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Marvin White

Marvin White

Chief Executive Officer and President at Aptevo TherapeuticsAptevo Therapeutics
CEO
Executive
Board

About Marvin White

Marvin L. White, 63, has served as Aptevo’s President, Chief Executive Officer, and a director since August 2016. He previously served as CFO of St. Vincent Health and Lilly USA and held roles in treasury, corporate finance, and investment banking at Eli Lilly; he holds a B.S. in Accounting (Wilberforce University) and an MBA in Finance (Indiana University) . Aptevo is a pre-commercial company; 2024 net loss was $24.13M, 2023 net loss $17.41M, and 2022 net income $8.03M was non-recurring; cumulative TSR based on a $100 initial investment fell from $6.00 (2022) to $0.49 (2023) to $0.03 (2024) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
St. Vincent HealthChief Financial Officer2008–2014Led finance, materials management, and patient financial services across 19 hospitals and 36 JVs
Lilly USA, LLC (Eli Lilly)Chief Financial Officer; leadership roles in treasury, corporate finance, corporate strategyPrior to 2008Senior finance leadership at a global pharma; capital allocation and strategy experience
Washington Prime Group (NYSE WPG)Director (prior to CEO role at Aptevo)n/aPublic REIT board oversight; retail real estate exposure
CoLucid Pharmaceuticals (acquired by Eli Lilly in 2017)Director (prior)n/aPublic biotech board; M&A exit experience

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYears
Emergent BioSolutions (NYSE EBS)Director (2010–2016; rejoined 2020)2010–2016; 2020–present
OneAmerica Financial Insurance Partners, Inc.DirectorCurrent
Delta Dental of WashingtonDirectorCurrent

Fixed Compensation

Metric20232024
Base Salary ($)$565,123 $575,000
All Other Compensation ($)$9,900 $10,350

Notes:

  • Board leadership is independent: Dr. John E. Niederhuber is independent Chairman; Board independence 83%, and 100% independence on Audit, Compensation, and Nominating/Governance committees .

Performance Compensation

Component20232024
Target Bonus (%)n/a55% of base salary
Actual Annual Bonus ($)$266,371 $316,250
Equity Awards – Grant Date Fair Value ($)$32,052 $4,420
  • 2024 bonus program weighting: CEO’s bonus is 90% corporate goals / 10% individual. For 2024, the Compensation Committee set payout factors at 72% for the corporate weighting and 100% for individual; however, the Summary Compensation Table shows a bonus paid equal to the full target amount for the CEO ($316,250) .
  • Performance metrics referenced include clinical progress, strategic milestones, and financial metrics; the company emphasizes non-financial R&D and operational milestones given its pre-commercial status .

Equity award mechanics and vesting

AwardGrant DateQuantityVestingExpiration/Notes
RSUs7/17/202431 1/3 on 7/17/2025; 1/3 on 7/17/2026; 1/3 on 7/17/2027 Service-vesting; dividends, if any, pay only upon vesting
Stock Options3/03/20231 (plus a prior fully vested option) 1/3 on 3/03/2024; 1/3 on 3/03/2025; 1/3 on 3/03/2026 One option expires 1/29/2031 at $1,090,760 strike (fully vested); 3/02/2033 option at $70,004 strike

Plan design features:

  • Minimum 1-year vesting (limited exceptions), no repricing without stockholder approval, no dividends on unvested equity, enhanced clawback provisions, and no tax gross-ups in the plan .
  • In 2025, the company sought approval to add 250,000 shares to the equity plan; one-year minimum vesting and director award caps remain in place .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership (6/20/2025)43 shares; includes 10 shares via options/RSUs exercisable/vesting within 60 days; <1% ownership
Ownership guidelinesCEO required to hold stock worth 3x base salary; all covered persons must retain 50% of after-tax shares until compliant; due to declining stock price, covered persons do not currently meet targets
Hedging/PledgingHedging prohibited under insider trading policy; no pledging disclosure noted

Implications:

  • Ownership is de minimis relative to salary/role, and guidelines are currently unmet, potentially weakening alignment; retention requirements partially mitigate this .

Employment Terms

ScenarioCash SeveranceEquityBenefits
Involuntary termination without Cause (non-CIC)150% of (base + target bonus), paid over 18 months; plus prior-year unpaid bonus and pro-rata current-year target bonus n/aContinued benefits for 18 months
CIC + termination without Cause or resignation for Good Reason (within 18 months), or termination in anticipation of CIC250% of compensation (lump sum) + prior-year unpaid and pro-rata current-year target bonus Full vesting of all unvested equity; option exercise period extension per original award terms Continued benefits for 30 months; indemnification and D&O coverage retained; advancement of legal fees

Other terms:

  • Payments conditioned on non-compete/non-solicit compliance, cooperation, and release execution .
  • Company-wide clawback policy (adopted April 2023) applies to erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation tied to financial reporting; time-vested RSUs/options generally not subject to the policy .

