David Acheson
About David Acheson
David Acheson serves as Executive Vice President and Head of Global Commercial at Apellis, responsible for commercial strategy and execution across SYFOVRE (geographic atrophy) and EMPAVELI (PNH and, newly, C3G/IC‑MPGN). Under his remit, Apellis delivered FY2024 total revenue of $781.4 million (+97% YoY), with U.S. net product revenue of $710 million from SYFOVRE and EMPAVELI . In Q2 2025, Apellis reported 6% quarter‑over‑quarter injection growth for SYFOVRE, while the launch of EMPAVELI for C3G/IC‑MPGN began with early demand and transition of Early Access Program patients to commercial drug . Executive compensation at Apellis is aligned to performance, with 2024 bonuses paid at 90.74% of target and 2025 long‑term incentives introducing PSUs tied to relative TSR versus the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index .
Past Roles
Not disclosed in SEC filings or earnings materials reviewed.
External Roles
Not disclosed in SEC filings or earnings materials reviewed.
Fixed Compensation
Apellis structures fixed pay via market‑benchmarked base salaries, reviewed annually and adjusted based on performance and peer data; this program is administered by the Compensation Committee with support from Pay Governance . Executives participate in an annual cash incentive program based on quantitative and qualitative corporate and individual goals; for 2024, payouts were determined by a corporate performance factor of 90.74% (no individual adjustments applied for named executive officers) .
| Component | Program Design | FY2024 Outcome | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | Market‑benchmarked; annual review by Compensation Committee | Not disclosed for David Acheson | Acheson is not a 2024 named executive officer in the proxy |
| Annual Cash Incentive | Corporate goals across revenue, regulatory, clinical progress, and operations | 90.74% of target paid to executive officers and employees | No individual adjustments for NEOs |
Performance Compensation
Apellis emphasizes pay‑for‑performance via equity incentives and measurable corporate objectives. Starting 2025, PSUs comprise 50% of long‑term incentives, with vesting tied to relative TSR; payouts are capped at target if absolute TSR is negative .
| Metric | Period | Target/Structure | Actual/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate Bonus Factor | FY2024 | Factor set vs pre‑set goals (net product revenue, regulatory, Phase 3 C3G/IC‑MPGN results, pipeline progress, operational objectives) | 90.74% of target payout | Cash, paid Feb 2025 |
| PSUs (Relative TSR) | FY2025–FY2027 | 50% of LTIs in PSUs; payout at 25th/55th/90th percentile equals 50%/100%/200% of target; capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative | Performance‑contingent (three distinct periods: 1‑yr 2025, 2‑yr 2025–26, 3‑yr 2025–27) | Vests annually following each performance period |
| RSUs (Time‑based) | Ongoing | 25% vest each year over 4 years | N/A (time‑based) | Time‑based vesting |
| Stock Options (historical) | Ongoing | Fair market strike; 4‑yr vesting (25% at 1st anniversary, then monthly) | N/A (time‑based) | 10‑year term; time‑based vesting |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO = 6× base salary; other executive officers = 1–3× base salary; non‑employee directors = 3× annual cash retainer. Five years to comply; as of December 31, 2024, directors and executive officers met the criteria .
- Recoupment (clawback) policy: Adopted to meet SEC rules; recovery of incentive‑based compensation for restatements; enhanced recovery up to 100% in cases of intentional misconduct/fraud or actions causing serious financial/reputational damage .
- Hedging/pledging restrictions: Short sales, derivatives, margin purchases, and pledging are prohibited; Audit Committee may grant an exception for pledging if the executive demonstrates repayment capacity without resort to pledged securities .
- Beneficial ownership: The 2025 proxy discloses beneficial ownership for directors and named executive officers; David Acheson is not listed among those categories in the proxy reviewed .
