Sign in

Rajesh Agrawal

Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer at ARROW ELECTRONICSARROW ELECTRONICS
Executive

About Rajesh Agrawal

Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Arrow Electronics since September 6, 2022; previously EVP & CFO of The Western Union Company (2014–2022). He holds an MBA from Columbia University and a BS in engineering from GMI/Kettering University, and was age 57 at appointment; he also serves on the board of Beazley PLC (Audit & Risk and Remuneration Committees) . Company performance during 2024 reflected cyclical headwinds: sales $27.9B, gross profit $3.3B, operating income $769M, and diluted EPS $7.29, with ~$250M of buybacks, as management emphasized structural margin work in Components and focus in ECS .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Arrow ElectronicsSVP, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)2022–presentFinance leadership through industry correction; supports cost discipline and capital allocation priorities .
The Western Union CompanyEVP & Chief Financial Officer2014–2022Led finance; also intermittently led M&A strategy and global operations .
Deluxe; General Mills; Chrysler; General MotorsVarious senior finance/business rolesn/a (prior to 2014)Progressive finance and operating roles across blue-chip companies .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Beazley PLCDirector; Audit & Risk Committee; Remuneration CommitteeCurrentPublic company board and committee service .

Fixed Compensation

Metric20232024
Base salary ($)700,000 700,000
Target annual bonus ($)700,000 700,000
Actual annual bonus paid ($)476,070 493,360

Additional 2022 new-hire terms: $700,000 base salary; $700,000 annual incentive target; sign-on RSU award $4,000,000 vesting in four equal annual installments; eligibility for severance and change-in-control programs from Oct 1, 2022 .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive (2024 design and outcomes)

MetricWeightTarget/Threshold/MaxActual resultPayout as % of target
Absolute EPS (non-GAAP)70%Threshold $9.08; Target $12.10; Max $15.13 $10.83 68.54%
Strategic Goals (GC growth; ECS growth; Opex savings)30%GC growth: 0.75–1.0 pp; ECS growth: 0.75–1.0 pp; Opex savings: $86.25M–$115M GC below threshold; ECS above target; Opex at target 75%
Total formulaic payout70.48% (committee approved)

Resulting non-equity incentive compensation for Agrawal in 2024: $493,360 .

Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP) – structure

  • Mix: 50% PSUs; 50% RSUs; annual grants .
  • PSU metrics: 60% three-year Relative EPS Growth vs peer group; 40% three-year average ROIC minus WACC; 0–185% payout; positive net income threshold; settlement in shares at 3 years .
  • RSUs: time-based, vest 25% annually over four years (subject to positive net income in grant year) .

2024 LTIP grants to Agrawal: 9,558 PSUs (target) and 9,558 RSUs (grant-date fair values ~$1.10M each) .

PSU vesting outcome for 2022 cycle (1/1/2022–12/31/2024): Relative EPS Growth ranked 10th (weighted 0%); average ROIC–WACC 4.73% (weighted 80%); overall payout 80% (approved Feb 2025) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: 15,129 shares (<1% of outstanding); includes 12,569 shares held jointly with spouse .
  • Executive ownership guidelines: CEO 5x salary; other NEOs 3x salary; all NEOs currently meet requirements .
  • Anti-hedging/anti-pledging: Hedging and pledging of company securities prohibited; trades require preclearance and are confined to open windows or 10b5-1 plans .
  • Stock vested and options exercised (2024): 12,301 shares vested for Agrawal (value $1,506,204); no options exercised .

Outstanding equity awards at FY-end 2024 (Agrawal)

Award typeGrant dateUnits outstandingMarket value at 12/31/24 ($)
RSUs09/14/202220,178 2,282,535
RSUs02/15/20236,634 750,438
RSUs02/21/20249,558 1,081,201
PSUs (unearned)02/15/20238,845 1,000,546
PSUs (unearned)02/21/20249,558 1,081,201

Notes: Agrawal has no outstanding stock options in the FY2024 table . Shares outstanding at record date: 51,867,253 .

