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Hadi H. Awada

President, Global Mobility Coatings at Axalta Coating SystemsAxalta Coating Systems
Executive

About Hadi H. Awada

President, Global Mobility Coatings at Axalta since 2024; the company raised base salaries for the three business Presidents in connection with their transitions into those roles effective January 1, 2024 . Education and age are not disclosed in the latest proxy. Under his purview, Mobility delivered YoY Adjusted EBITDA margin expansion in Q1 2025 (16.5% vs 14.2%) amid flat net sales . Company performance during 2024 set records in net sales ($5.3B, +2% YoY) and Adjusted EBITDA ($1.116B, +17% YoY); Adjusted EPS rose 40% to $2.35, and the 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid at ~26% of target with Relative TSR at the 50th percentile modifier level .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
AxaltaPresident, Global Mobility Coatings2024–presentExceeded financial targets via new business (China/LatAm), pricing actions, and integration execution; advanced early-careers rotational program .

Fixed Compensation

Component20232024 (effective Mar 11, 2024)
Base Salary ($)$505,852 $571,500
Target Bonus (% of salary)70% 75%
Target Bonus ($)$428,625

Notes: 2024 target increases reflect expanded responsibilities for business Presidents .

Performance Compensation

Annual Bonus Plan (ABP) – Design and 2024 Results

  • Company-wide metrics; individual modifier 0–200%; 2024 metrics and outcomes below .
MetricWeightThreshold (50% payout)Target (100%)Max (200%)2024 ActualPayout as % of WeightNotes
Adjusted EBIT ($mm)50%$643 $772 $884 $835 75.7% Company definition adjustments detailed in proxy .
Adjusted EBIT Margin25%13.9% 14.9% 16.6% 15.9% 40.2%
Free Cash Flow ($mm)25%$383 $435 $544 $451 28.3%
Total100%144.2%
  • Executive-specific modifier and payout:
ExecutiveTarget Bonus ($)Company Payout %Individual ModifierActual Award ($)Payout % of Target
Hadi H. Awada$428,625 144.2% 110% $679,885 158.6%

Modifier drivers for Awada: exceeded financial targets through new business in China and Latin America and pricing; integration execution; talent development program .

  • 2025 plan change: ABP shifts to Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA Margin (replacing Adjusted EBIT metrics), plus FCF; range remains 0–200% with individual modifier .

Long-Term Equity – Awards and Metrics

  • 2024 LTI mix: 60% PSUs (3-year performance), 40% RSUs (time-based, 3 annual tranches) .
2024 GrantVehicleTarget Value ($)Units (#)Metric(s)Performance WindowPayout Range
H. AwadaPSUs$540,000 16,624 50% Adjusted EBITDA; 50% Relative TSR vs S&P 400 MidCap2024–2026 (EBITDA); ~Feb 27, 2024–Feb 27, 2027 (TSR) 0–200%
H. AwadaRSUs$360,000 11,085 Time-vestVest in 3 equal annual installments n/a
  • 2022–2024 PSU payout: Vested at ~26% of target; Relative TSR at 50th percentile (no modifier); ROIC above threshold/below target; Adjusted EPS below threshold for final year and cumulative .

  • 2025 PSU design change: financial metric shifts from Adjusted EBITDA to 3-year cumulative Adjusted EPS (50% of PSUs), with 50% Relative TSR maintained .

2024 Shares Vested (Realized)

ExecutiveShares Vested in 2024 (#)Value on Vesting ($)
Hadi H. Awada29,590 $996,371

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: 39,671 common shares as of April 10, 2025 (less than 1% of shares outstanding) .
  • Outstanding equity (Dec 31, 2024):
Grant YearInstrumentUnvested Units (#)Market Value at 12/31/24 ($)
2024RSUs11,085 $379,329
2024PSUs (at threshold display)8,312 $284,437
2023RSUs7,160 $245,015
2023PSUs (at threshold display)8,053 $275,574
2022RSUs3,702 $126,682
2022PSUs (2012–24 cycle; service-only post 12/31)4,315 $147,661
  • Ownership guidelines: President-level executives required to hold 2x base salary; PSUs/options excluded; all NEOs either meet guidelines or are within grace period .
  • Hedging/pledging: Prohibited (no margin, no hedging/short sales, no pledging); pre-clearance and blackout windows apply to trades by officers .

Potential vesting/supply considerations:

  • RSUs vest in equal annual tranches over 3 years (grants in 2022–2024) , indicating scheduled stock delivery through 2027.
  • 2022 PSUs vested in March 2025 at ~26% of target , adding stock supply.
  • Merger agreement treatment (AkzoNobel): At closing, outstanding RSUs/PSUs generally convert into AkzoNobel RSUs based on an exchange ratio; PSUs convert at deemed performance and become time-vesting; awards not assumed or held by former service providers receive cash/share consideration and may fully vest; options assumed or cashed out depending on status; delivery net of tax withholding . This structure can accelerate vesting/settlement upon change-in-control (subject to terms), potentially pulling forward equity supply.

