Mark DeLong

About Mark DeLong

Mark DeLong is Chief Business & Strategy Officer at Apellis Pharmaceuticals (APLS), age 48, with responsibility for business development and strategic planning; he has served in this capacity since January 2023 after joining Apellis in February 2018 and progressing through VP and SVP roles in strategy and BD . Prior roles include leadership at EMD Serono (Head of US Business Development; Head of Global Portfolio Management, Neurology & Immunology) and Managing Director at Bluepoint Healthcare Consulting; he holds a B.S. from Penn State and an MBA from the University of Michigan . Under Apellis’ company-wide compensation programs, short-term incentives (FY2024) paid at 90.74% of target based on product revenue, regulatory, pipeline, and operational goals, and the company introduced 50% PSU/50% RSU long-term incentives tied to relative TSR starting 2025 . Company execution during his tenure included 2024 revenue of $781.4M (+97% y/y), continued U.S. leadership of SYFOVRE in GA, and FDA approval of EMPAVELI for C3G/IC-MPGN on July 28, 2025, supporting commercialization momentum and value creation .

Past Roles

External Roles

Fixed Compensation

• Individual base salary, target bonus %, and actual bonus for Mr. DeLong are not disclosed; Apellis’ proxy reports detailed compensation for named executive officers (NEOs), a group that does not include Mr. DeLong for 2024–2025 .
• Company program design (applies to executive officers generally): base salary reviewed annually versus peers; 2024 annual bonus funded at 90.74% of target based on corporate goals; 2025 maintained target bonus %s for NEOs and introduced PSUs for long-term incentives .

Performance Compensation

• Annual cash incentive mechanics (company-wide): bonuses based on corporate goals across product revenue, regulatory milestones, pipeline progress (e.g., APL-3007), and operational objectives; 2024 corporate performance factor = 90.74% .

Notes: Weightings of annual bonus sub-metrics and individual targets for Mr. DeLong are not disclosed .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

• Beneficial ownership: Individual holdings for Mr. DeLong are not itemized; the proxy lists 5% holders, directors, and NEOs. All directors and executive officers as a group (14 persons) held 8,383,034 shares/options (6.5%) as of Mar 31, 2025, indicating meaningful insider alignment .
• Ownership guidelines: CEO 6x salary; other executive officers 1–3x salary depending on title; 5-year compliance window; as of Dec 31, 2024, all directors and executive officers met the guidelines (implies Mr. DeLong, as an executive officer, was in compliance) .
• Hedging/pledging: Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited unless Audit Committee grants an exception (one such exception for a director in 2024). No pledging exceptions disclosed for Mr. DeLong .
• Trading plans: Executives may use Rule 10b5-1 plans for pre-scheduled trades; such plans are permitted under company policy .
• Filing history: One late Section 16 Form 4 for Mr. DeLong was noted for an RSU grant dated Oct 20, 2021 (filed Oct 27, 2021) .

Employment Terms

• Executive Separation Benefits & Retention Plan (coverage): Applies to “C-level officers” (CEO, CFO, CMO, COO, GC) and certain other executives VP+ designated by the board; Mr. DeLong is a C-level executive officer (CB&SO). The proxy does not explicitly list covered individuals by name, but outlines the plan terms below .
• Not-for-cause termination (outside change of control): Salary continuation (CEO 12 months; other C-level officers 9 months) and COBRA premium contributions for the severance period .
• Change of control (within 12 months; double-trigger): Lump-sum salary (CEO 18 months; other C-level 12 months), target bonus (CEO 150%; others 100%), COBRA contributions, outplacement, and full acceleration of time-based equity (performance awards follow plan terms) .
• Clawback/recoupment: Adopted in Dec 2023; recovery of incentive compensation after restatements, misconduct, or serious financial/reputational damage (up to 100% at board discretion) .
• Non-compete/non-solicit: The proxy explicitly confirms one-year non-compete and non-solicit agreements for NEOs; it does not specifically enumerate Mr. DeLong’s agreement .

Performance & Track Record

Compensation Structure Diagnostics (pay-for-performance levers)

• Shift to PSUs tied to relative TSR (50% of LTI in 2025), with a cap at target for negative absolute TSR, is shareholder-friendly and increases at-risk pay sensitivity to market-relative performance .
• Annual bonus funding at 90.74% in 2024 reflects below-target performance on aggregate corporate goals (including product revenue thresholds and regulatory outcomes), showing discipline in variable pay .
• Stock ownership guidelines and anti-hedging/limited-pledging policies reinforce alignment; all executive officers met ownership requirements as of YE2024 .
• Double-trigger change-in-control protection with equity acceleration mitigates “single-trigger windfall” risk while still supporting retention during strategic events .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

• Pledging/hedging: Company-wide prohibitions with controlled exceptions; no exceptions disclosed for Mr. DeLong (mitigates alignment risk) .
• Clawbacks: Enhanced policy (Dec 2023) covering restatements and misconduct reduces risk of misaligned incentives .
• Section 16 compliance: One late filing for Mr. DeLong in 2021—an administrative timing issue rather than a trading practice concern .
• Governance: Strong say-on-pay approval (89.9%) suggests low shareholder dissent on executive pay .

Compensation Peer Group (benchmarking context)

Investment Implications

• Incentive alignment: The 2025 introduction of relative-TSR PSUs (with downside cap for negative absolute TSR) meaningfully increases performance linkage and reduces windfalls in weak markets—supportive for long-term holders monitoring insider motivation .
• Selling pressure timing: RSUs vest annually (25% per year) and options vest monthly after the first year; executives can use Rule 10b5-1 plans—expect potential periodic Form 4 sales clustered around vest dates, though hedging/pledging is restricted and ownership guidelines apply .
• Retention risk and COC economics: Double-trigger severance and full time-based equity acceleration under change-of-control are competitive but not excessive; they should stabilize leadership through strategic events while avoiding single-trigger optics .
• Data limitations: Mr. DeLong is not a named executive officer, so precise base/bonus and grant-level detail are not disclosed; monitoring future proxies and Section 16 filings (Form 4) is recommended to quantify ownership changes and potential selling cadence .