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Carl D. Anderson II

Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer at Axalta Coating SystemsAxalta Coating Systems
Executive

About Carl D. Anderson II

Axalta’s Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer since August 14, 2023; age 55 as of February 13, 2025. Education: MBA, Wayne State University; BA in Economics, Michigan State University . Prior roles include CFO of XPO (Nov 2022–Aug 2023) and SVP & CFO of Meritor (Mar 2019–Oct 2022), with earlier treasury and finance roles at GMAC and First Chicago . Under his finance leadership, Axalta achieved record 2024 net sales of $5.3B (+2% YoY) and Adjusted EBITDA of $1.116B (+17% YoY), with year-end net leverage reduced to 2.5x; 2024 ABP paid above target, reflecting company overachievement on EBIT, EBIT margin and FCF .

Company Performance ContextFY 2023FY 2024
Net Sales ($B)5.2 5.3
Adjusted EBITDA ($B)0.951 1.116
Company TSR (Value of $100)$111.74 $112.57

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
XPO, Inc.Chief Financial OfficerNov 2022–Aug 2023 Led finance at a large North American freight carrier; public company CFO experience .
Meritor, Inc.SVP & CFO; earlier Group VP Finance; Treasurer; Asst. Treasurer; Director, Intl. Capital Markets/Risk/Insurance2006–Oct 2022; CFO Mar 2019–Oct 2022 Drove capital markets, treasury, and investor relations; automotive/commercial vehicle end-market expertise .
GMAC; First ChicagoTreasury and financial planning; analyst rolesEarly career Foundational finance and capital markets experience .

External Roles

No current public company board roles disclosed for Anderson .

Fixed Compensation

Component20232024
Base salary rate ($)665,000 (offer letter) 693,263 effective 3/11/2024
Salary paid (SCT) ($)255,769 693,161
Target annual bonus (% of base)90% 90%
Perquisites and other ($)84,942 55,285 (includes 401(k) $24,150; deferred comp match $23,922; disability $4,850; liability insurance $2,363)
Sign‑on cash ($)500,000 (repayable if leave before 2 years)

Notes:

  • 401(k) and nonqualified deferred compensation plans available; no defined-benefit pension .
  • No tax gross‑ups; perquisites modest and disclosed .

Performance Compensation

Annual Bonus Plan (ABP) – 2024

MetricWeightThresholdTargetMaxActualPayout as % of weight
Adjusted EBIT ($MM)50%643772884835151.3%
Adjusted EBIT Margin (%)25%13.914.916.615.9160.9%
Free Cash Flow ($MM)25%383435544451113.2%
Company weighted payout144.2%
Anderson’s 2024 ABP outcomeValue
Target bonus ($)623,937
Individual modifier105% (finance, leverage reduction, cyber, talent development)
Payout (% of target)151.4%
Actual award ($)944,703

Design notes: 2024 ABP was a single global plan (ONE Axalta), with individual performance as a modifier to company financial outcomes; metrics and banding set ex‑ante by the Compensation Committee .

Long‑Term Incentives (LTI)

2024 Annual Grants (Target values and counts)

InstrumentTarget grant value ($)Units/Terms
PSUs (50% Adjusted EBITDA; 50% Relative TSR vs S&P 400 MidCap)1,050,000 32,326 target PSUs; 3‑year performance, 0–200% payout; TSR capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative
RSUs (time‑based)700,000 21,553 RSUs; vest in 3 equal annual installments beginning 2/28/2025, subject to continued service

2023 Sign‑On Equity and Cash

  • Equity: $3,500,000, split 50% RSUs (3‑year pro‑rata vesting on 8/14 annually) and 50% PSUs on same 2023 PSU terms as other executives .
  • Cash: $500,000 sign‑on (repayable in full if he resigns or is terminated for cause within 2 years) .

Performance share program evolution and rigor

  • 2021 PSUs (EPS/ROIC with TSR modifier) paid at 12.7% of target overall, reflecting below‑threshold multi‑year EPS/ROIC outcomes for 2022–2023; demonstrates stretch calibration .
  • 2022–2024 PSUs paid at ~26% of target overall (ROIC above threshold; EPS below threshold) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Holding/PolicyDetail
Beneficial ownership15,911 common shares as of April 10, 2025 (less than 1%) .
Unvested RSUs (as of 12/31/2024)41,313 (sign‑on 8/14/2023); 21,553 (annual 2/28/2024) .
Unearned PSUs (as of 12/31/2024)30,984 (8/14/2023); 16,163 (2/28/2024) .
Stock ownership guidelines2× base salary for SVP direct reports to CEO; all NEOs met guidelines or within grace period as of 12/31/2024 .
Pledging/hedgingProhibited; also pre‑clearance and blackout periods apply to Section 16 officers .
Equity plan protectionsMinimum 12‑month vesting (exceptions limited); dividend payments deferred until vesting; no option repricing; double‑trigger CIC vesting .

