Mario Rizzo
ALLSTATEAbout Mario Rizzo
Mario Rizzo is Allstate’s Chief Operating Officer (effective Oct 1, 2025) and previously President, Property-Liability; he has 33 years of experience at Allstate as of Aug 2022 and is 58 years old . He led Property-Liability, which comprises ~87% of Allstate’s total revenues, through margin repair and Transformative Growth execution . Company performance under his operating span rebounded in 2024: revenue $64.1B (+12.3% YoY), net income $4.6B, ROE 25.8%, and 2024 shareholder total return 40.6% . The AIP paid out at 188.1% of target in 2024, driven by a 93.2 combined ratio and Performance Net Income above target, while 2022–2024 PSAs vested at 62.2% reflecting earlier auto margin pressure .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Allstate Corporation | Chief Operating Officer | Appointed Oct 1, 2025 | Elevated to COO overseeing Property-Liability and Protection Services; targets increased to 250% AIP and 425% equity; equity mix 60% PSAs / 20% options / 20% RSUs . |
| Allstate Insurance Company (AIC) | President, Property-Liability | Sept 1, 2022 – Sep 30, 2025 | Led majority of revenues; auto margin repair and Transformative Growth; compensation targets raised to 150% AIP and 325% equity at appointment . |
| The Allstate Corporation & AIC | EVP & Chief Financial Officer | Jan 3, 2018 – Aug 31, 2022 | Strengthened capital, investment repositioning and Transformative Growth funding; set at 125% AIP and 300% equity when appointed . |
| AIC | SVP & CFO, Allstate Personal Lines | Jun 2014 – Jan 2018 | Finance leadership for Personal Lines; precursor to corporate CFO . |
External Roles
No public-company board roles or external directorships disclosed for Mr. Rizzo in the proxy or 8-Ks. Skip.
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2018 (CFO) | 2022 (PL President) | 2024 (PL President) | 2025 (COO) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $700,000 | $850,000 | $875,000 | $950,000 |
| Target Annual Incentive (% of Salary) | 125% | 150% | 225% (raised from 150%) | 250% |
| Target Equity Incentive (% of Salary) | 300% | 325% | 400% (raised from 325%) | 425% |
Performance Compensation
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout/Outcome | Vesting/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 AIP Corporate Pool | Market-Facing Businesses + Investments Roll-up | 70% | Interpolated to 0–200% of target | 184.2% | 184.2% | Based on segment matrices and investment metrics . |
| 2024 AIP Corporate Pool | Performance Net Income | 30% | $3,660M target | $5,213M | 197.1% | Pool funding based on actual vs plan . |
| 2024 AIP Property-Liability sub-metric | Combined Ratio / Items-in-Force Growth (Matrix) | Included in Roll-up | CR target 96.5; IIF target -1.5% | CR 93.2; IIF -0.6% | 195.0% | CR/IIF matrix calibrates payout . |
| 2024 Equity Mix (NEOs) | PSAs / Stock Options / RSUs | 60% / 20% / 20% | — | — | Mix changed based on shareholder feedback | CEO: 70% PSAs / 30% options . |
| PSAs Cycle | 2021–2023 | Avg Perf Net Income ROE (50%); Relative TSR (30%); IDE/Items-in-Force (20%) | 100% | 31% | 31% vesting | 3-year performance period; vest on third anniversary . |
| PSAs Cycle | 2022–2024 | Avg Perf Net Income ROE (50%); Relative TSR (30%); Items-in-Force growth (20%) | 100% | 62.2% | 62.2% vesting | 3-year performance period; vest on third anniversary . |
| 2024 Rizzo AIP Award | AIP paid (cash) | — | 225% of salary | $3,703,219 | 188% of target funding outcome | Individual payout aligns with corporate pool; no discretion applied . |
| 2024 Rizzo LTI Grant | Grant date fair value | — | 400% of salary | $4,576,502 | 154% of target (above target equity opportunity) | PSAs, options and RSUs grant on Feb 21, 2024 . |
| 2024 Rizzo Option Award | Options (#) and strike | — | — | 22,129 @ $159.17 | Grant-date FV $874,981 | Expires 2/21/2034 . |
| 2024 Rizzo PSAs | Target / Max (#) | — | 16,492 / 32,984 | — | Grant-date FV $2,826,564 | Vest on 3rd anniversary, 0–200% based on performance . |
| 2024 Rizzo RSUs | RSUs (#) | — | — | 5,497 | Grant-date FV $874,957 | RSUs vest one-third annually over 3 years . |
Compensation Summary (Multi-Year)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $793,750 | $870,192 | $875,000 |
| Stock Awards ($) | $1,490,699 | $1,798,427 | $3,701,521 |
| Option Awards ($) | $928,419 | $1,137,493 | $874,981 |
| Non-Equity Incentive ($) | $603,665 | $653,014 | $3,703,219 |
| Change in Pension Value ($) | — | $239,380 | $143,939 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $26,250 | $27,460 | $28,200 |
| Total ($) | $3,842,783 | $4,725,966 | $9,326,860 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Metric | As of Date | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Shares directly owned | Mar 1, 2025 | 70,341 shares |
| Options exercisable (within 60 days) | Apr 30, 2025 | 262,006 shares |
| Total stock-based ownership (shares + options + RSUs within 60 days) | Mar 1, 2025 | 332,347 |
| Stock ownership guideline (multiple of salary) | Requirement | 4x salary; Actual 15.5x salary |
| Hedging/Pledging policy | — | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited for senior executives/directors unless exception granted; no shares pledged as of Mar 1, 2025 |
| RSUs/PSAs unvested (market value) | Dec 31, 2024 | RSUs 5,497 ($1,059,767); PSAs max potential 24,890 ($4,798,543) |
| Options outstanding | Dec 31, 2024 | Exercisable 228,327 (value $19,228,229); Unexercisable 60,757 (value $3,103,269) |
| 2024 equity vesting/exercises | 2024 | Options exercised: 24,698 ($1,709,102); PSAs vested: 4,058 ($656,503) |
Employment Terms
- Current role and targets: Effective Oct 1, 2025, COO salary $950,000; target AIP 250% of salary; target equity 425% of salary; eligible for $60,000 equity grant (60% PSAs, 20% options, 20% RSUs) on Oct 3, 2025 .
