Robert Martens
AllegionAbout Robert Martens
Robert C. Martens, age 54, is Allegion’s Senior Vice President and Chief Innovation and Design Officer (since Dec 2019) and Futurist and President of Allegion Ventures (since 2017), leading innovation, design and strategic venturing across the portfolio . Company performance context during his leadership includes 2024 net revenues of $3,772.2m (+3.3% YoY), operating income of $780.7m (+10.2%), available cash flow of $582.9m (+12.9%), EPS of $6.82 (+11.4%), and a 2022–2024 TSR of 10.06% (30th percentile vs S&P 400 Capital Goods), which drove 2022–2024 PSU payouts at 117% for NEOs in that cohort .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allegion plc | SVP, Chief Innovation & Design Officer | 2019–present | Executive leadership of innovation and design; LTI design emphasizes EPS and relative TSR, with options/RSUs vesting over 3 years to align long-term execution . |
| Allegion Ventures | Futurist and President | 2017–present | Venture ROIC performance of 124% over the 2019–2022 period triggered a $400,000 RSU award (vested Feb 24, 2024), evidencing tangible value creation from the venture program . |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in the company’s proxy/filings for Martens. (No items to report.)
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 446,275 | Reported in Summary Compensation Table . |
| 2024 (target) | 475,000 | Included in 2024 total direct compensation at target . |
| Compensation Element (2023) | Amount ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Salary | 446,275 | Reported actual . |
| All Other Compensation | 54,242 | Company matching contributions $39,937 and other benefits $14,305 (patent awards, financial counseling, physical, product rebate) . |
Additional policy parameters: for SVPs like Martens, stock ownership guideline is 2x base salary; all NEOs were in compliance or on track as of the last evaluation (Apr 2024) . Hedging and pledging are prohibited; no directors or executive officers hold pledged shares .
Performance Compensation
| Component | Metric/Design | Weighting/Target | Actual/Payout | Vesting/Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 AIP (Cash) | Corporate: Adj. Revenue, Adj. EBITDA/Adj. OI, ACF; Individual score with ESG modifier | Target % of salary: 60% (Martens) | 2023 financial score for corporate NEOs: 141.66%; Martens AIP payout: $390,982 | One-year performance; individual ESG scorecard modifier set at target (no adjustment) . |
| PSUs (2021–2023) | EPS (50%), relative TSR vs S&P 400 Capital Goods (50%) | Threshold–Max: 50%–200% | Company payout 70% overall; Martens target 2,177 PSUs, earned 1,524 | Cliff vest at 3 years; if TSR not positive, TSR portion capped at target . |
| 2023 Annual LTI Grants | PSUs, Options, RSUs | Target grant values; PSUs 50%, Options 25%, RSUs 25% | PSUs target 2,443; Options 4,085 (ex. price $112.59); RSUs 1,222 (values per table) | Options/RSUs vest ratably over 3 years; options 10-year term . |
| 2019 Retention Awards (Granted Feb 24, 2023) | Ventures ROIC; Growth in electronics, ecosystems, strategic partnerships | ROIC: 10%/15%/20% → 50%/$100k, 100%/$200k, 200%/$400k | Achieved 124% ROIC → $400,000 RSUs; plus $100,000 RSUs tied to electronics/ecosystem objectives (both vested Feb 24, 2024) | RSUs; standard vest timing noted above . |
Program design notes:
- Beginning 2024 PSUs, the TSR peer set was expanded to include S&P 500 Capital Goods (still 50% EPS, 50% TSR; 50–200% payout curve; TSR cap at target if TSR negative) .
