Rachel S. Labrecque
About Rachel S. Labrecque
Senior Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer at Apple Hospitality REIT (APLE). Appointed effective April 1, 2020; joined the Apple REIT Companies in 2015. Age 46, BS in Accounting from Virginia Tech, Certified Public Accountant; oversees accounting, financial reporting, treasury operations, and taxation . Company performance metrics used to assess pay include TSR and operational goals; Apple Hospitality’s TSR based on a $100 initial investment was 81.11 (2020), 101.73 (2021), 104.13 (2022), 116.88 (2023), and 115.39 (2024), with Net Income of $214.1M and MFFO/share of $1.61 in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apple Hospitality REIT Companies | Senior Vice President of Accounting | Jan 2019–Mar 2020 | Led accounting prior to CAO appointment; oversight of financial reporting/treasury/tax . |
| Bowlero/Lucky Strike Entertainment (formerly Bowlmor AMF) | SVP Finance & Corporate Controller | 2011–2015 | Led corporate finance and controller functions . |
| Bowlero/Lucky Strike Entertainment | VP & Corporate Controller | 2008–2011 | Corporate controller responsibilities . |
| Bowlero/Lucky Strike Entertainment | Director of Financial Reporting | 2006–2008 | Led financial reporting . |
| The Mills Corporation; AOL Time Warner; Arthur Andersen LLP | Financial reporting/accounting/auditing roles | Not disclosed | Various finance and audit roles at a publicly traded REIT and large corporates . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annual base salary ($) | 412,500 | 440,000 | 453,200 |
| Annual base salary rate ($) | — | 440,000 | 453,200 |
Performance Compensation
2024 Incentive Plan Structure (Company-level metrics and weights)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Comparable Hotels RevPAR Change | 7.5% | 2.0% | 3.0% | 4.0% | 1.4% | 0.0% |
| Comparable Hotels Adjusted Hotel EBITDA Margin % | 7.5% | 34.6% | 35.1% | 35.6% | 36.0% | 15.0% |
| Adjusted EBITDAre ($000s) | 7.5% | 452,000 | 463,000 | 474,000 | 467,216 | 10.4% |
| Modified FFO per share | 7.5% | 1.56 | 1.61 | 1.65 | 1.61 | 7.5% |
| Manage Capital Expenditures ($000s) | 7.5% | 85,000 | 80,000 | 75,000 | 78,262 | 10.1% |
| Capital structure management | 6.25% | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Above Target | 9.38% |
| Build market forecasting capabilities | 6.25% | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Target | 6.25% |
| TSR 1-year | 4.2% | 4.0% | 7.0% | 10.0% | -1.3% | 0.0% |
| TSR 2-year | 4.2% | 7.0% | 13.0% | 19.0% | 10.8% | 3.4% |
| TSR 3-year | 4.2% | 11.0% | 18.0% | 27.0% | 13.4% | 2.8% |
| TSR 1-year vs peers (percentile) | 12.5% | 25th | 55th | 75th | 44th | 10.2% |
| TSR 2-year vs peers (percentile) | 12.5% | 25th | 55th | 75th | 39th | 9.2% |
| TSR 3-year vs peers (percentile) | 12.5% | 25th | 55th | 75th | 86th | 25.0% |
- For 2024, the company achieved an average of 109.3% of target across metrics; relative TSR requires 55th percentile to reach target payout .
