Dana Deasy
Chief Information Digital Officer and Senior Vice President, Information Technology & Data Analytics at BA
Executive
About Dana Deasy
Dana S. Deasy is Boeing’s Chief Information Digital Officer (CIDO) and Senior Vice President, Information Technology & Data Analytics, effective December 31, 2024, reporting to the CEO and serving on the Executive Council . He is 65 years old (as of Feb. 3, 2025) and brings 40+ years of technology leadership, including serving as CIO of the U.S. Department of Defense, JPMorgan Chase, and BP; his career began in information management at Rockwell’s Space Systems Division . In his role, Deasy oversees IT, cybersecurity, and data/analytics and provides regular risk and cybersecurity briefings to the Board via the Audit Committee, a key lever for operational resilience and governance oversight . Company-level TSR or revenue/EBITDA performance metrics specific to Deasy’s tenure have not been disclosed.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. Department of Defense | Chief Information Officer | 2018–2021 | Led enterprise cybersecurity and IT modernization across a large, complex, highly regulated organization . |
| JPMorgan Chase & Co. | Global Chief Information Officer & Managing Director | 2013–2017 | Drove large-scale digital, data, and security capabilities at a systemically important financial institution . |
| BP plc | Global Chief Information Officer & Group Vice President | 2007–2013 | Oversaw global IT and cyber in a critical infrastructure and energy environment . |
| Rockwell – Space Systems Division | Information management (early career) | — | Early grounding in aerospace systems and engineering environments . |
External Roles
No current public-company board or external governance roles for Deasy were disclosed in Boeing’s filings. Skip if not disclosed.
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Boeing design (applicable to executive officers like the CIDO) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | Fixed cash (amounts for Deasy not disclosed) | Executive salaries set and reviewed by the Compensation Committee; benchmarking to a 19-company peer group . |
| Benefits/retirement | 401(k) plus Executive Supplemental Savings Plan (Executive SSP) | Executive SSP allows deferred compensation and company match on certain deferrals; post-termination forfeiture/clawback conditions for competition, certain misconduct, solicitation, disparagement, or misuse of confidential information for five years . |
| Perquisites | Limited perquisites; tax gross-ups only for relocation per policy | For NEOs in 2024, perqs included aircraft usage, relocation, concierge health, etc.; policy avoids excess perqs and tax gross-ups (other than relocation) . |
Boeing states it does not use employment contracts for executive officers (except where required by non-U.S. law) .
Performance Compensation
| Incentive | Metric design | Weighting / mechanics | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) | Blend of financial and operational metrics; following early-2024 design changes, operational metrics focused entirely on quality and safety goals (e.g., rework/traveled work reduction, 787 join verification rework, delivery of MAX inventory, injury rate reduction) . | For Commercial Airplanes in 2024: 60% operational (safety/quality), 40% financial; financial split equally between enterprise and BU; Global Services and Defense had tailored mixes; free cash flow used at enterprise level . | Payout ranges 0–200% of target; Committee can apply discretion and recoup via clawback where applicable . |
| Long-Term Incentive (LTI) | Mix of time-vested RSUs and performance RSUs (PRSUs) tied to cumulative free cash flow over a 3-year period . | Typical mix for senior executives in 2024 was 45% RSUs and 55% PRSUs; PRSUs carry a safety “downward modifier” (–25% if two product-safety milestones complete in 2025; 0% if not completed by 2025) . | RSUs/PRSUs generally require three years of continuous service; retirement, layoff, death, disability have specific vesting treatments per plan . |
Additional alignment and controls:
- Robust clawback policy: mandatory recovery for accounting restatements and discretionary recoupment for misconduct, including negligent conduct compromising product safety; applies even absent restatement .
- No change-in-control (CIC) arrangements and no accelerated vesting upon a CIC .
- Securities trading policy prohibits hedging, pledging, short sales, and monetization structures; executives may only trade in open windows with pre-clearance .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Status / Policy |
|---|---|
| Initial beneficial ownership | On his initial Form 3 (filed Jan. 3, 2025 for event 12/31/2024), Deasy reported “No securities are beneficially owned” . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Senior executives must attain and maintain significant stock ownership within five years of assuming the role; must hold all newly vested stock until meeting the guideline; time-vested RSUs, Career Shares, and stock in qualified/nonqualified plans count; options/PRSUs do not . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for executives and directors . |
| Grant timing | Executives who join after the annual grant date are generally eligible for first LTI awards at the next annual grant or upon/shortly after hire . |
Implication: With zero reported ownership at appointment and strict holding/anti-hedging rules, near-term insider selling pressure from Deasy is minimal; expect initial equity awards in 2025 to begin the compliance clock on ownership thresholds .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Boeing policy details |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | No employment agreements for executive officers (except where required by non-U.S. local law) . |
| Severance (Executive Layoff Benefits Plan) | If terminated due to job elimination after ≥1 year service: one year of base salary plus AIP at full-year target multiplied by actual incentive score; offset by any individual agreements; subject to non-compete/solicit, misconduct, disparagement and confidentiality-based forfeiture/clawback for five years . |
| Vesting on termination | RSUs/PRSUs under the LTI program fully vest at retirement after age 62 with ≥1 year service, or death/disability; pro-rata vesting for earlier qualifying retirement/layoff; standard in plan documents . |
| Change-in-control | No CIC arrangements; no accelerated vesting for CIC . |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | Enforced via forfeiture and clawback under Executive SSP and plan terms for specified periods post-termination . |
Performance & Track Record
- Governance/oversight role: As CIDO, Deasy provides recurring cybersecurity risk briefings to the Audit Committee, shaping enterprise cyber posture and risk management processes that are integral to safety, compliance, and operational continuity .
- Boeing reweighted incentives in 2024 to prioritize safety/quality operational metrics—contextually relevant to CIDO accountability for cyber-safety governance and data integrity in production systems .
- Company-specific financial or TSR performance tied directly to Deasy’s tenure has not been disclosed.
Compensation Structure Analysis (alignment, retention, signals)
- Alignment: Heavy use of equity, stock ownership guidelines, and three-year vesting—plus safety-linked PRSU modifiers and a broad clawback—reinforce long-horizon, safety-first behavior; hedging/pledging prohibitions strengthen alignment .
- Retention: Deferred vesting and the five-year window to meet ownership guidelines increase stickiness; absence of CIC acceleration reduces windfall risk but may lessen change-in-control retention value; Executive SSP and layoff plan provide baseline security subject to restrictive covenants .
- Trading signals: Initial Form 3 shows no holdings; watch for first LTI grants and any open-market purchases or subsequent Form 4s to gauge conviction; policy significantly limits opportunistic trades .
Investment Implications
- Deasy’s mandate centralizes cyber, IT, and data analytics under Board-visible governance—material for Boeing’s safety/quality execution and regulatory posture; the reweighted 2024 incentive design toward safety/quality further embeds this priority into compensation outcomes .
- Ownership guidelines and anti-hedging/pledging rules imply limited near-term sell pressure; initial equity awards (likely in 2025) will be key to assessing retention incentives and future vesting overhang .
- Severance/CIC structure reduces “golden parachute” risk and emphasizes long-term performance; robust clawbacks tied to safety reduce adverse-incentive risk but heighten personal accountability—important for culture change and investor confidence .