Board Governance (Director-Service Specifics for Marvin White)

  • Board service: Director since August 2016; not independent (as CEO). Chairman is independent; therefore no Lead Independent Director is designated .
  • Committees: Serves on the Executive Committee; does not serve on Audit, Compensation, or Nominating/Governance committees (all independent) .
  • Board attendance: Board met 7 times in 2024; all directors attended at least 75% of meetings/committees .
  • Independence: 83% of Board independent; 100% independence on Audit, Compensation, and Nominating/Governance committees .

Director Compensation (for governance quality context)

ElementAmount
Annual Board Cash Retainer$40,000
Board Chair Retainer$50,000
Committee Chair RetainersAudit $20,000; Compensation $15,000; Nominating/Gov $15,000; Executive $20,000
Committee Member RetainersAudit $10,000; Compensation $7,500; Nominating/Gov $7,500; Executive $10,000
Annual Director Equity1 RSU (shifted to 100% RSUs; 1-year cliff vest)

Performance & Track Record

Metric202220232024
Cumulative TSR (Value of $100)$6.00 $0.49 $0.03
Net Income (Loss) ($)$8,027,000 (non-recurring) $(17,411,000) $(24,130,000)

Notable corporate finance and listing actions:

  • Reverse stock splits: 1-for-44 (Mar 5, 2024), 1-for-37 (Dec 3, 2024), and 1-for-20 (May 23, 2025) cumulatively exceeding 250:1 over two years, eliminating future Nasdaq cure periods if bid price falls below $1.00 within two years of Mar 5, 2024 .
  • 2025 capital measures: SEPA with Yorkville up to $25M; June 2025 offering with 2,465,000 shares/pre-funded warrants and 12,325,000 five-year warrants at $3.25; warrants require shareholder approval to exercise (potentially materially dilutive) .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Cash-heavy tilt: 2024 equity grant value for CEO ($4,420) was minimal versus cash salary and bonus; 2023 equity grant value ($32,052) also modest, indicating reliance on cash incentives over equity .
  • Year-over-year mix: Equity grant value declined in 2024 vs 2023, increasing guaranteed comp mix relative to at-risk equity; however, annual bonus remains at-risk, with corporate and individual factors applied .
  • Clawback and plan safeguards: Strong plan features (no repricing/dividends on unvested, minimum vesting) and a Dodd-Frank-compliant clawback add guardrails, but the predominance of cash incentives and low equity value weakens long-term alignment .
  • Performance linkage: Bonuses tied to development and strategic milestones (appropriate for pre-commercial biotech), but TSR collapse and continued losses underscore limited shareholder-value alignment in pay outcomes, especially with full-target payout reported for 2024 .

Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure

  • Upcoming CEO RSU vests on 7/17/2025, 7/17/2026, and 7/17/2027 (equal tranches). Quantities are small (31 total), implying minimal near-term selling pressure from time-based vesting .
  • Options appear far out-of-the-money given very high historical strike prices driven by reverse-split history (e.g., $1,090,760 strike on a 2011-origin option), reducing exercise/sale incentives .
  • Significant external warrant overhang (e.g., 12,325,000 warrants from June 2025 offering) could pressure shares upon approval/exercise; not insider-driven but relevant to trading dynamics .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • TSR collapse; ongoing net losses; heavy reliance on dilutive financings and repeated reverse splits (over 250:1 cumulative), removing future Nasdaq cure windows—heightened delisting risk if price weakens again .
  • Minimal CEO share ownership and non-compliance with ownership guidelines signal weak “skin in the game,” though retention rules are in place .
  • Change-in-control economics are above typical small-cap medians (2.5x for CEO) with full equity acceleration—shareholder-friendly double-trigger but sizable payout relative to market cap .
  • No related party transactions disclosed (mitigates conflict concerns) and hedging prohibited (alignment positive) .

Compensation Peer Group & Say-on-Pay

  • The Compensation Committee engaged Willis Towers Watson to evaluate programs and refine peers; consultant provided no other services (reducing conflict risk) .
  • 2025 advisory say-on-pay was put to a vote (Proposal 6); historical approval percentages not disclosed in the proxy excerpt provided .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Very low CEO ownership and small equity grants vs sizeable cash pay and robust CIC benefits suggest weaker long-term alignment. Ownership guidelines are unmet, though retention requirements help at the margin .
  • Retention/Transition: Non-CIC severance (1.5x base+bonus) and CIC (2.5x with full equity acceleration) reduce turnover risk; however, they also raise potential cost of leadership changes if performance disappoints .
  • Trading Signals: CEO equity vestings are small; insider selling pressure from executive awards should be limited. The larger trading overhang comes from external warrants and financing structures pending shareholder approval, which could create supply upon exercisability/registration .
  • Governance: Independent Chair and majority-independent board/committees are positives; however, repeated reverse splits and ongoing dilution highlight financing risk that may continue to weigh on equity value until clinical or partnering catalysts emerge .