Ronald Lewis
About Ronald J. Lewis
Ronald J. Lewis, age 58, is Ball’s Senior Vice President and Chief Supply Chain & Operations Officer, with 5 years at Ball and 4 years in his current role as of FY2024 . Company performance in 2024 included 9.3% YoY comparable diluted EPS growth, Operating Earnings up ~$131 million (~9.7%) excluding Aerospace, and consolidated EVA of $365.6 million (above target), while share repurchases and dividends totaled ~$1.96 billion . Ball’s 2024 TSR (value of a $100 initial investment) was $90 vs $137 for its peer index, while EVA remained the core pay-performance lens through 2024 and is embedded in Lewis’s incentives .
Board service status: Lewis is an executive officer and is not listed among Ball’s directors or nominees; therefore, he does not serve on Ball’s Board or any Board committees at this time (no dual-role or independence concerns at Ball) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ball Corporation | President, Beverage Packaging EMEA | Prior to Oct 2021 | Led EMEA operations; expatriate assignment; foundation for later global ops role |
| Ball Corporation | SVP & Chief Operating Officer, Global Beverage Packaging | Began Oct 2021 | Scale and operating model transformation across beverage packaging |
| Ball Corporation | SVP, Chief Supply Chain & Operations Officer | 4 years in role as of FY2024 | Enterprise-wide operating excellence, plant optimization, cost-reduction initiatives |
External Roles
No external public board roles or committee positions are disclosed for Lewis in Ball’s proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $724,715 | $753,650 | $791,193 |
| Target Annual Incentive (% of Salary) | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | 100% ($791,918) |
| Actual Annual Incentive Paid ($) | $221,756 | $737,389 | $1,488,807 |
Performance Compensation
| Incentive | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive (2024) | Consolidated EVA dollars | 80% | $153.5m | $365.6m | 200% of EVA component | Paid early 2025; banking feature removed |
| Annual Incentive (2024) | Individual Performance Objectives | 20% | HR Committee-approved | Approved outcomes per CEO/HR review | Overall Lewis payout 188% of target | Paid early 2025 |
| LTCIC (2022–2024) | Relative TSR (S&P 500 subset) | 50% | 50th percentile | 13.8th percentile | 0% | Cash payout early 2025 |
| LTCIC (2022–2024) | ROAIC (after-tax) | 50% | 9% | 11.1% | 200% | Cash payout early 2025 |
| LTCIC (2022–2024) | Overall payout | — | — | — | 100% → $330,000 to Lewis | Paid early 2025 |
| PC‑RSUs (2022–2024) | Absolute EVA dollars | 100% | $326.0m (target) | $365.6m | 200% (Lewis PC‑RSUs vested at 200%) | Vested early 2025 |
| PB‑RSUs (Granted Jan 24, 2024) | Run-rate cost reduction achieved by end of 2025 | 100% | Target grant value $750,000 | Performance-based | Vests contingent on cost reduction | Vests on second anniversary (Jan 31, 2026) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Beneficially Owned | 212,159 (less than 1%) |
| Shares Outstanding | 282,378,872 (for % context) |
| Options Exercisable or Becoming Exercisable within 60 days | 152,987 |
| Deferred Share/Stock Unit Equivalents | 13,916 |
| RSUs Outstanding | 41,249 |
| Upcoming RSU Vesting (service-based) | 4,000 on Dec 15, 2025 |
| PC‑RSU Vesting Schedule (performance-contingent) | ~Jan 31, 2025: 7,624; ~Jan 31, 2026: 11,653; ~Jan 31, 2027: 12,171 |
| PB‑RSU Vesting (cost-reduction metric) | 13,425 units scheduled ~Jan 31, 2026 |
| Options Granted in 2024 | 37,715 @ $55.87, expiring 1/24/2034 |
| Option Exercise Activity (2024) | None (0 shares exercised) |
| Anti‑pledging / Anti‑hedging status | Pledging and hedging prohibited for executives; no shares pledged as security |
| Stock Ownership Guideline | 3x base salary for SVPs/EVPs; all executive officers in compliance |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | At‑will; no individual employment contract |
| Severance (without cause) | 1.5x base + target bonus (NEOs other than CEO); illustrative Lewis cash severance $2,375,754 at 12/31/2024 |
| Change‑in‑control (CIC) | Double trigger required; NEOs receive 2x base + target bonus; illustrative Lewis $3,167,672 at 12/31/2024 |
| Annual Incentive treatment on termination | Pro‑rata if performance achieved for most scenarios; forfeiture for cause |
| LTI treatment (LTCIC, PC‑RSUs, Options) | Performance-based awards vest per plan specifics; CIC accelerates unvested PC‑RSUs; detailed schedule/acceleration rules disclosed |
| Health & welfare continuation (illustrative) | Lump sum equivalents; e.g., $56,972 for disability or $58,441 for CIC at 12/31/2024 |
| Other benefits | Outplacement ($20,000) under certain terminations; financial planning benefits; standard relocation/expatriate program features |
