Andrew Jassy
About Andrew Jassy
Andrew R. Jassy is President and CEO of Amazon (since July 2021) and a director of the Company; age 57, with deep operational and technology credentials from founding and leading AWS and holding multiple leadership roles since joining Amazon in 1997 . Amazon’s pay-versus-performance disclosure shows CEO Compensation Actually Paid tracking TSR: ≈$92.4M in 2024 when TSR rose ~45%, and −$148M in 2022 when TSR declined ~50% . Under his tenure, Company revenues increased from $469.8B in FY2021 to $638.0B in FY2024, and EBITDA rose from $59.3B to $120.5B, reflecting improvement in fundamentals; values marked with an asterisk are from S&P Global and converted to USD using SPGI methodology. Revenues citations are provided; EBITDA values are marked with an asterisk and S&P Global disclaimer .
Amazon top-line and EBITDA trend (FY)
| Metric | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD Billions) | $469.8 | $514.0 | $574.8 | $638.0 |
| EBITDA ($USD Billions) | $59.3* | $55.3* | $85.5* | $120.5* |
Values marked with * retrieved from S&P Global.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amazon Web Services | Chief Executive Officer | Apr 2016–Jul 2021 | Scaled AWS; cloud leadership, core profit engine for AMZN |
| Amazon Web Services | Senior Vice President | Apr 2006–Apr 2016 | Built AWS from inception; platform creation and growth |
| Amazon.com, Inc. | Various leadership roles | 1997–2006 | Led businesses and functions prior to founding AWS |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rainier Scholars | Trustee and sponsor | Since 2011 | Education pathway for underrepresented students; community reputation |
| Rainier Prep | Chair and founding board member | — | Charter middle school; regional educational leadership |
| National Academy of Engineering | Member | — | Recognition of engineering/tech expertise; governance and credibility |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base salary ($) | Target bonus (%) | Actual bonus ($) | All other compensation ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 317,500 | Not applicable (no annual cash incentive program) | 0 | 981,223 | All other includes 401(k) match, HSR filing fees ($105k), security costs |
| 2023 | 365,000 | N/A | 0 | 992,764 | As above |
| 2024 | 365,000 | N/A | 0 | 1,231,889 | Security costs ≈$1,119,989; HSR fees $105,000 |
Amazon does not operate an annual cash incentive plan for NEOs; compensation is base salary plus long-vesting RSUs and limited perquisites (primarily security) .
Performance Compensation
Amazon does not use discrete annual performance-conditioned metrics (e.g., revenue growth targets, EPS hurdles) for executive payouts; alignment is achieved via multi-year, back-end weighted RSU vesting and stock price performance assumptions .
| Element | Metric basis | Weighting/structure | Targeting approach | Realization mechanics | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs (periodic, long-term) | Stock price performance/TSR linkage | Primary component of pay | Committee assumes fixed annual stock price increase; grants every other year (not annual) | Value realized driven by stock price; no “above-target” share vesting; no discretion to adjust payouts | 5–6+ years, back-end weighted; no acceleration for termination/retirement |
Pay vs performance highlights for CEO:
- 2024: CAP ≈$92.4M with TSR up ~45%; change in fair value of unvested RSUs ≈$84.4M; vested RSUs fair value change ≈$6.4M .
- 2022: CAP ≈−$148M with TSR down ~50% (decline in unvested RSU value >$139M; vested RSUs value −$9.5M) .
Grants in 2024:
- No equity award granted to Mr. Jassy (consistent with 2021 CEO promotion award intended to cover years ahead) .
Stock vested in 2024:
| Item | Shares vested | Value realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Andrew R. Jassy | 211,000 | 38,475,495 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 2,194,288 shares (as of Feb 24, 2025) |
| Shares outstanding | 10,608,335,720 (as of Feb 24, 2025) |
| Ownership as % of class | ≈0.021% (calculated from above) |
| Unvested RSUs at FY-end 2024 | 1,250,680 units; market value ≈$274,386,685 (at $219.39) |
| Hedging/derivatives | Prohibited for directors/executives; robust anti-hedging policy |
| Pledging | No pledging disclosure identified in proxy; not specified for executives/directors (search yielded no result) |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Robust guidelines disclosed for directors; executive guideline specifics not detailed in proxy overview |
Upcoming vesting schedule (selected tranches):
| Vest date | Shares (award a) | Shares (award b) | Total expected per date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 21, 2025 | 31,960 (vested) | 20,000 (vested) | 51,960 |
| May 21, 2025 | 24,680 | 25,000 | 49,680 |
| Aug 21, 2025 | 24,680 | 25,000 | 49,680 |
| Nov 21, 2025 | 24,680 | 25,000 | 49,680 |
| Feb 21, 2026 | 24,680 | 25,000 | 49,680 |
| May 21, 2026–Feb 21, 2031 (each quarter) | — | 50,000 each listed quarterly date | 50,000 per date |
Proxy notes that >80% of CEO’s 2021 RSU award vests in years 5–10 (2026–2031), creating long-dated alignment and potential periodic supply around scheduled vest dates .
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Employment status | At-will; no employment contract term specified |
| Severance | None; Company does not provide severance or retirement benefits to NEOs |
| Change-in-control | If awards under the 1997 Plan are not assumed/substituted in a Corporate Transaction, outstanding awards accelerate to 100% vested immediately before transaction; hypothetical values disclosed by reference to FY-end table |
| Post-termination vesting | Unvested RSUs expire upon termination; for employees other than CEO, RSUs vest upon death to the extent scheduled within two years |
| Clawback policy | Recovery of equity and cash bonuses for fraud/intentional misconduct causing a restatement; recovery of incentive-based compensation per SEC/Nasdaq rules upon required restatement |
| Hedging policy | Directors/executives prohibited from speculative/derivative transactions referencing Amazon securities |
Board Governance
- Board leadership: Roles are separated—Jeff Bezos serves as Executive Chair; Jassy is CEO and director. Independent directors appoint a Lead Independent Director (Jamie S. Gorelick) to reinforce independent oversight .
