Sign in

You're signed outSign in or to get full access.

Troy D. Weaver

President, Global Refinish at Axalta Coating SystemsAxalta Coating Systems
Executive

About Troy D. Weaver

President, Global Refinish (since January 2024), previously Senior Vice President, Global Refinish (Oct 2020–Jan 2024), Vice President, Global Refinish (Aug 2019–Oct 2020), and Vice President, North America Refinish (Jan 2017–Aug 2019). Began career at DuPont Performance Coatings in 1992; former Chair of CIECA; recognized with DuPont Marketing Excellence Awards in 2007 and 2010 . Under Axalta’s 2026 A Plan, 2024 company results reached record net sales of $5.3B (+$92M YoY), net income of $391M, and Adjusted EBITDA of $1,116M (+$165M YoY); 2024 ABP (annual bonus) paid at 144.2% on company metrics before individual modifiers and 2022 PSU cycle paid ~26% of target, reflecting improved but disciplined pay-for-performance linkage . Axalta’s Pay vs. Performance disclosure shows 2024 company TSR value of a $100 investment at $112.57 (peer group $161.74) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Axalta Coating SystemsPresident, Global RefinishJan 2024–presentLeads Global Refinish; executed acquisitions (e.g., The CoverFlexx Group) and integrations; drove growth amid macro headwinds .
Axalta Coating SystemsSVP, Global RefinishOct 2020–Jan 2024Led global P&L; expanded portfolio; pricing/actions to support profitability .
Axalta Coating SystemsVP, Global RefinishAug 2019–Oct 2020Global leadership for Refinish; commercial execution .
Axalta Coating SystemsVP, North America RefinishJan 2017–Aug 2019Grew share with MSOs, mega-dealers, and national networks in U.S./Canada .
DuPont Performance CoatingsSales/Marketing leadership1992–2013Commercial leadership and industry recognition (Marketing Excellence Awards) .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Collision Industry Electronic Commerce Association (CIECA)Chairman of the BoardN/AIndustry standards and data interoperability leadership .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary (paid, $)504,554 536,524 602,196
Base Salary Rate effective Mar 11, 2024 ($)600,394
Target Bonus % of Salary70% 70% 75%
Target Bonus Amount ($)359,520 450,296
Actual Annual Bonus ($)286,131 535,980 616,860
All Other Compensation ($)44,228 46,918 47,978
Total Compensation ($)2,872,567 2,251,802 2,517,522

2024 “All Other” includes 401(k) and deferred comp contributions, insurance; detail: $24,150 (401k), $17,546 (nonqualified deferred comp), plus insurance, totaling $47,978 .

Performance Compensation

Annual Bonus Plan (ABP) – Structure and 2024 Outcomes

  • 2024 ABP metrics measured company-wide: Adjusted EBIT (50% weight), Adjusted EBIT Margin (25%), Free Cash Flow (25%); linear payout 0–200% vs threshold/target/maximum .
  • 2024 actual company performance yielded 144.2% weighted payout before individual modifiers .
  • Individual performance modifier for Weaver: 95% (oversaw Refinish growth, CoverFlexx acquisition, integrations, strong operational delivery) .
ABP ComponentWeightThresholdTargetMaximumActual (2024)Payout as % of Weight
Adjusted EBIT ($mm)50%64377288483575.7%
Adjusted EBIT Margin (%)25%13.9%14.9%16.6%15.9%40.2%
Free Cash Flow ($mm)25%38343554445128.3%
Total Company Payout144.2%144.2%
Individual ABP Result20222024
Individual Modifier (%)95%
Payout as % of Target80% 137.0%
Actual Award ($)286,131 616,860

Long-Term Incentives (LTI) – Grants, Metrics, and Vesting

  • LTI mix: 60% PSUs, 40% RSUs in 2024; RSUs vest in 3 equal annual installments; PSUs have 3-year performance; double-trigger CIC vesting applies (see Employment Terms) .
  • 2024 PSUs: 50% Adjusted EBITDA (3-year 2024–2026) and 50% Relative TSR vs S&P 400 MidCap (3-year from day before grant to day before 3rd anniversary); max 200% of target .
Grant YearInstrumentGrant DateTarget Units/ValueGrant-date Fair Value ($)Performance Metric(s)Vesting
2024PSUs2/28/202420,780 800,446 50% Adj. EBITDA; 50% Relative TSR vs S&P 400 MidCap; 0–200% Cliff after performance period; CIC rules apply
2024RSUs2/28/202413,856 450,043 Time-based1/3 per year over 3 years
2023PSUs2/28/202310,067 732,374 Adj. EBITDA and Relative TSR; 0–200% Cliff after performance; CIC rules apply
2023RSUs2/28/202313,423 400,005 Time-based1/3 per year over 3 years
2022PSUs2/15/202220,818 $600,000 target value Adjusted EPS/ROIC (annual and cumulative) with TSR modifier; 0–200% Cycle ended 2024; paid ~26% of target
2022RSUs2/15/2022$400,000 target value Time-based1/3 per year over 3 years

