David Ilardi
AllegionAbout David Ilardi
David S. Ilardi, age 46, is Senior Vice President, Allegion Americas (since March 2022). Prior roles include General Manager, Allegion Home (2019–2022) and Regional VP Sales, Central (2017–2019) . During 2024, Allegion reported company-level TSR of $112.54 vs peer TSR $218.59 since the 2019 base, net income of $597.5M, and adjusted EPS of $7.53, anchoring the pay-for-performance calibration used for NEO incentives . In 2023, TSR was $107.51 vs peer $189.57, net income $540.6M, and adjusted EPS $6.96 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allegion plc | SVP, Allegion Americas | 2022–present | Leads Americas; 2023 AIP narrative cites “exceptional financial performance” and strategic realignment of operations and supply chain into the Americas . |
| Allegion plc | General Manager, Allegion Home | 2019–2022 | Business leadership in residential; platform for Americas leadership . |
| Allegion plc | Regional VP Sales, Central Region | 2017–2019 | Commercial growth and sales leadership . |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in 2024 or 2025 proxy for Ilardi.
Fixed Compensation
Multi‑year compensation detail (SCT actuals and approved targets):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (SCT, $) | 416,497 | 483,750 | 536,250 |
| Approved Base Salary as of Year ($) | — | 495,000 | 550,000 |
| Target AIP (% of base) | 65% | 75% | 75% |
| Non‑Equity Incentive (AIP) Paid ($) | 295,507 | 644,590 | 365,393 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 470,747 | 600,193 | 741,782 |
| Option Awards ($) | 150,012 | 186,274 | 218,758 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 64,534 | 73,618 | 82,203 |
| Total Compensation ($) | 1,397,297 | 1,992,237 | 1,944,386 |
2025 target total direct compensation:
| Item | 2025 Target |
|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 575,000 |
| Target AIP (% base) | 75% |
| Target LTI ($) | 925,000 |
| Total Direct Compensation ($) | 1,931,250 |
Notes:
- 2024 base increase positioned Ilardi nearer market median; 2024 LTI target raised by $130,000 vs 2023 to align with peer median .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) mechanics and payouts (formulaic; financial score × individual score, with ESG/People-Environment-Safety modifier and 200% cap) .
| AIP Component | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| AIP Target ($) | 371,250 | 412,500 |
| Financial Performance Score (%) | 150.98% | 88.58% |
| Individual Score (%) | 115% | 100% |
| AIP Award ($) | 644,590 | 365,393 |
- 2023 narrative highlights Ilardi “led the achievement of exceptional financial performance” and embedded operations and supply chain into the Americas, supporting above-target individual score .
Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) design and PSU performance:
- LTI mix for NEOs: PSUs 50%, Stock Options 25%, RSUs 25% .
- PSU metrics: 50% adjusted EPS and 50% relative TSR over 3 years; PSUs cliff‑vest after performance period .
PSU payout for 2021–2023 cycle (affects Ilardi’s realized equity):
| Metric (weight) | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | % Earned |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EPS (50%) | $6.12 | $6.48 | $7.64 | $6.94 | 140% |
| TSR (50%) | 25th pct | Median | ≥75th pct | 21st pct (3.6% TSR) | 0% |
| Final Payout | 70% of target | ||||
| Ilardi PSUs | Target 207 | Earned 145 | — |
2024 Grants to Ilardi (selected):
- Granted 2/22/2024: RSUs 1,679 ($218,757), PSUs target 1,679 (payout tabled as 3,358 unearned shares at 12/31/24, $438,823), options 5,346 at $130.29 expiring 2/22/2034 ($218,758) .