Grants of Plan-Based Awards – 2024 (Rachel S. Labrecque)
| Grant date | Cash incentive threshold ($) | Cash target ($) | Cash max ($) | Equity incentive threshold ($) | Equity target ($) | Equity max ($) | Grant date fair value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 7, 2024 | 141,625 | 283,250 | 566,500 | — | — | — | 893,994 |
Actual Awards Earned – 2024 (Rachel S. Labrecque)
| Metric | 2024 Actual ($) | Vesting terms |
|---|---|---|
| Cash incentive | 332,006 | Paid March 2025 . |
| Equity incentive | 906,112 | Two-thirds vested immediately; one-third to vest Dec 2025 (second Friday of December) . |
Multi-year Compensation (Summary Compensation Table)
| Component ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 412,500 | 440,000 | 453,200 |
| Share awards (grant-date fair value) | 1,020,835 | 1,070,025 | 893,994 |
| Non-equity incentive | 428,613 | 398,578 | 332,006 |
| All other compensation | 92,431 | 127,330 | 102,017 |
| Total | 1,954,379 | 2,035,933 | 1,781,217 |
Mix and trend: salary increased 3.0% YoY in 2024; share awards decreased vs 2023; non-equity incentive declined; perquisites include benefits and estimated dividends on share awards .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (Mar 21, 2025) | 236,007 shares; less than 1% of class; includes restricted shares subject to time vesting . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Executives must own ≥3x annual base salary; all current execs have either met guidelines or are within transition . |
| Hedging/pledging policy | Hedging and margin accounts prohibited; pledging more than 50% of individually held shares prohibited . |
| Clawback policy | Mandatory recovery of incentive-based comp for 3 years preceding a restatement under Dodd-Frank/NYSE rules . |
Vested vs Unvested Shares
| Period | Shares vested | Value realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 vesting events | 66,315 | 1,064,715 |
| 2024 vesting (Dec 13, 2024) | 32,842 | 527,114 |
Outstanding Equity Awards (Unearned at Year-end)
| Year-end | Grant date | Unearned shares (max payout basis) | Payout value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dec 31, 2023 | Feb 8, 2023 | 99,338 | 1,650,000 |
| Dec 31, 2024 | Feb 7, 2024 | 110,717 | 1,699,500 |
- Company does not grant options to officers; no option exercises; equity awards are delivered in common shares with mix of immediate and 1-year vesting .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key terms |
|---|---|
| Employment contracts | None; company does not have employment contracts with executive officers . |
| Severance plan (Executive Change of Control Severance Plan) | Double-trigger: if terminated without Cause or for Good Reason within 1 year of Change in Control, lump sum payment equal to salary/paid time-off due, prorated annual bonus, plus 3.0x (Annual Base Salary + Annual Bonus); accelerated vesting of stock incentives; welfare/COBRA benefits; outplacement up to $15,000 . |
| CIC without termination | Assumes awards not assumed by successor; equity awards accelerate to actual performance; cash awards accelerate . |
| Definitions | “Annual Base Salary”: 12x highest monthly base salary in prior 12 months; “Annual Bonus”: bonus paid in prior calendar year; “Cause” and “Good Reason” defined (salary reduction, material duty reduction, relocation >50 miles, etc.) . |
| Tax gross-ups | None provided; no tax gross-ups to NEOs . |
| Supplemental retirement | None; no supplemental retirement plans . |
Potential Payments (as of Dec 31, 2024 scenario)
| Scenario | Cash severance ($) | Acceleration of equity ($) | Acceleration of cash awards ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without Cause/for Good Reason within 1 year of CIC | 8,620,526 | 969,302 | — |
| Change in Control (no termination) | — | 969,302 | 332,006 |
Performance & Track Record
| Year | Company TSR (Value of $100) | Peer group TSR | Net Income ($) | MFFO per share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 81.11 | 76.52 | (173,206,725) | 0.09 |
| 2021 | 101.73 | 89.23 | 18,827,539 | 0.93 |
| 2022 | 104.13 | 74.05 | 144,804,963 | 1.53 |
| 2023 | 116.88 | 93.49 | 177,488,702 | 1.60 |
| 2024 | 115.39 | 91.43 | 214,064,469 | 1.61 |
- Incentive design emphasizes objective shareholder returns and operational metrics with target payout requiring ≥55th percentile relative TSR; 78% of executive target compensation is incentive-based and ~75% payable in common shares .
Governance, Ownership Guidelines, and Say-on-Pay
- Executive officers must maintain ownership equal to 3x salary; all current executives have met or are within transition .
- Hedging, short sales, margin accounts prohibited; pledging capped at ≤50% of individually held shares .
- Compensation Recovery (clawback) adopted in 2023 per Dodd-Frank/NYSE rules .
- 2024 say-on-pay support ~97% for 2023 executive compensation, indicating strong shareholder alignment .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: half based on shareholder return and half on operational goals; target payout requires relative outperformance (≥55th percentile), and 75% of incentive in equity, increasing skin-in-the-game; immediate vesting of two-thirds creates potential near-term sellable supply but one-third deferral to December concentrates vesting windows that may influence insider selling pressure around year-end .
- No options, no tax gross-ups, and robust clawback/anti-hedging/pledging limits reduce governance risk; ownership guidelines at 3x salary with compliance reported mitigate misalignment, though the policy allows limited pledging up to 50% which is a monitored risk factor .
- In a change-in-control, Rachel’s 3x multiple (base+bonus) and equity acceleration represent meaningful retention/transaction costs ($8.62M cash severance plus ~$0.97M equity acceleration in termination scenarios), suggesting disciplined but material economics in M&A that could affect deal terms or required synergies; double-trigger mitigates windfall risk .
- 2024 actual awards (cash $332k; equity $906k) reflect above-target performance (average 109.3%), driven by margin expansion and strong 3-year relative TSR, reinforcing management execution but highlighting sensitivity to RevPAR underperformance and 1-year TSR metrics; monitoring 2025 operational/TSR metrics and December vesting cadence is prudent for trading signals .