violations may trigger cancellation and clawback of awards/realized gains .
- Non‑Compete: One‑year post‑termination non‑compete for equity awards granted on/after May 21, 2013; violations may result in award cancellation .
- Clawback: Mandatory Dodd‑Frank recoupment for restatements; discretionary clawback adopted July 2024 for improper conduct with material adverse impact; applies to cash/equity, performance/time‑based awards .
- CIC Termination Triggers: Termination by Allstate without cause or by executive for good reason within two years of CIC; definition of “cause” and “good reason” provided (e.g., material reduction in compensation/authority, job location change) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Strong pay-for-performance architecture with majority of LTI in PSAs, rigorous ownership guidelines (4x salary), and hold‑until‑compliant policy reduce near‑term selling pressure; hedging/pledging prohibitions further align interests .
- Payout sensitivity: PSA outcomes are balanced across profitability (Average Performance Net Income ROE), relative TSR, and strategic measures; 2022–2024 vesting at 62.2% shows compensation sensitivity to underwriting/profitability execution despite strong TSR .
- CIC economics: Double-trigger severance and accelerated vesting, without excise tax gross‑ups, suggest competitive but shareholder‑friendly terms; Brady’s individual severance multiple would follow plan formulas given executive officer status .
- Execution footprint: Brady leads enterprise marketing, customer experience, communications, and innovation; partnerships like the Big 12 Allstate Championship Series reinforce brand engagement and customer connectivity, supporting growth and retention objectives .
Note: Allstate’s proxy does not disclose individual base salary, target bonus, or specific equity grant counts for Elizabeth A. Brady (not a named executive officer in 2024–2025). Compensation, ownership, and employment terms above reflect policies applicable to executive officers.