Erick DeVinney
AxogenAbout Erick DeVinney
Erick DeVinney is Axogen’s Chief Innovation Officer (CIO), promoted effective January 1, 2024, after joining the company in April 2007 and serving in progressively senior roles across clinical research, R&D, product development, medical education, and medical affairs . He holds a B.S. in Chemistry from Virginia Commonwealth University and has conducted research with VCU Medical College of Virginia Hospitals, University of Utrecht, National Clinical Research, PRA International, and Angiotech; he also serves on the board of the Global Nerve Foundation (GNF) . DeVinney is 49 and was one of Axogen’s Named Executive Officers (NEOs) for 2024 . Company performance markers relevant to his incentive design include 2024 revenue of $187.3M (+17.8% YoY) and improved profitability; Axogen also highlights a ~125% increase in share price from $7.92 (Aug 7, 2024) to $17.81 (Apr 1, 2025) as TSR momentum into 2025, and BLA submission for Avance Nerve Graft (Nov 2024) with an FDA PDUFA goal date of Sept 5, 2025 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Axogen | Chief Innovation Officer | 2024–present | Leads innovation portfolio and scientific/regulatory programs; aligned with Avance BLA milestones and performance equity design . |
| Axogen | Progressive leadership across clinical research, R&D, product development, medical education, medical affairs | 2007–2023 | Drove innovation in peripheral nerve injury diagnosis/repair, including clinical and regulatory strategies, portfolio development, and scientific thought leadership . |
| Virginia Commonwealth University Medical College of Virginia Hospitals | Research | Not disclosed | Academic/clinical research experience relevant to tissue technologies, devices, pharma, biologics . |
| University of Utrecht | Research | Not disclosed | Academic research supporting scientific foundation for innovation . |
| National Clinical Research; PRA International; Angiotech | Research/clinical development roles | Not disclosed | Contributed to submissions including NDAs, BLAs, and FDA 510(k) applications . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global Nerve Foundation (GNF) | Board Member | 2024–present (served during 2024) | GNF is a 501(c)(3) focused on improving awareness and care for peripheral nerve injuries; Axogen entered a partner agreement and contributed $100,000 in 2024 . |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus % | Target Bonus ($) | Actual Bonus Paid ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 400,318 | 50% | 200,159 | 335,467 (167.6% payout) |
| 2023 | 348,000 | — | — | 189,834 |
- 2024 base pay increased 15.0% YoY; promotion accounted for +10.6% plus merit, effective January 1, 2024 .
- 2024 bonus design and results are detailed under Performance Compensation (below) .
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Cash Incentive – Corporate Scorecard and Outcome
| Metric | Minimum Threshold | Minimum % of Target Bonus | Target Threshold | Target % of Bonus | Maximum Threshold | Maximum % of Target Bonus | Performance Achieved | Earned % of Target Bonus |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $174M; 9.4% growth | 20% | $180M; 13.2% growth | 40% | $198M; 24.5% growth | (1) | $187.3M; 17.8% growth | 56.5% |
| Year-end cash balance | $30M | 20% | $34M | 40% | $42M | (1) | $39.5M | 67.0% |
| Protection category revenue growth | $4.1M | 5% | $5.6M | 10% | $8.7M | (1) | $9.9M | 24.1% |
| Product & quality systems management | (2) | 5% | (2) | 10% | (2) | 20% | (2) | 20.0% |
| BLA supplemental | (3) | —% | (3) | —% | (3) | 20% | (3) | —% (0%) |
| Total | 50% | 100% | 200% | 167.6% | ||||
| (1) Metric-level maximum not capped, but total payout capped at 200% . | ||||||||
| (2) Regulatory audit-driven scale; earned max 20% in 2024 . | ||||||||
| (3) Supplemental BLA innovation milestones; net payout 0% . |
- DeVinney’s 2024 individual bonus outcome was 167.6% of target, consistent with NEOs, yielding $335,467 on a $200,159 target .
Long-Term Incentives – 2024 Grants (structure, counts, vesting)
| Award Type | 2024 Grant (Target/Units) | Performance Window / Vesting | Payout Range | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSR PSUs | 68,600 | Performance from Feb 22, 2024 to Feb 22, 2027; payout based on average share price hurdles over 30-day trading periods | 0–200% | Initially capped at 100% pending shareholder plan amendment; after June 5, 2024 approval, up to 200% . |
| BLA PSUs | 25,000 | Performance period through Dec 31, 2025; milestone-based (submission/approval) | 0–100% | BLA submission milestone achieved Sept 2024; 10% of target earned; for 2024 BLA PSUs, 10% vested Feb 2025 . |
| RSUs | 50,000 | Time-vest: 50% at 24 months from grant date, then 12.5% each six months thereafter | N/A | Award tied to CIO promotion effective Jan 1, 2024 . |
Additional context on prior PSU designs and outcomes:
- Revenue PSUs (2022–2024 cycle): payout determined at 99.2% of target; annual achievements were 74.1% (2022), 97.9% (2023), 113.6% (2024) with final payout based on greater of average annual factor or 3-year CAGR .