Employment Terms
Apellis maintains an Executive Separation Benefits and Retention Plan covering C‑level officers and certain other employees holding a title of vice‑president or higher, as designated by the Board; all named executive officers are covered . If designated, severance economics are as follows:
| Scenario | Covered Group | Cash Severance | Bonus | COBRA Premiums | Equity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause (no change‑of‑control) | CEO | 12 months base salary | N/A | Company share of premiums during severance period | N/A |
| Termination without cause (no change‑of‑control) | Other C‑level | 9 months base salary | N/A | Company share of premiums during severance period | N/A |
| Termination without cause or resignation for good reason within 12 months post change‑of‑control | CEO | 18 months base salary (lump sum) | 150% of target bonus (lump sum) | Company share of premiums during severance period; outplacement | 100% vesting acceleration for time‑based equity |
| Termination without cause or resignation for good reason within 12 months post change‑of‑control | Other C‑level | 12 months base salary (lump sum) | 100% of target bonus (lump sum) | Company share of premiums during severance period; outplacement | 100% vesting acceleration for time‑based equity |
Note: The plan’s coverage requires designation for vice‑president‑and‑higher employees; the proxy does not explicitly disclose David Acheson’s coverage status .
Performance & Track Record
| Operational Indicator | Period | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| SYFOVRE injections growth | Q2 2025 | +6% QoQ; market leadership maintained; revenue impacted by elevated use of “free goods” (samples + patient assistance) |
| Free goods/program dynamics | Q2 2025 | A little less than half of growth attributed to samples; ongoing elevated usage due to funding issues; shift in terminology to capture samples + PATH under “free goods” |
| Commercial execution (GA market) | Q2 2025 | Physician education, DTC campaigns, optometry/ophthalmology referral programs; emphasis on early treatment and functional impact awareness |
| EMPAVELI (C3G/IC‑MPGN) launch | H2 2025 | Early demand; ~50 EAP patients expected to transition to commercial; broad label incl. pediatric and post‑transplant recurrence; three pillars: awareness, treatment of choice, access |
| Corporate performance context | FY2024 | $781.4m revenue (+97% YoY); $710m U.S. net product revenue; Sixth Street facility up to $475m; business highlights summarized in proxy |
Board Governance (context for compensation oversight)
- Compensation Committee (independent directors) oversees executive pay, incentives, succession, and engages Pay Governance; six meetings in 2024 .
- Say‑on‑pay support: 89.9% approval at 2024 annual meeting; annual say‑on‑pay frequency recommended .
Compensation Peer Group (benchmarking)
- 2024 peer group (14 companies): ACADIA, Alkermes, Amicus, Blueprint, Corcept, Insmed, Ionis, Intra‑Cellular Therapies, Neurocrine, PTC, Sarepta, Ultragenyx, Exelixis, United Therapeutics .
- 2025 peer group adjustments: Removed Exelixis, Sarepta, United Therapeutics; Added Axsome, BioCryst, Madrigal .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: 89.9% of votes cast supported NEO compensation; the committee retained its general approach with enhanced alignment via PSUs in 2025 .
Equity Program Mechanics (vesting and award types)
- Options: Fair market strike; 4‑yr vest (25% year‑1, then monthly); 10‑yr term .
- RSUs: 25% annual vest over 4 years .
- 2025 PSUs: 50% of LTIs; three TSR performance periods; 50–200% payout tied to TSR percentile vs NASDAQ Biotech Index; capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Introduction of TSR‑linked PSUs (50% LTIs) increases pay‑for‑performance rigor and ties long‑term awards to shareholder outcomes; robust clawback and ownership policies reinforce alignment .
- Execution signals: Acheson’s commentary and Q2 actions indicate disciplined commercial focus—driving injection growth amid funding constraints, increasing physician/patient education, and structured launch metrics for EMPAVELI in new indications .
- Retention risk: Apellis’ Separation Benefits Plan provides market‑standard severance/change‑of‑control protection and time‑based equity acceleration, which supports retention for designated executives; however, Acheson‑specific severance terms are not disclosed .
- Watch‑items: Elevated “free goods” usage weighs on revenue conversion despite demand growth; monitor foundation funding normalization and conversion from sampling/PATH to trade files. Track EMPAVELI launch metrics (EAP transitions, REMS enrollments, start forms) and nephrology uptake trajectory .
Disclosure gaps: The proxy does not list David Acheson as a named executive officer; his personal compensation (salary, bonus %, equity grant sizes), ownership amounts, and employment agreement terms are not disclosed in the filings reviewed. Where company‑wide policies and program mechanics are presented, they apply generally to executives but may require designation for coverage (e.g., Separation Benefits Plan) .