Carey Causey
About Carey Causey
Carey S. Causey is Senior Vice President and Chief Growth Officer at Ball Corporation; age 47; 11 years at Ball and 1 year in her current role (promoted January 1, 2024) . Ball’s 2024 performance backdrop included the sale of its Aerospace business, deleveraging to ~2.5x net debt/EBITDA, nearly $2B returned to shareholders, and 9.3% YoY growth in comparable diluted EPS, with compensation programs tightly linked to EVA dollars, ROAIC, and relative TSR performance .
Fixed Compensation
| Item | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary (program level) | $590,000 | Approved in late Jan 2024, effective Jan 1, 2024 |
| Base salary (SCT actual paid) | $586,849 | Summary Compensation Table actual |
| Target annual incentive (% of base) | 90% | HR Committee-set target |
| Target annual incentive ($) | $531,000 | 90% of $590,000 |
| Actual annual incentive paid | $977,040 | Overall payout 184% of target |
Performance Compensation
Ball’s NEO incentives are predominantly at-risk, using EVA-based annual incentives and multi-year LTCIC and PC-RSU programs .
- Annual Incentive (2024)
- Design: 80% consolidated EVA dollars; 20% Individual Performance Objectives (IPOs) .
- Corporate EVA outcomes: threshold $(76.5)m; target $153.5m; max $268.5m; actual $365.6m → 200% payout on the EVA component .
- Individual result (Causey): Overall payout 184% of target (paid early 2025) .
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Component Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EVA dollars vs target | 80% | $(76.5)m | $153.5m | $268.5m | $365.6m | 200% |
| Individual Performance Objectives | 20% | — | — | — | HR Committee-approved | — |
| Overall (Causey) | — | — | — | — | — | 184% |
- Long-Term Incentives (2024 grants; in progress)
- Mix and targets (Causey): Total $1,180,000 with 20% LTCIC ($236,000), 40% Stock Options ($472,000), 40% PC-RSUs ($472,000) .
- LTCIC metrics: 50% Relative TSR vs S&P 500 subset; 50% ROAIC. TSR thresholds: 37.5th/50th/75th percentile; ROAIC thresholds: 7%/9%/11% for 0%/100%/200% payout .
- PC-RSUs (2024–2026): EVA dollars growth targets; threshold $140.9m, target $158.5m, maximum $177.5m (absolute EVA dollars in year 3) .
- Recently concluded cycles: 2022–2024 LTCIC paid 100% (Causey target $82,000); 2022–2024 PC‑RSUs vested at 200% for Causey .
| LTI Vehicle (2024 grant) | Target Value ($) | Metric(s) | Performance Window | Payout Curve | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LTCIC (cash) | $236,000 | 50% Relative TSR; 50% ROAIC | 2024–2026 | TSR 37.5/50/75 pct; ROAIC 7/9/11% → 0/100/200% | Pays after performance certification |
| Stock Options | $472,000 | Stock price appreciation | 10-year term | — | 25% per year over 4 years |
| PC‑RSUs | $472,000 | EVA dollars (abs) | 2024–2026 | $140.9m/$158.5m/$177.5m → 0/100/200% | Cliff vest post-certification |
| Concluded: LTCIC 2022–2024 | $82,000 target | TSR/ROAIC | 2022–2024 | Overall 100% | Paid early 2025 |
| Concluded: PC‑RSUs 2022–2024 | — | EVA $ | 2022–2024 | 200% | Vested (200%) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (shares) | 72,622 (sole voting/dispositive unless noted) |
| Ownership as % of outstanding | <1% (“*” per table) |
| Options exercisable or becoming exercisable within 60 days | 50,531 |
| Deferred share/stock unit equivalents | 2,177 |
| RSU shares/units (unvested) | 14,426 |
| Executive stock ownership guideline | 3x base salary for SVPs/EVPs |
| Compliance status | In process of attaining updated requirement after 1/1/2024 promotion (within 5-year window) |
| Hedging/pledging | Executives prohibited from hedging, short sales, pledging, and holding in margin accounts |
Vesting Schedules and Option Overhang
Upcoming time- and performance-based vesting (subject to continued service and/or performance certification as applicable):
- RSUs/PC‑RSUs
- RSUs: 2,800 units vest on September 15, 2025 .
- PC‑RSUs (contingent on EVA targets and certification): ~Jan 31, 2025: 1,894; ~Jan 31, 2026: 3,178; ~Jan 31, 2027: 8,448 .
| Options by grant (Causey) | Exercisable (#) | Unexercisable (#) | Exercise Price | Expiration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Legacy grant | 6,800 | — | $33.05 | 1/27/2026 |
| Legacy grant | 4,684 | — | $38.375 | 1/25/2027 |
| Legacy grant | 6,174 | — | $38.84 | 1/24/2028 |
| Legacy grant | 4,620 | — | $50.78 | 1/23/2029 |
| Legacy grant | 3,646 | — | $72.59 | 1/29/2030 |
| Grant | 5,303 | 1,768 | $85.33 | 1/27/2031 |
| Grant | 3,788 | 3,787 | $86.57 | 1/26/2032 |
| Grant | 2,655 | 7,964 | $56.64 | 1/25/2033 |
| 2024 grant | — | 26,179 | $55.87 | 1/24/2034 |
Note: Options typically vest 25% per year and expire 10 years from grant; values above reflect exercisable vs unexercisable status as of 12/31/2024 .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Cash severance – without cause | $1,681,500 (Causey) |
| Cash severance – termination following change in control | $2,242,000 (Causey) |
| Change-in-control construct | Double trigger required; multiples do not exceed 2x; excise tax gross-ups eliminated and not applicable to current executive officers |
| Clawback | Robust recoupment policy covering cash and equity compensation for executives (shareholder-approved component) |
| Deferred compensation eligibility | NEOs may defer annual incentives/RSUs into non-qualified plans per program design |
| Pension/SERP present value (12/31/2024) | U.S. Qualified Plan: $148,148; U.S. SERP: $35,540 (Causey) |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 annual incentive paid at 184% of target for Causey, driven by a maximum (200%) EVA component and approved IPO outcomes, reflecting Ball’s EVA discipline and 2024 outperformance versus EVA targets .
- LTI leverage to returns: 2024 LTI split emphasizes performance via ROAIC/relative TSR (LTCIC) and EVA growth (PC‑RSUs), plus multi-year stock option exposure, reinforcing long-term value creation .
- Governance controls: Double-trigger CIC, no excise tax gross-ups for current execs, anti-hedging/pledging, strong clawback, and ownership guidelines support alignment and risk mitigation .
Investment Implications
- Incentive alignment is high: A large share of Causey’s target compensation is variable and tied to EVA, ROAIC, and relative TSR, pointing to strong alignment with value creation drivers investors track for Ball’s packaging business .
- Near-term vesting/events: A 2025 RSU vest (2,800 units) and performance-contingent PC‑RSUs scheduled around early 2025–2027 could create localized liquidity windows; sizable option tranches, including a new 2024 grant (26,179 options at $55.87 exp. 2034), extend optionality into the next decade .
- Retention and risk: Cash severance of ~$1.68M without cause and ~$2.24M upon double-trigger CIC, plus robust clawback/anti-pledging policies and ownership guidelines (3x salary; in process post-promotion), collectively reduce misalignment and retention risk while maintaining accountability .
- Company execution context: 2024 corporate actions (Aerospace sale, deleveraging to ~2.5x, $1.96B capital return, 9.3% EPS growth) underpin the max EVA payout and suggest incentives are responsive to operational and capital allocation execution—key for investors evaluating continuity in growth and returns under the Ball Business System .