Employment Terms

  • Coverage: Subject to Company’s Restrictive Covenant and Severance Policy (not the CEO’s separate agreement) .
  • Definitions: Non-CIC Good Reason severance not available under policy; Good Reason only if within two years post-Change-in-Control (procedural requirements apply) .
  • Change-in-Control equity: “Double-trigger” (CIC plus qualifying termination) for 100% acceleration of RSUs; PSUs settle based on target vs actual performance per award terms; if awards not assumed/substituted at CIC, acceleration may occur .
  • Clawback: Policy compliant with SEC/NYSE rules; separate broader recoupment for Executive Committee members; enforced for restatements and certain policy violations .
  • Hedging/pledging: Prohibited (see above) .
  • Severance economics (illustrative amounts as of Dec 31, 2024):
Scenario (as of 12/31/24)Salary Severance ($)Bonus Severance ($)Equity Vesting Value ($)Other Severance ($)Total ($)
Termination without Cause (non-CIC)571,500 443,432 29,729 1,044,661
Termination without Cause or Resignation for Good Reason within 2 years post-CIC1,143,000 857,250 2,171,089 59,457 4,230,796
Death/Disability2,440,947 2,440,947
  • Non-compete/non-solicit: Severance Policy includes restrictive covenants; e.g., separation agreements reference non-competition obligations .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Pay mix: Significant at-risk pay for NEOs (ABP + LTI); program designed for pay-for-performance; no tax gross-ups; no single-trigger CIC vesting; no option repricing; clawbacks in place .
  • Year-over-year changes: Awada’s target bonus increased from 70% to 75% with promotion to President role; base salary increased to $571,500 in 2024 .
  • Shift to EBITDA focus: 2025 ABP shifts from EBIT to EBITDA metrics; 2025 PSUs use 3-year cumulative Adjusted EPS (replacing Adjusted EBITDA), keeping Relative TSR for balance .
  • Peer benchmarking: Compensation set with reference to a chemicals/industrials peer set; broader WTW survey data used; Company positioned near median on size metrics .

Multi-Year Compensation Summary (Hadi H. Awada)

YearSalary ($)Stock Awards ($)Non-Equity Incentive Plan ($)All Other ($)Total ($)
2022$505,852 $1,630,116 $232,287 $38,985 $2,407,240
2023$525,366 $905,878 $654,578 $45,345 $2,131,167
2024$575,896 $1,000,397 $679,885 $45,376 $2,301,554

All Other Compensation 2024 detail: liability insurance $2,363; disability insurance $3,100; 401(k) employer contribution $24,150; nonqualified deferred comp employer contribution $15,763 .

Equity Awarding and Vesting Schedules (Detail)

GrantUnits (#)Vesting Terms
2024 RSUs11,085 3 equal annual installments on each of the first three anniversaries of grant .
2024 PSUs16,624 (target) 50% Adjusted EBITDA (2024–2026); 50% Relative TSR vs S&P 400 MidCap (3-year period); 0–200% payout; vest post-certification in 2027 .
2023 RSUs7,160 Same 3-year annual vest schedule .
2023 PSUs8,053 (displayed at threshold) 2023–2025 cycle; vest post-certification in 2026 if earned .
2022 RSUs3,702 3-year annual vest schedule .
2022 PSUs4,315 (service-only as of 12/31/24) Vested at ~26% of target in March 2025 based on performance .

Equity Ownership & Beneficial Ownership

HolderShares Beneficially Owned% of Class
Hadi H. Awada39,671 * (<1%)

Executive Officer Stock Ownership Guidelines: 2x base salary for President-level; all current executive officers satisfy or are within grace period .

Governance, Controls, and Policies Relevant to Alignment

  • Clawback policies (SEC/NYSE-compliant and broader internal policy) .
  • Insider trading policy: blackouts, pre-clearance; prohibits hedging, short sales, pledging, and margin accounts .
  • Related-party transactions: none reportable since start of 2024 .
  • Say-on-Pay support: 98.65% approval at 2024 AGM, indicating strong shareholder endorsement of executive pay practices .

Employment Contracts, Severance, and Change-of-Control Economics

  • Severance Policy governs Awada; non-CIC Good Reason severance not available (only within two years post-CIC) .
  • Double-trigger CIC vesting for RSUs; PSU treatment based on target vs actual and award design; accelerated vesting also for death/disability (PSUs at target) .
  • Estimated benefits as of 12/31/24 summarized in Employment Terms table above .

Merger-related equity treatment (if consummated): Axalta awards generally assumed and converted into AkzoNobel equity awards; PSUs become time-based RSUs at deemed performance; certain awards (e.g., vested RSUs; awards held by former service providers; completed performance periods) cash/stock-settled at closing; options assumed or cashed out based on status; delivery timelines and tax withholding specified .

Performance & Track Record

  • Mobility Coatings Q1 2025: Adjusted EBITDA $73M (YoY +$10M); margin 16.5% (vs 14.2% prior-year), with price-mix positive and lower costs; net sales -1% YoY .
  • Company 2024: records in net sales ($5.3B, +2%) and Adjusted EBITDA ($1.116B, +17%); net income $391M (+45%); Adjusted EPS $2.35 (+40%); ROIC improved by 270 bps; share repurchase $100M .
  • 2022–2024 PSUs paid ~26% (below target), with Relative TSR at median (50th percentile) .

Investment Implications

  • Incentive alignment: Awada’s pay is highly performance-linked; 2024 ABP overachievement and a 110% individual modifier produced a 158.6% payout, reflecting outperformance in Mobility and execution on growth and integration—supportive of pay-for-performance .
  • Retention risk: Meaningful unvested RSUs/PSUs across 2022–2024 vintages with 3-year schedules and double-trigger CIC protection promote retention; Severance Policy provides moderate cash protection (e.g., ~$4.23M CIC scenario total as of 12/31/24), reducing flight risk during strategic change .
  • Selling pressure: Regular RSU tranches through 2027 plus 2022 PSU vesting in March 2025 add supply; potential CIC could convert/accelerate equity per merger terms, pulling forward deliveries; however, insider trading policy (blackouts, pre-clearance) and ownership guidelines temper opportunistic selling .
  • Strategic execution: Mobility margin expansion and company-level records in 2024 indicate operational momentum under the A Plan; 2025 metric shifts (ABP to EBITDA; PSUs to EPS) heighten focus on cash-earnings quality and capital discipline—potentially raising hurdle rates for incentive payouts .