Vesting cadence and potential selling pressure

  • RSUs: 1/3 of 41,313 sign‑on RSUs vest each 8/14 in 2024/2025/2026; 1/3 of 21,553 annual RSUs vest each 2/28 in 2025/2026/2027 (net of tax), creating predictable quarterly/annual liquidity windows .
  • PSUs: Earn and vest after Committee certification at cycle end (2026 for 2023 awards; 2027 for 2024 awards) .

Employment Terms

TermDetail
Start date & roleSenior Vice President & CFO effective August 14, 2023 .
Base/bonus setup (offer)Base $665,000; target bonus 90% of base (not prorated for 2023); 2024 LTI target $1,750,000 .
Non‑compete/non‑solicit12 months post‑termination under Restrictive Covenant and Severance Policy .
ClawbacksSEC/NYSE‑compliant restatement clawback; broader policy for specified misconduct (e.g., code of conduct violations) .

Severance and Change‑in‑Control (CIC) Economics (as of 12/31/2024)

Scenario (Anderson)Cash severanceBonus severanceEquity vestingCOBRATotal
Termination without Cause (no CIC)$693,263 $928,872 $1,413,731 $22,838 $3,058,704
Termination without Cause or Good Reason within 2 years after CIC$1,386,526 $1,247,873 $5,915,519 $45,676 $8,595,594

Plan mechanics (per policy and CIC award terms)

  • Absent CIC: 1× (salary + target or average bonus), plus COBRA; equity vesting per plan specifics .
  • CIC: 2× (salary + target bonus), COBRA for 24 months, and double‑trigger equity acceleration; PSUs settle at target or based on actual to CIC date per award terms .

Performance & Track Record

  • 2024: Company delivered net sales $5.3B (+2%) and Adjusted EBITDA $1.116B (+17%), citing margin expansion and operational execution; net leverage at year-end reduced to 2.5×, a Company record .
  • 2024 ABP: Company exceeded targets on EBIT and margin and exceeded target on FCF, driving 144.2% company payout; Anderson’s modifier 105% reflected leverage reduction, finance function development, and cybersecurity strengthening .
  • LTIs: 2021 and 2022 PSU outcomes (12.7% and ~26% of target, respectively) indicate strong pay‑for‑performance alignment and stringent goals .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and leverage: 2024 pay emphasized at‑risk components; Anderson’s LTI mix 60% PSUs/40% RSUs aligns to multi‑year EBITDA and relative TSR goals, with straight‑line interpolation and 200% cap (TSR capped at 100% if absolute TSR <0) .
  • One‑plan ABP design: Company‑wide financial metrics with individual modifier reinforces “ONE Axalta” and minimizes siloed optimization .
  • Governance and safeguards: Independent Compensation Committee with Pearl Meyer as advisor; clawbacks formalized; hedging/pledging prohibited; no option repricing; minimum vesting standards .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 Say‑on‑Pay support: 98.65%, signaling strong investor alignment with the compensation program .
  • Investor outreach: Engagement with holders representing ~55–60% of shares; no significant compensation concerns raised .

Related‑Party & Red‑Flag Review

  • Related‑party transactions: None reportable since the beginning of FY 2024 .
  • Tax gross‑ups: None .
  • Pledging/hedging: Prohibited .
  • Equity plan features: No liberal share recycling; no option repricing; double‑trigger CIC only .

Equity Ownership Detail (as of 12/31/2024 unless noted)

CategoryCount/Status
Common shares beneficially owned (4/10/2025)15,911
RSUs outstanding41,313 (sign‑on 8/14/2023); 21,553 (annual 2/28/2024)
PSUs outstanding (unearned)30,984 (8/14/2023); 16,163 (2/28/2024)
OptionsNone outstanding for Anderson
Ownership guideline2× salary; compliant or within grace
PledgesNone permitted by policy

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and rigor: Above‑target annual bonus tied to clear EBIT/margin/FCF outperformance and low PSU vesting from prior cycles (~13–26% of target) indicate tight calibration and pay‑for‑performance discipline .
  • Retention overhang manageable: RSU tranches vesting on predictable schedules (Feb 28 and Aug 14) create limited, known potential selling windows; pledging/hedging prohibitions mitigate adverse alignment signals .
  • CIC/Severance optics: Standard 1× (no CIC) and 2× (with CIC) multiples with double‑trigger equity are market‑typical and avoid single‑trigger windfalls; no tax gross‑ups .
  • Execution focus: 2024 leverage reduction, margin expansion, and strong FCF underpin future PSU potential; however, prior low PSU outcomes underscore performance risk if multi‑year targets are not met .