- Committee service: Jassy is not a member of any Board committee; all Committees (Audit, Leadership Development and Compensation, Nominating & Corporate Governance, Security) are composed entirely of independent directors .
- Attendance and meetings: The Board met 5 times in 2024; all incumbent directors attended at least 75% of aggregate Board/committee meetings; committees met: Audit 6, LDCC 5, Nominating 4, Security 2 .
- Independence: Jassy is management (CEO) and therefore not independent; the proxy lists independent directors by name, excluding Jassy and Bezos .
- Director compensation: Jassy receives no additional compensation for director service beyond executive pay; Board members generally receive RSUs with 3-year vesting; grants vary by cycle .
- Governance signal: 2025 shareholder proposal seeks to codify permanent separation of Chair/CEO roles to avoid future recombination risk; current Board opposes mandating the policy but roles are currently separated .
Say-on-Pay & Compensation Committee Analysis
- 2024 say-on-pay support: 78% of votes cast supported NEO compensation .
- Compensation design: Simple structure—nominal base salary, periodic time-vested RSUs with long vesting, no annual cash incentive, no “above-target” share vesting, focus on realizable multi-year value .
- Peer benchmarking and consultants: LDCC reviewed survey data for peers (Alphabet, Apple, Cisco, Costco, Disney, Intel, Kroger, Meta, Microsoft, Netflix, Oracle, Salesforce, Target, UPS, Walmart); no compensation consultant engaged in 2024 .
- 2024 grants: No equity award to Jassy; routine periodic RSU awards to other NEOs with six-year vesting .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Year-over-year mix: Cash remains nominal; equity dominates. No CEO grants since 2021 indicates confidence in long-dated alignment and reduces annual dilution/signal noise .
- Shift from options to RSUs: Company has used RSUs as primary vehicle since 2002; awards back-end weighted; reduces gaming risk and accentuates long-term focus .
- Guaranteed vs at-risk: No guaranteed bonuses; RSUs’ value fully at risk to stock price; vesting does not accelerate on termination/retirement .
- Metric rigor: No discrete short-term performance metrics; pay tracks TSR via fair value changes—both positive and negative (e.g., CAP −$148M in 2022) .
Director Compensation (for completeness)
| Item | 2024 policy/practice |
|---|---|
| Cash retainer | None; directors do not receive cash |
| Equity | RSUs; typical 3-year vesting; grants not annual (once every three years historically) |
| Committee fees | Not varied by committee service |
| Notable 2024 grants | Examples: Ng 5,952 RSUs; Cooper 6,126; Weeks 5,448, designed to ≈$355k/year at 50th percentile among peers |
Risks, Red Flags, and Trading Signals
- Insider selling pressure: CEO has predictable quarterly vest dates—Feb 21, May 21, Aug 21, Nov 21—49,680 shares scheduled each of May/Aug/Nov 2025; beginning May 2026, an additional 50,000 per quarter vests through Feb 2031, potentially increasing supply around those dates .
- No severance/CIC cash protections: Retention relies on long-dated RSUs and stock performance; equity forfeiture upon termination may deter departure but increases sensitivity to share price volatility .
- Hedging prohibited: Reduces misalignment; pledging policy not disclosed—monitor for future disclosures or Form 4/10b5-1 plans .
- Pay-for-performance alignment: CAP swings demonstrate high linkage to TSR; symmetrical downside mitigates windfall risk .
Equity Award Detail (CEO vesting cadence)
| Period | Vest cadence | Shares per event |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Feb 21 (already vested), May 21, Aug 21, Nov 21 | 31,960 and 20,000 (Feb); then 24,680 and 25,000 on each later date |
| 2026 | Feb 21, May 21, Aug 21, Nov 21 | 24,680 and 25,000 (Feb); then 50,000 each quarter starting May |
| 2027–2031 | Feb 21, May 21, Aug 21, Nov 21 (each year) | 50,000 per quarterly vest date |
Additional Performance Context
| Metric | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD Billions) | $469.8 | $514.0 | $574.8 | $638.0 |
| EBITDA ($USD Billions) | $59.3* | $55.3* | $85.5* | $120.5* |
Values marked with * retrieved from S&P Global.
Investment Implications
- Strong alignment but heavy vesting runway: Multi-year, back-end weighted RSUs align Jassy’s realized pay with TSR; >80% of CEO grant vests 2026–2031, implying recurring quarterly vest supply beginning May 2026—watch 10b5‑1 activity and volume around vest dates for potential selling pressure or liquidity impacts .
- Governance quality and independence safeguards: Separation of Chair/CEO roles and appointment of a Lead Independent Director mitigate dual-role risks; however, the absence of a codified policy to keep roles separate introduces potential future governance uncertainty (see 2025 shareholder proposal) .
- Retention dynamics: No severance/retirement benefits and forfeiture on termination increase reliance on stock performance for retention; long-term design has historically supported talent retention through volatility, but it heightens sensitivity to drawdowns .
- Pay-for-performance credibility: CAP disclosures demonstrate symmetric alignment to shareholder returns; lack of cash incentives and no “above-target” equity payouts reduce manipulation risk and enhance transparency .
Notes:
- All document-based claims are cited to Amazon’s 2025 DEF 14A and specified sections.
- Financial values with * are retrieved from S&P Global.
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