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: 125,421 AXTA shares; less than 1% of outstanding (218,560,711 shares outstanding as of Apr 10, 2025) .
  • Stock ownership guidelines: Presidents/SVPs must hold 2x base salary (counts common + unvested RSUs; PSUs/options excluded). All NEOs met or were within grace period as of Dec 31, 2024 .
  • Pledging/hedging: Prohibited; pre-clearance and blackout windows apply .
CategoryDetail
Beneficial Shares125,421 (<1% of class)
Unvested RSUs at 12/31/202413,856 (2024 grant); 8,949 (2023 grant); 4,627 (2022 grant)
Unearned PSUs at 12/31/202410,390 (2024 cycle); 10,067 (2023 cycle)
Exercisable Options11,574 @ $27.01 exp. 2/25/2029; 8,768 @ $29.81 exp. 2/5/2028; 8,951 @ $29.48 exp. 2/6/2027; 11,006 @ $23.24 exp. 2/2/2026; 10,457 @ $32.50 exp. 5/12/2025
Ownership Guidelines2x base salary for Presidents/SVPs; retention requirements until compliant
Pledging/HedgingProhibited by Insider Trading Policy

Axalta currently does not grant new stock options; LTI is PSUs/RSUs (reduces optionality-driven selling pressure) .

Employment Terms

  • No single-trigger; double-trigger applies for CIC (both termination without Cause/by NEO for Good Reason within two years after CIC and/or failure to assume awards) .
  • No tax gross-ups; 280G cutback to avoid excise tax if better after-tax outcome .
  • Clawback policy compliant with SEC/NYSE and broader internal recoupment policy; hedging/pledging prohibited .
Scenario (as of 12/31/2024)Salary Severance ($)Bonus Severance ($)Equity Vesting ($)Other Severance ($)Total ($)
Death/Disability3,051,1923,051,192
Termination Without Cause / Resign for Good Reason (non‑CIC)600,394450,29629,1791,079,869
Termination Without Cause / Resign for Good Reason Following a CIC (double trigger)1,200,788900,5912,713,86958,3594,873,607

RSUs vest 100% on double trigger after CIC; 2023/2024 PSUs vest at greater of target or actual-to-date for specified metrics, with timing per award agreements; death/disability generally accelerates at target; Qualifying Retirement prorates PSUs (age+service rule) .

Performance & Track Record

  • 2024 achievements cited for Weaver: led year-over-year growth for Global Refinish, executed multiple acquisitions (CoverFlexx), and delivered strong integration/operational metrics; individual ABP modifier set at 95% .
  • Company 2024 records: net sales $5.3B (+$92M), net income $391M (+$122M), Adjusted EBITDA $1,116M (+$165M); ABP company payout 144.2%; 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid ~26% (disciplined) .
  • Pay vs Performance: value of $100 TSR investment = $112.57 in 2024; average non-PEO NEO “compensation actually paid” moved with performance .

Compensation Committee & Peer Benchmarking

  • Independent Compensation Committee; independent consultant (Pearl Meyer); peer and survey market data used .
  • Company positioned ~45th percentile of peer revenues and 55th percentile of market cap at time of 2024 decisions; peer group listed below .
Compensation Peer Group
Albemarle; Ashland; Avient; Cabot; Celanese; Eastman; Element Solutions; FMC; H.B. Fuller; Huntsman; IFF; Minerals Technologies; NewMarket; Olin; PPG; RPM; Stepan; Chemours; Sherwin-Williams; Tronox

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 Say‑on‑Pay support: 98.65% approval; ongoing investor engagement covering ~55% of shareholder base (Mar 2024–Mar 2025) .

Additional Compensation Policies

  • Deferred compensation: Weaver contributed $20,007 in 2023; company contributed $14,373; year-end balance $81,442 .
  • No defined benefit pension; equity plan: 12‑month minimum vesting (limited exceptions), no option repricing, no dividends before vest .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High at‑risk pay (bonus tied to Adjusted EBIT/Margin/FCF; LTI 60% PSUs with multi‑year EBITDA/relative TSR), ownership guidelines, and robust clawback/anti‑hedging policies mitigate misalignment risk .
  • Retention risk: Moderate. Significant unvested RSUs/PSUs and double‑trigger CIC protection encourage continuity; severance outside CIC is ~1x salary+target bonus (limited), rising to ~2x under CIC which is market‑typical for Presidents .
  • Selling pressure: Ongoing annual RSU vesting from 2022–2024 grants could prompt periodic tax‑withhold sales; options are legacy and already exercisable with expiries running 2025–2029; no pledging/hedging allowed .
  • Execution: Weaver’s unit delivered growth and accretive M&A/integration in 2024; ABP paid above target but below peers’ TSR level; 2022 PSU cycle’s ~26% payout evidences rigor in performance goals, reducing windfall risk .