- 2024 AIP corporate metrics used Adjusted Revenue, Adjusted Operating Income, and Adjusted Available Cash Flow; corporate financial score was 92.06% (context for plan design evolution) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Outstanding equity awards as of year-end 2023 (select grants) for Martens:
| Grant Date | Instrument | Status/Counts | Terms/Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2/24/2023 | Options | 4,085 unexercisable; ex. price $112.59; exp. 2/24/2033 | 10-year term; 3-year ratable vest . |
| 2/24/2023 | RSUs | 1,222 granted; plus 3,553 RSUs ($400,032) and 889 RSUs ($100,093) from retention awards | Standard RSUs 3-year ratable vest; retention RSUs tied to venture/electronics goals . |
| 2/24/2023 | PSUs | 2,443 target | 3-year performance (EPS/TSR) . |
| 2/17/2022 | Options | 1,384 exercisable / 2,770 unexercisable; ex. price $115.335; exp. 2/17/2032 | 10-year term; 3-year ratable vest . |
| 2/17/2022 | RSUs | 687 unvested; market value shown in table | 3-year ratable vest . |
| 2/17/2022 | PSUs | 2,060 unearned at 12/31/2023 | 3-year performance (EPS/TSR) . |
| 2/18/2021 | Options | 3,168 exercisable / 1,584 unexercisable; ex. price $109.14; exp. 2/18/2031 | 10-year term; 3-year ratable vest . |
| 2/18/2021 | RSUs | 363 unvested | 3-year ratable vest . |
| 2/18/2021 | PSUs | 1,524 unearned at 12/31/2023 (later paid at 70% for 2021–2023) | 3-year performance (EPS/TSR) . |
Alignment safeguards and guidelines:
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policy; no pledged securities by execs/directors .
- Ownership guidelines: SVP 2x base salary; options and unvested PSUs excluded; compliance/on-track status confirmed for execs as of Apr 2024 .
Employment Terms
Change-in-control (CIC) and severance economics:
- CIC plan: double trigger; cash severance multiples of 1.5x salary+target bonus for executive officers (3.0x for CEO); health benefits continuation for multiple years; up to $25,000 outplacement; “Best-of-Net” cutback applies; PSUs pro-rata at target; options/RSUs vest if no alternate award provided .
- Indicative potential payments (12/31/2023): Involuntary without cause total $1,552,655; CIC total $3,334,875 (includes severance $1,472,000; AIP $390,982; PSU payout $470,231; unvested equity value $923,866; benefits/outplacement per table) .
- No fixed-term employment agreements (company policy avoids defined-term executive contracts) .
- Clawbacks: NYSE/10D-1 compliant restatement clawback plus enhanced policy enabling recoupment (including time-based awards) if terminated for cause or in cases of fraud/intentional misconduct .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shifts/focus: 2023 TDC at target for Martens set at $1.286m (salary $460k; AIP 60%; LTI $550k) and increased to $1.335m in 2024 (salary $475k; AIP 60%; LTI $575k), maintaining a heavy tilt to equity/performance .
- Performance metrics rigor: PSU design remains 50% EPS and 50% relative TSR, with a TSR cap when negative, and expanded TSR comparator (from 2024) to include S&P 500 Capital Goods—reducing windfall risk and aligning with broader capital goods peers .
- Discretionary/re-pricing risk: Company explicitly prohibits option repricing without shareholder approval and avoids uncapped incentives and tax gross‑ups; severance only upon qualifying termination post-CIC .
- ESG linkage: AIP includes a quantitative People, Environment and Safety Scorecard (modifier up to −3% in 2024; at target in 2023), integrating human capital and sustainability execution into payouts .
Say‑on‑Pay, Peer Group & Governance
- Say‑on‑pay support: ~85% approval in 2024, with investor feedback supportive of incentive design; no material changes made .
- Compensation benchmarking peer group refreshed for 2024 to better align revenue and market cap positioning (adds: Graco, nVent, SPX Technologies, Sensata, Littelfuse, Resideo, Watts; removals: ADT, Diebold, Roper, Vivint) .
- Related party transactions: None above $120,000 involving directors/executive officers since Jan 1, 2024 (or Jan 1, 2023 in prior proxy) .
Investment Implications
- Incentive alignment: Martens’ package is predominantly performance/equity-based, with PSUs tied to EPS and relative TSR and sizeable 3‑year vesting RSUs/options. This reinforces multi‑year value creation but can reduce realized pay if TSR underperforms peers (as seen in 2021–2023 PSU payout at 70%) .
- Innovation/ventures lever: The venture ROIC-based RSU award (max achieved) and electronics/ecosystem objectives indicate explicit incentives around strategic growth adjacencies under Martens’ purview—constructive for innovation velocity and potential mix shift to software/recurring revenue .
- Retention/overhang: Double‑trigger CIC with 1.5x multiple and continued health/outplacement mitigates flight risk without excessive parachute economics; three‑year vesting on equity and the anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging policy reduce misalignment and leverage risks .
- Monitoring: Track future PSU outcomes under the broadened comparator, equity vesting cadence (options/RSUs), and any Form 4 activity for sell‑to‑cover vs. discretionary sales to gauge potential selling pressure and confidence; note 2022–2024 TSR ranked 30th percentile (PSU payout 117% overall for that cohort) .