Bryan E. Giles
Mission ProduceAbout Bryan E. Giles
Bryan E. Giles is Chief Financial Officer of Mission Produce (AVO), serving as CFO since 2018 after joining the company in 2012 as Vice President of Finance; he is 54 years old, holds a B.S. and MBA from California State University, Northridge, and is a CPA (inactive) . Under the leadership team including Giles, FY2024 revenue rose 29% to $1.23B (from $953.9M in FY2023), Adjusted EBITDA more than doubled to $107.8M (from $48.4M), and net income was $36.7M; cash flow from operations was $93.4M . The annual incentive plan for 2024 paid well above target on strong results (company metric paid at 172% of target), while the inaugural 2022–2024 PSU program paid 0%—demonstrating both upside and downside alignment to results .
AVO performance context
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($USD Millions) | $1,050.0 | $953.9 | $1,230.0 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($USD Millions) | $47.6 | $48.4 | $107.8 |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mission Produce | Chief Financial Officer | 2018–present | Expanded support of decision-making teams; strengthened investor/analyst relationships; drove cost-reduction initiatives (basis for 2024 individual bonus component) . |
| Mission Produce | Vice President of Finance | 2012–2018 | Finance leadership during scale-up period . |
| Tecom Industries (Smiths Group) | VP Finance & Administration; VP Finance – MSS Technology Group | Not disclosed | Senior finance roles at a Smiths Group division . |
| Deloitte & Touche LLP | Auditor (early career) | Not disclosed | Foundation in accounting/audit; CPA (inactive) . |
External Roles
No public-company directorships or external board roles disclosed in executive biography sections .
Fixed Compensation
Base salary and target bonus
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus % of Salary | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 472,500 | 75% | |
| 2024 | 487,000 | 75% | |
| 2025 | 510,000 | 75% (unchanged) |
Perquisites and other compensation (FY2024)
| Component | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| 401(k) matching contributions | 13,800 |
| Health insurance premiums | 34,255 |
| Car allowance | 22,906 |
| Supplemental disability income premiums | 5,650 |
| Total “All Other Compensation” | 76,611 |
Deferred compensation (FY2024)
| Item | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Executive contributions in FY2024 | 105,933 |
| Company contributions | 0 |
| Aggregate earnings in FY2024 | 84,771 |
| Aggregate withdrawals/distributions in FY2024 | (98,536) |
| Aggregate balance as of 10/31/2024 | 402,205 |
Multi-year reported compensation (Summary Compensation Table)
| Year | Salary ($) | Bonus ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 484,782 | 73,051 | 701,711 | 502,591 | 76,611 | 1,838,746 |
| 2023 | 467,354 | 70,875 | 584,051 | — | 73,594 | 1,195,874 |
| 2022 | 442,338 | — | 455,296 | — | 65,955 | 963,589 |
Notes: 2024 “Bonus” reflects the 20% individual component of the annual incentive; “Non-Equity Incentive” reflects the company performance component payout .
Performance Compensation
Annual cash incentive (design and outcomes)
| Year | Metric | Weighting | Performance Range | Target | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Adjusted EBITDA | 80% (CFO) | 50% thr / 100% tgt / 150% max | $79,238k | $107,763k | 172% of target (company component) |
| 2024 | Individual performance | 20% (CFO) | Discretionary up to 20% | — | Achieved | Paid full 20% |
| 2024 | Overall CFO payout | — | — | $365,250 target | — | $575,642 (158% of target) |
| 2023 | Adjusted Operating Income | 80% (CFO) | 70% thr to 130% max | $38,990k | $11,673k (30% of tgt) | 0% of target |
| 2023 | Individual performance | 20% (CFO) | Discretionary up to 20% | — | Achieved | Paid full 20% |
| 2023 | Overall CFO payout | — | — | $354,375 target | — | $70,875 (20% of target) |
Long-term equity incentives (structure and awards)
- 2024 equity mix: 50% RSUs / 50% PSUs; CFO total equity value $680,000 ($340,000 RSUs; $340,000 PSUs) .
- 2024 grants (effective 1/5/2024): RSUs 35,016; PSUs (target) 35,015; PSUs pay 50%/100%/200% at 70%/100%/130% of 3-year cumulative adjusted net income per share; 3-year performance period 11/1/2023–10/31/2026; PSUs cliff-vest at end of period; RSUs vest ratably over 3 years .
- 2022–2024 PSU results: 0% payout (actual 47% of target ANI/share vs 70% threshold) .