Employment Terms

ProvisionSeverance Policy (no cause)Change-in-Control (CIC) Retention Agreement (double-trigger, within 24 months post-CIC)
Cash severance18 months of base salary and annual cash incentive (prorated as applicable) paid per normal schedule Lump sum: 2x (CEO 3x) the sum of base salary and target annual cash incentive (greater of CIC date vs termination date)
Annual bonusPro-rata bonus for year of termination based on actual performance; severance-period bonus based on actual performance but 0% credit for strategic goals Pro-rata bonus for year of termination based on actual performance
Equity treatmentContinues to vest during severance period; forfeiture of any portion not vested by end of period Immediate vesting of all unvested equity awards
Health benefitsContinuation through severance period; up to $50,000 outplacement ($75,000 CEO) Continuation for up to 24 months (36 months CEO)
Restrictive covenantsRequired release; non-compete and non-solicit for period equal to severance period As per CIC agreement; excise tax cutback if economically favorable; no golden parachute tax gross-up (company-wide policy)
SERPSERP continues per plan; present value at 12/31/24: $800,668; 2.25 years credited service SERP benefits payable at age 60 (if CIC qualifying termination and age thresholds met)

Sign-on award (2022): $4,000,000 RSUs vesting in four equal annual tranches; base $700,000; target bonus $700,000; effective Sept 6, 2022; CIC/severance eligibility effective Oct 1, 2022 .

Financial Context (ARW consolidated)

Metric (USD)FY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Revenues$34,477,018,000*$37,124,422,000*$33,107,120,000*$27,923,324,000*
EBITDA$1,750,935,000*$2,262,159,000*$1,643,657,000*$1,119,023,000*
Net Income (IS)$1,108,197,000*$1,426,884,000*$903,505,000*$392,074,000*

*Values retrieved from S&P Global (GetFinancials).

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Cash vs equity mix: For Agrawal, base salary remained $700k in 2023–2024, with stock awards of ~$2.2M annually and non-equity incentive moving from $476k (2023) to $493k (2024) amid below-target EPS results, indicating variable pay sensitivity to performance .
  • Metric design and stringency: Annual plan weighted 70% to Absolute EPS with explicit threshold/target/max and strategic goals at 30% (growth in each segment and opex savings); committee retained negative discretion and approved 70.48% payout for 2024 .
  • Long-term focus: PSUs tied to relative EPS vs peers and ROIC–WACC; 2022 cycle paid at 80% (ROIC–WACC outperformance offset by weak relative EPS growth), reinforcing capital efficiency emphasis .
  • Governance: Clawbacks (Dodd-Frank and misconduct), anti-hedging/anti-pledging, no option repricing, no golden parachute tax gross-ups; ownership guidelines met .

Say‑on‑Pay, Peer Group, and Shareholder Feedback

  • Say-on-pay approval: 97.1% at 2024 annual meeting .
  • PSU peer group (for relative EPS): Avnet, CDW, Celestica, Flex, HPE, HP Inc., Jabil, TD SYNNEX, Wesco International .
  • Shareholder engagement: Off‑season outreach to holders representing ~74% of shares; feedback supportive of compensation structure .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Pledging/hedging: Prohibited (mitigates alignment risk) .
  • Clawbacks: Both restatement-based and misconduct-based recovery in place .
  • Change-in-control: Double-trigger required; excise tax cutback provision rather than gross-up .
  • Insider activity: 2024 shows vesting of 12,301 shares and no option exercises for Agrawal; no pledging; specific Form 4 sales not indicated in proxy tables .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Finance leadership (public-company CFO since 2014), M&A strategy and operational oversight at Western Union; board-level risk and remuneration oversight at Beazley; MBA (Columbia), BS Engineering (Kettering). These credibly support CFO responsibilities in a global distribution/solutions enterprise .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 below-target EPS drove sub‑target annual bonus (70.48% payout), while long-term PSUs partially paid (80% for 2022 cycle) on ROIC–WACC strength despite weak relative EPS, indicating balanced incentives that reward capital efficiency even in cyclical downturns .
  • Retention and selling pressure: Significant unvested RSUs/PSUs outstanding (e.g., ~20.2k 2022 RSUs plus 2023–2024 grants) create retention hooks; absence of pledging and strong ownership guidelines reduce misalignment risk .
  • Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger with 2x cash multiple and full equity vesting could be meaningful in a transaction, but absence of gross-ups and presence of cutback and clawbacks temper governance concerns .
  • Context: Company-level revenue and EBITDA have contracted through the cycle (2022–2024); the compensation framework appears calibrated to cyclicality, limiting windfalls and emphasizing efficiency—supportive for investors seeking disciplined capital stewardship through downturns (S&P Global financials).