- BLA PSUs from 2017–2019: following the Sept 2024 submission milestone, 5% of target vested immediately and 5% will vest in Sept 2025 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Measure | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 323,514 shares; plus 173,103 underlying options/RSUs/PSUs currently exercisable or vesting within 60 days; “less than 1%” of shares outstanding . |
| Ownership guidelines | Executives (non-CEO) must hold 1× base salary; as of Dec 31, 2024, all executive officers met guidelines except the newly hired CEO (within compliance window); implies DeVinney met guidelines . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited by policy; beneficial holders listed have shares “not subject to any pledge” . |
| Notable near-term vesting | 2017–2019 BLA PSUs: additional 5% of target to vest in Sept 2025 due to submission milestone structure . 2024 BLA PSUs: 10% vested in Feb 2025 (already occurred) . RSUs (50,000 from March 2024 grant) follow 50% vesting at 24 months, then semiannual 12.5% thereafter . |
Selected details of outstanding equity (as of Dec 31, 2024):
- Options: Exercisable/Unexercisable tranches include grants with strikes and expirations such as 12/29/2016 (50,000 @ $8.95, exp. 12/29/2026), 12/18/2017 (13,900 @ $27.00, exp. 12/18/2027), 12/27/2018 (11,900 @ $19.17, exp. 12/27/2028), 3/16/2020 (24,000 @ $8.61, exp. 3/16/2030), 3/16/2021 (20,562 exercisable/2,938 unexercisable @ $20.91, exp. 3/16/2031), 3/16/2022 (14,836 exercisable/8,902 unexercisable @ $8.20, exp. 3/16/2032), 3/16/2023 (64,000 unexercisable @ $8.27, exp. 3/16/2033) .
- Unvested RSUs/PSUs: include 3/16/2021 RSUs (2,950), 3/16/2022 RSUs (12,725) and PSUs (24,799), 3/16/2023 RSUs (46,300) and PSUs (30,000), 2/22/2024 PSUs (68,600), 2/22/2024 PSUs (25,000), 3/1/2024 RSUs (50,000). Payout values at year-end use $16.48 assuming target for PSUs .
Employment Terms
- Status: Employed “at-will”; latest agreement superseded and amended on Feb 27, 2024 .
- Severance (non-change-in-control): Lump sum equal to 15 months base salary; plus 125% of target annual bonus; plus COBRA premiums for 15 months or until comparable coverage is obtained, whichever shorter .
- Change-in-control (double-trigger): If terminated without substantial cause upon/within 365 days after a CIC (or 90 days before), or for good reason following a CIC, receives 24 months base salary; 200% of target annual bonus; 24 months COBRA; (CEO has special time-based equity acceleration; not applicable to DeVinney) .
- Definitions (examples): “Substantial cause” includes fraud/theft/embezzlement, material breach, policy violations, failure to meet performance standards, or certain convictions; “Good reason” includes material diminishment of role, material base pay reduction without cause, or required relocation >50 miles .
- Clawback: Compensation recovery policy adopted in 2023 per SEC/Nasdaq rules for restatements .
- Anti-hedging/pledging: Policy revised Dec 16, 2024; prohibits hedging and pledging by insiders .
- Ownership guidelines: Executives must hold 1× salary; DeVinney in compliance as of Dec 31, 2024 .
- No excise tax gross-ups; no single-trigger CIC payments; no option repricing/backdating .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay mix balances fixed and at-risk; in 2024 DeVinney’s long-term mix was 76% performance-based (TSR PSUs, BLA PSUs) with remaining in time-vested RSUs, aligning with shareholder TSR and BLA milestones .
- Annual bonus design emphasized revenue growth, cash, category expansion, and quality systems; delivered 167.6% of target for NEOs on strong 2024 execution (revenue $187.3M, +17.8% YoY) .
- PSU accountability: historical revenue-growth PSU cycles paid near target (2022–2024 cycle at 99.2%), while BLA PSUs tied to regulatory milestones had partial vesting on submission in 2024 and future vest tied to approval timelines .
- Governance and shareholder responsiveness: say-on-pay support was ~70% in 2024; 2025 equity moved to 50% PSUs tied to 3-year revenue CAGR and relative TSR with cliff vesting at 3 years, indicating tighter pay-for-performance linkage .
Related Party Considerations
- Axogen contributed $100,000 in 2024 to GNF under a partner agreement; DeVinney serves on GNF’s board. GNF is a separate 501(c)(3) entity; the agreement carries a limited early termination payment exposure capped at $100,000 (two payments) .
Say‑on‑Pay & Peer Benchmarking
- Say-on-pay approval ~70% in 2024; Axogen engaged investors and implemented changes (e.g., 2025 PSUs tied to 3-year revenue CAGR and relative TSR, cliff vesting) .
- Compensation Committee employs Aon as independent consultant; formal peer group spans medtech and biotech comparables (e.g., Alphatec, Glaukos, Vericel, OrthoPediatrics, etc.) for market calibration .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of performance-based equity (TSR and BLA PSUs) plus 2025 shift to multi-year revenue CAGR and relative TSR PSUs signal strong alignment of DeVinney’s upside with value creation and regulatory milestones critical to Axogen’s thesis .
- Retention vs. selling pressure: Upcoming vesting events include BLA PSU tranches in Sept 2025 and multi-year RSU vesting from the 2024 promotion grant (50% at 24 months, then semiannual tranches), which could create periodic insider selling windows but are standard retention mechanisms; hedging and pledging prohibitions reduce misalignment risk .
- Downside protection and risk: Double-trigger CIC terms (24× salary months and 200% of target bonus) provide robust protection but are within market norms, with clawback, no gross-ups, and no single-trigger terms moderating governance risk .
- Execution linkage: With 2024 performance above plan (revenue +17.8% YoY) and Avance BLA on track (submission accepted; PDUFA Sept 2025), DeVinney’s equity is tightly tethered to operational scale-up and regulatory success—key drivers for TSR and PSU outcomes .