- Mark-to-target: As of 10/31/2024, 2023–2025 and 2024–2026 PSUs were trending between target and maximum levels based on 2024 results (disclosure basis) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and guidelines
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership (2/11/2025) | 182,246 shares; <1% of outstanding |
| Ownership guidelines | CFO required 3x base salary; all NEOs met guidelines at 10/31/2024 except the April-2024 hire (Pawlowski) |
| Hedging/shorting | Prohibited by Insider Trading Policy |
| Clawback | SEC-compliant “Big R” and “little r” restatement clawback; no misconduct required |
| Pledging | No pledging noted for Giles in ownership table; pledge disclosure in this section pertains to CEO trusts only |
Outstanding and unvested awards (as of 10/31/2024)
| Instrument | Terms/Count | Status/Value |
|---|---|---|
| Stock options | 120,723 options at $12.00, expiring 9/30/2030 | Underwater at $11.80 close on 10/31/2024 |
| RSUs (unvested) | 6,686 (granted 1/3/2022), vests 1/3/2025 | Unvested shares 6,686 |
| RSUs (unvested) | 19,682 (granted 1/6/2023), vest 1/6/2025 and 1/6/2026 (9,841 each) | Unvested shares 19,682 |
| RSUs (unvested) | 35,016 (granted 1/5/2024), vest 11,672 on 1/5/2025, 1/5/2026, 1/5/2027 | Unvested shares 35,016 |
| PSUs (2023–2025) | Performance 11/1/2022–10/31/2025; disclosed at max for table purposes [3] | 39,364 at 200% disclosure basis [3] |
| PSUs (2024–2026) | Performance 11/1/2023–10/31/2026; disclosed at max for table purposes [4] | 70,030 at 200% disclosure basis [4] |
Vesting schedule detail provides visibility into potential selling pressure around early-January vest dates; options are currently out-of-the-money, reducing option-exercise-driven selling .
Employment Terms
- Severance/change-in-control (Executive Severance Plan for CFO): cash severance equals 1.0x (non-CIC) or 1.5x (during CIC period) of base salary + target bonus; up to 12 months COBRA; equity: double-trigger full acceleration at target for PSUs upon qualifying CIC termination, and pro-rata/actual performance for non-CIC qualifying termination; 12‑month post-termination option exercise window; 24‑month non‑solicit; no tax gross-ups .
- Stock ownership/insider policy: robust ownership guidelines (CFO 3x salary); hedging/short sales prohibited .
- Clawback: mandatory recovery of incentive compensation for accounting restatements (Big R and little r), regardless of misconduct .
- No pension/SERP: company discloses no defined benefit/SERP; limited perquisites .
Performance Compensation – Detailed Tables
Annual cash incentive math (CFO)
| Component | Weight | Target ($) | Actual/Assessment | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company performance (Adj. EBITDA) FY2024 | 80% | $79,238,000 | $107,763,000 (136% of target) | 172% of target component |
| Individual performance FY2024 | 20% | — | Full achievement based on CEO assessment | 20% (max) |
| Total payout FY2024 (CFO) | — | $365,250 | — | $575,642 (158% of target) |
PSU program guardrails
| Cycle | Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Payout range | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024–2026 | 3-yr cumulative adjusted net income/share | 70% | 100% | 130% | 50%–200% of target shares | Cliff-vest at performance period end |
| 2022–2024 | 3-yr cumulative adjusted net income/share | 70% | 100% | 130% | 50%–200% | Actual 47% → 0% payout |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix tilting to performance: shift from 60/40 RSU/PSU in 2023 to 50/50 in 2024 increases at-risk, results-driven equity exposure for the CFO .
- Cash metric tightened to EBITDA: 2024 annual plan switched from adjusted operating income to Adjusted EBITDA—a key external KPI—tightening linkage to financial outcomes; 2024 paid 172% on company metric following a zero payout in 2023, consistent with pay-for-performance .
- Realized pay discipline: 2022–2024 PSUs paid 0%; all options were underwater as of 10/31/2024 (strike $12.00; price $11.80), curbing windfalls .
- Governance and shareholder support: robust clawback and hedging restrictions; 2024 say-on-pay support ~97.34% (2023: 90.6%) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Giles’ incentives are tightly linked to company performance—near-term to Adjusted EBITDA and long-term to cumulative adjusted net income per share—with visible downside (0% PSUs in 2022–2024) and upside (2024 cash payout at 158% for CFO) .
- Selling pressure: Upcoming RSU vest dates concentrate around early January each year (e.g., 1/3–1/6 and 1/5 tranches), but options are out-of-the-money, reducing exercise-driven selling; ownership guideline compliance also supports retention .
- Retention/transition risk: Severance terms are market-typical (1.0x–1.5x cash, double-trigger equity), non-solicit for 24 months, and no tax gross-ups—balancing retention with shareholder protections .
- Governance quality: Strong say-on-pay outcomes and use of an independent consultant (Pearl Meyer), plus robust clawback/hedging rules, indicate compensation risk is well managed .
Sources: AVO DEF 14A (2025): **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:3]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:5]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:6]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:7]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:28]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:29]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:31]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:33]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:39]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:40]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:41]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:42]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:43]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:45]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:46]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:49]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:50]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:52]** **[1802974_0001140361-25-005868_ny20041112x1_def14a.htm:72]**; AVO DEF 14A (2024): **[1802974_0001140361-24-009015_ny20011520x2_def14a.htm:4]** **[1802974_0001140361-24-009015_ny20011520x2_def14a.htm:12]** **[1802974_0001140361-24-009015_ny20011520x2_def14a.htm:34]** **[1802974_0001140361-24-009015_ny20011520x2_def14a.htm:39]** **[1802974_0001140361-24-009015_ny20011520x2_def14a.htm:40]** **[1802974_0001140361-24-009015_ny20011520x2_def14a.htm:47]** **[1802974_0001140361-24-009015_ny20011520x2_def14a.htm:48]** **[1802974_0001140361-24-009015_ny20011520x2_def14a.htm:49]** **[1802974_0001140361-24-009015_ny20011520x2_def14a.htm:52]** **[1802974_0001140361-24-009015_ny20011520x2_def14a.htm:57]**.