- CIC economics: Double-trigger required; cash severance equal to 2×(base salary + target AIP); equity awards accelerate upon qualifying termination after CIC; no excise tax gross-ups; deferred comp and SRIP distributions accelerate for Mr. Wilson; Rizzo’s deferred comp/SRIP accelerate per plan terms outlined (company disclosure notes accelerated distribution applies to Messrs. Wilson and Rizzo) .
- Potential payments (as of Dec 31, 2024): Retirement total $14,120,832; CIC total $18,812,574 (severance $5,687,500; AIP at target $1,968,750; options accelerated $3,103,269; RSUs/PSAs $7,996,929; welfare/outplacement $56,126) .
- Retirement eligibility and equity treatment: Awards >12 months continue to vest; pro-rata within 12 months; PSAs pay on actual performance; options/RSUs vest with special retirement treatment .
- Deferred compensation: 2024 executive contributions $402,552; aggregate balance $4,255,545; plan is unfunded, credited to notional investment options; 100% vested; distribution elections and in-service withdrawal rules disclosed .
Governance, Clawbacks, Perquisites
- Clawbacks: Dodd-Frank mandatory clawback plus discretionary policy allowing recovery of incentive and time-based awards for conduct causing reputational or economic harm; applies broadly to executive officers .
- Perquisites/benefits: Executive physicals; financial planning reimbursement up to $10,000; officer-level perquisite allowance ($13,560 for EVPs); 401(k) matching formula disclosed; aviation arrangement primarily for CEO; ground transport available on taxable basis .
- Say-on-pay: 2024 vote supported by >86% of votes cast; program changes included reduced option weight, higher PSAs/RSUs for NEOs and shift to performance-aligned metrics .
Performance & Track Record
- Operating turnaround: 2024 AIP funding at 188.1% evidences profitability recovery with CR 93.2 and Performance Net Income above plan; however multi-year PSA vesting remained below target (62.2% for 2022–2024; 31% for 2021–2023) reflecting prior-year auto margin pressure .
- Enterprise outcomes: Revenue $64.1B (+12.3%); Net Income $4.6B; ROE 25.8%; TSR 40.6% in 2024; investment income rose 24.8%; policies in force reached 208M .
- Strategic initiatives: Transformative Growth execution across customer value, access, acquisition, technology, and organizational transformation; PL profitability improvement plan cited by CEO and Board letters .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and alignment: For NEOs, 84% of pay is at-risk; 2024 equity mix increased PSAs/RSUs to strengthen pay-for-performance linkage; CEO retains only PSAs/options. Rizzo’s targets were increased in 2024 and again in 2025 with promotion, signaling retention and high-performance expectations .
- Metric rigor: AIP includes multi-factor segment and investment metrics plus Performance Net Income; PSAs emphasize ROE and relative TSR with growth KPIs; ranges reviewed by independent consultant and CRO for risk alignment .
- Cash vs equity trend: Year-over-year increases in stock awards and AIP in 2024 drove total compensation; option proportion reduced, mitigating risk of excessive leverage while maintaining performance orientation .
Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure
- Vesting: RSUs vest one-third annually over 3 years; PSAs vest after a 3-year performance period; options typically 10-year expiry with annual vesting; retirement and CIC provisions provide accelerated or continued vesting per plan terms .
- Potential supply: Large exercisable option overhang (228,327 exercisable; aggregate value $19.23M) and unexercisable balance (60,757; $3.10M) could translate to exercise-related share issuance; Rizzo exercised 24,698 options in 2024 (value realized $1.71M) and 4,058 PSAs vested, adding potential shares to float; hedging/pledging prohibitions and ownership requirements mitigate misalignment risk .
Equity Ownership & Pledging
- Ownership multiple compliance: 15.5× salary vs 4× requirement (strong alignment); no pledging reported; hedging banned (exceptions only by Board leaders) .
Compensation Peer Group and Shareholder Feedback
- Compensation targeted at 50th percentile; program adjustments based on shareholder engagement led to higher PSAs/RSUs, reduced options, and clear pay-performance metrics; >86% say-on-pay support in 2024 indicates investor endorsement .
Investment Implications
- Alignment signal: High ownership multiple, robust clawbacks, and performance-heavy equity mix (PSAs) support alignment; 2024 AIP payout reflects genuine profit recovery but PSA underperformance over recent cycles tempers windfall risk .
- Retention and succession: Promotion to COO with higher targets suggests strong internal succession depth and retention emphasis; CIC terms are shareholder-friendly (double-trigger, no gross-ups), limiting entrenchment risk .
- Trading dynamics: Option overhang and periodic exercises can create episodic supply; monitoring Form 4s around standard grant dates (third day of month after promotion/hire; annual grants in Q1) and vest dates could signal near-term selling pressure, though policy constraints and guideline compliance mitigate adverse alignment concerns .
- Performance leverage: Continued execution on PL combined ratio and Performance Net Income is central to incentive outcomes; failure to sustain CR ≤96.5–95.5 corridors or Net Income above plan would compress AIP/PSA payouts, providing a self-correcting mechanism for compensation vs performance .