David Barranco
About David Barranco
David Barranco, age 54, is Senior Managing Director at Ambac Financial Group (AMBC) and head of Risk Management since October 2016; he has served as Senior Managing Director since February 2012, joined Ambac in 1999, and has been Executive Director of Ambac Assurance UK Limited since September 2011 . Ambac’s 2024 transformation included selling the legacy financial guarantee business and expanding insurance distribution; total revenue from continuing operations rose 89% to $236 million and Adjusted EBITDA to Ambac common stockholders increased 43% to $13 million . Over the 2021 LTIP measurement period, Ambac’s rTSR ranked 10th of 12 peer participants with a -5.2% TSR, reducing PSU payouts by 10% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ambac Financial Group, Inc. | Senior Managing Director | Since February 2012 | Executive responsibility for risk remediation, credit risk management, surveillance across AAC’s insured portfolio |
| Ambac Financial Group, Inc. | Head of Restructuring Group | Not disclosed (prior role) | Led corporate development and strategy |
| Ambac Assurance UK Limited | Executive Director | Since September 2011 | Governance/oversight for the London-based financial guarantee subsidiary |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed | — | — | Proxy lists no external public-company board roles for Barranco |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year reported compensation (Summary Compensation Table):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 |
| Bonus ($) | — | — | — |
| Stock Awards ($) | 760,033 | 916,709 | 841,790 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | 707,500 | 698,000 | 600,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 21,273 | 21,223 | 21,884 |
| Total ($) | 1,988,806 | 2,135,932 | 1,963,674 |
2024 target bonus detail:
| Item | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 500,000 |
| Target STIP ($) | 425,000 |
Notes:
- Base salaries for NEOs were unchanged in 2024 vs. 2023 .
Performance Compensation
2024 STIP design and company performance against metrics (financial portion = 70% of STIP):
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Everspan earned premium and program fees ($mm, Q4 vs budget) | 28.6% | 28 | 31 | 34 | 22.9 |
| Everspan number of underwritten programs (#) | 7.1% | 6 | 8 | 10 | 8 |
| Cirrata new MGAs/other program business ≥$5mm GWP (#) | 14.3% | 4 | 6 | 8 | 13 |
| Cirrata EBITDA margin (%) | 21.4% | 35% | 45% | 50% | 51.5% |
| Net Par Outstanding ($bn) | 14.3% | 17.8 | 17.4 | 16.8 | Committee credited max due to pending AAC sale |
| Gross Operating Run Rate Expense ($mm, Q4 vs budget) | 14.3% | 15.1 | 14.6 | 14.2 | 13.9 |
- Committee applied a consistent financial-performance multiplier to all NEOs; the strategic portion (30%) used scorecards tailored to each NEO’s responsibilities .
- Barranco’s 2024 STIP payout was $600,000 vs. $425,000 target (≈1.41x of target) .
2024 LTIP PSU metrics and weights:
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WLACC Outstanding ($bn, AAC) | ≈22% | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.0 |
| Everspan Cumulative Gross Written Premium ($mm) | ≈39% | 1,374.0 | 1,566.0 | 1,723.0 |
| Everspan Cumulative EBITDA ($mm) | ≈39% | 31.5 | 40.0 | 46.5 |
| Cirrata Cumulative Gross Written Premium ($mm) | ≈39% | 983.0 | 1,092.0 | 1,256.0 |
| Cirrata Cumulative EBITDA ($mm) | ≈39% | 44.0 | 49.0 | 56.0 |
- PSU payouts are subject to a relative TSR modifier of ±20% (±10% for earlier cycles) .
Selected realized LTIP payout (2011–2023 PSU cycle settled in early 2024):
| Grant | Grant Date Value at Target ($) | Performance % | rTSR reduction | Final Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 PSU (settled early 2024) | 510,000 | 169.1% | 152.2% (after -10% rTSR) | 779,123 |
2024 equity awards granted:
| Grant Date | PSU Target (#) | PSU Max (#) | RSU (#) | Grant-Date FV ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| March 13, 2024 | 37,497 | 74,994 | 16,069 | PSU $597,702; RSU $244,088 |
Vesting schedules:
- 2024 RSUs vest in three equal annual installments on March 13, 2025; March 3, 2026; March 3, 2027 .
- 2023 RSUs vest in three equal annual installments on March 3, 2024; March 3, 2025; March 3, 2026 .
- 2022 RSUs vested in three equal annual installments on February 28, 2023; February 28, 2024; February 28, 2025 .
- 2024 PSUs settle within 75 days after December 31, 2026; subject to rTSR modifier .
Insider selling pressure indicators:
- Stock vested in 2024: Barranco realized value on vesting of $1,068,176 across RSUs/PSUs, with 65,885 shares delivered on vesting .