| Clawback | Robust recoupment policy aligned with NYSE Section 303A.14 and Exchange Act Section 10D‑1; applies to executive officers and VPs+ |
| Tax gross‑ups | Excise tax gross‑ups eliminated and do not apply to any current executive officer |
| Non‑compete / Non‑solicit | Customary covenants included in severance/CIC arrangements; required for certain retirement vesting treatments |
Multi‑Year Compensation Summary (Lewis)
| Component ($) | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $724,715 | $753,650 | $791,193 |
| Bonus | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Stock Awards (fair value) | $660,010 | $660,026 | $1,430,049 |
| Option Awards (fair value) | $660,000 | $659,999 | $680,001 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive (Annual + LTCIC) | $221,756 | $737,389 | $1,818,807 |
| Change in Pension Value & Above‑Market DC Earnings | $38,826 | $106,018 | $97,650 |
| All Other Compensation | $1,132,218 | $104,299 | $39,297 |
| Total Compensation | $3,437,526 | $3,021,381 | $4,856,997 |
Compensation Structure and Incentives
- Mix and trend: 2024 shows a higher performance payout year with larger stock awards and non‑equity incentives versus 2023, consistent with strong EVA/ROAIC outcomes and Operating Earnings growth .
- Equity design levers: Options vest 25% annually over four years and require share price appreciation; PC‑RSUs tie to absolute EVA growth (threshold, target 4% CAGR, and max 8% CAGR); PB‑RSUs for Lewis add role‑specific cost‑reduction goals, vesting in 2 years .
- Governance features: Anti‑hedging/pledging, rigorous stock ownership guidelines (3x base for SVP), robust clawback, double‑trigger CIC; excise tax gross‑ups not applicable .
Ownership, Pledging, and Deferred Compensation
- Skin‑in‑the‑game: Lewis beneficially owns 212,159 shares (less than 1% of outstanding), holds significant RSUs/options, and had no option exercises in 2024, reducing near‑term selling indicators .
- Deferred comp alignment: Deferred $100,000 (annual incentive) with $20,000 company match; aggregate balance $1,452,338 as of FY2024, supporting a long‑term alignment profile .
- Pledging/hedging: Prohibited; no shares pledged per disclosures .
Performance & Track Record
- Pay‑versus‑performance: Despite 2024 TSR lagging the peer index ($100→$90 vs $137), EVA and ROAIC performance met or exceeded targets, driving 200% payouts on EVA‑linked and ROAIC‑linked components (with TSR at 0% for LTCIC) .
- Operational execution: Company highlights include plant optimization, cost savings, deleveraging (net debt down $2.9B), and major capital returns ($1.96B) executed in 2024; these operational levers underpin Lewis’s role‑linked PB‑RSUs .
Board Governance (Director‑Specific Elements)
- Board service: Lewis is not a Ball director; therefore, no committee memberships, chair roles, or director compensation apply .
- Governance quality: Ball’s Board is majority independent (9 of 10), with defined Lead Independent Director responsibilities and all committees composed of independent directors; robust governance practices reported .
Compensation Committee Analysis
- Committee and consultant: Human Resources Committee composed entirely of independent directors; Farient Advisors LLC served as independent compensation consultant in 2024 and 2025 program designs .
- Peer group: Containers & packaging and adjacent industries used to benchmark (e.g., Crown Holdings, Silgan, Graphic Packaging, PPG, Keurig Dr Pepper); peer group refreshed for better alignment post‑Aerospace sale .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- Advisory vote history: Average 93% approval over the last three years; active investor engagement and program adjustments disclosed .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong linkage to EVA/ROAIC and to role‑specific cost savings via PB‑RSUs suggests continued focus on operational efficiency and cash generation; anti‑hedging/pledging and ownership guidelines reduce misalignment risk .
- Retention: Two‑year PB‑RSUs and multi‑year PC‑RSUs with defined performance targets create retention and execution incentives through at least early 2026; severance/CIC protections are competitive but double‑triggered, limiting windfalls .
- Trading signals: No 2024 option exercises and ongoing deferred compensation contributions point to a longer‑term orientation; however, 2024 payouts were elevated, which can increase liquidity but is mitigated by ongoing vesting schedules and ownership rules .
- Program evolution: In 2025, Ball broadens incentive metrics (operating cash flow, unit volume growth, EPS/EVA PSUs, rTSR, GHG and safety scorecards), increasing transparency on operational KPIs that directly impact margins and cash, which may further tighten pay‑performance alignment .
All data and statements above are sourced from Ball Corporation’s 2025 DEF 14A (Proxy Statement) as cited.