- Options and RSUs vest in three equal annual installments beginning on the first anniversary of grant; PSUs vest after the three‑year performance period, subject to results .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership (record date snapshots):
| Ownership | 2024 Record Date | 2025 (Mar 14) |
|---|---|---|
| Ordinary Shares | 2,889 | 6,126 |
| Options exercisable or RSUs vesting within 60 days (2024 definition) / Options exercisable within 60 days (2025 definition) | 9,770 | 14,357 |
| Percent of outstanding | <1% | <1% |
Selected outstanding awards at 2024 year‑end (Ilardi):
| Grant Date | Options Exercisable (#) | Options Unexercisable (#) | Exercise Price ($) | Expiration | Unvested RSUs (#) | RSU Market Value ($) | Unearned PSUs (#) | PSU Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/22/2024 | — | 5,346 | 130.29 | 2/22/2034 | 1,679 | 219,412 | 3,358 | 438,823 |
| 2/24/2023 | 1,845 | 3,689 | 112.59 | 2/24/2033 | 1,103 | 144,140 | 3,309 | 432,420 |
| 2/17/2022 | 3,497 | 1,750 | 115.335 | 2/17/2032 | 434 | 56,715 | 3,045 | 397,921 |
| 2/18/2021 | 901 | — | 109.14 | 2/18/2031 | — | — | — | — |
Ownership policy and risk controls:
- Stock ownership guidelines: Senior Vice Presidents must hold 2x base salary; all NEOs were in compliance or on track as of April 2024 .
- Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging: Hedging and pledging prohibited; no directors or executive officers have pledged securities .
- Clawbacks: NYSE/Section 10D‑compliant policy plus enhanced discretionary recoupment for fraud/cause; applies to cash and equity .
Vesting cadence and potential liquidity windows:
- Options and RSUs vest ratably over three years from grant; PSUs cliff‑vest after 3 years subject to performance, creating scheduled vesting events over 2025–2027 for 2024 grants .
Employment Terms
Potential payments upon termination or change‑in‑control (as of 12/31/2023 scenario for Ilardi):
| Component | Involuntary Without Cause ($) | Change in Control ($) | Disability ($) | Death ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Severance | — | 1,732,500 | — | — |
| Earned but unpaid AIP | 644,590 | 644,590 | 644,590 | 644,590 |
| PSU award payout (pro‑rata) | 377,874 | 377,874 | 377,874 | 377,874 |
| Value of unvested equity | 232,096 | 498,932 | 498,932 | 498,932 |
| Outplacement | — | 25,000 | — | — |
| Health benefits | — | 52,796 | — | — |
| Total | 1,254,560 | 3,331,692 | 1,521,396 | 1,521,396 |
Key terms:
- Double‑trigger CIC (no automatic single‑trigger equity vesting); no tax gross‑ups; severance benefits only upon qualifying termination following a CIC .
- Health benefits continuation assumptions: 24 months for NEOs other than CEO .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and pay mix: Ilardi’s compensation remains highly performance‑linked: AIP at 75% target of base and LTI at ~$0.9M (2025 target), with LTI split 50% PSUs (adj. EPS/relative TSR), 25% options, 25% RSUs—supporting earnings quality and TSR alignment . 2024 AIP paid below target (88.58% financial score), confirming downside sensitivity; 2023 AIP was above target driven by exceptional Americas execution .
- Retention and succession: Above‑market 2024 base increase (+11%) and LTI target uplift (+$130k) were explicitly to position near market median; 2025 target TDC is stable, indicating continued retention focus without excessive guaranteed cash .
- Selling pressure and vesting overhang: Regular three‑year vesting for 2024 RSUs (1,679 units) and options (5,346) plus PSU cliffs may create recurring vest events over 2025–2027; sizeable unearned PSU tranches emphasize performance risk to realized pay .
- Ownership and governance: Low direct ownership (<1%) but increasing share count YoY (2,889 to 6,126) and strong controls (no pledging; robust clawbacks; 2x salary ownership guideline in compliance/on track) limit misalignment and governance risk .
- Change‑in‑control economics: 2023‑basis CIC multiple implies ~$3.33M aggregate exposure for Ilardi, with double‑trigger structure and limited perquisites—tempering parachute risk while providing retention during strategic activity .