- Outstanding at 2024 YE: 32,223 RSUs unvested and 114,069 PSUs unearned; market values $407,621 and $1,442,973 respectively at $12.65/share .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership (shares) | 241,220 |
| Shares outstanding (record date) | 51,091,190 |
| RSUs unvested (#) | 32,223 |
| PSUs unearned (#) | 114,069 |
| Executive stock ownership guideline (value required) | $1,000,000 |
| Value of shares owned at record date (for guideline) | $1,888,753 |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited by Insider Trading Policy (no pledging, no hedging, preclearance required) |
Notes:
- Ownership as percent of outstanding ≈ 241,220 / 51,091,190 ≈ 0.47%, based on disclosed share counts .
- Stock Ownership Policy requires 2x base salary for non-CEO executives; Barranco exceeds requirement ($1.888mm vs $1.0mm) .
Employment Terms
Barranco does not have an individual employment agreement; he is covered by Ambac’s Severance Pay Plan .
Key provisions:
- Severance payment: 52 weeks of base salary upon job elimination/reduction in force or termination by mutual agreement; plus 12 months of COBRA premium reimbursement at active-employee rate .
- Definition of “Just Cause” includes misconduct, improper disclosure, and other violations; severance contingent on general release of claims .
- Clawback (Recoupment Policy): for accounting restatements, recover incentive-based compensation within 3-year lookback; also subject to clawback under applicable law .
- Insider Trading Policy: prohibits pledging, hedging, short sales, and unapproved 10b5-1 plans; trades only in open windows with preclearance .
Potential payments (assumed termination at Dec 31, 2024, $12.65/share):
| Scenario | Severance ($) | RSU Settlement ($) | PSU Settlement ($) | Benefits ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death/Disability | — | 987,029 | 1,442,960 | — | 2,429,989 |
| Involuntary Termination without “Cause” or by Executive for “Good Reason” | 500,000 | 987,029 | — (not determinable until performance end) | 42,793 | 1,529,822 |
| Involuntary Termination in Connection with Change in Control | 500,000 | 987,029 | — (not determinable until performance end) | 42,793 | 1,529,822 |
Notes:
- Unlike certain other executives, Barranco’s severance multiples do not increase in change-in-control scenarios; RSU treatment reflects vesting under plan terms; PSU death benefits pay at 100% of overall payout multiple; other PSU terminations defer until performance determination .
Compensation Structure and Peer Benchmarking
- Pay mix emphasizes variable/equity incentives: NEOs have substantial equity-based LTIP awards (PSUs/RSUs), with STIP financial metrics at 70% weighting in 2024; strategic goals accounted for 30% with structured scorecards .
- Compensation consultant: Meridian Compensation Partners advised the Compensation Committee on 2024 cycle .
- Peer group and sizing: comparator group spans P&C insurance and insurance brokers; Ambac market cap ~$600mm, assets ~$9,256mm, enterprise value ~$5,520mm; percentile ranks vs peers: market cap 14%, assets 85%, EV 98% .
Say‑on‑Pay and Shareholder Feedback
- Say‑on‑Pay approval ~95% at 2024 annual meeting; IR engaged holders of ~48% of outstanding shares in Fall 2024; no compensation concerns raised .
Additional Notes and Recent Events
- Following the September 29, 2025 closing of the AAC sale, the Compensation Committee accelerated certain PSUs for LeBlanc, Trick, and Smith (121.5% of 2023 targets and 100% of 2024 targets); Barranco was not listed among recipients in the acceleration 8‑K .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Barranco’s incentives tie to risk reduction (WLACC, Net Par), cost discipline, and growth metrics at Everspan/Cirrata, with meaningful equity exposure via PSUs/RSUs and rTSR modifier; his 2024 STIP payout was ≈1.41x of target amid strong Cirrata margins and expense reduction but weak Everspan earned premiums .
- Retention risk: Absent an individual employment agreement, severance is limited to ~1x salary plus COBRA and standard RSU treatment; no enhanced CIC multiple—suggesting moderate retention incentives relative to peers with richer CIC protections .
- Insider selling pressure: Aggregate unvested 32,223 RSUs and unearned 114,069 PSUs point to scheduled share delivery in 2025–2027; combined with 2024 vesting of 65,885 shares, monitor 10b5‑1 activity and window timing for potential supply .
- Alignment safeguards: Strong ownership compliance ($1.889mm vs $1.0mm required), recoupment/clawback policy, and prohibitions on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment and governance risk .
- Shareholder stance: Robust Say‑on‑Pay support and structured STIP/LTIP designs indicate low near‑term governance friction; continued execution on specialty P&C growth and completing legacy runoff will likely dominate compensation outcomes .