Brenna Preisser
BRUNSWICKAbout Brenna Preisser
Executive Vice President and President — Brunswick Boat Group since August 2024; previously Executive Vice President and President — Business Acceleration (2019–2024) and Chief Human Resources Officer (2016–2021). Age 47; first became an executive officer in 2016; joined Brunswick in 2004 . Key operating achievements include leading the acquisition and expansion of Freedom Boat Club from 170 to 410 locations globally and creating Boateka (pre-owned boat platform) , as well as driving AI-enabled “Boating Intelligence” initiatives in shared access businesses . Company performance context (FY2024): net sales $5.2B (below prior year), GAAP diluted EPS $2.21, adjusted EPS $4.57, and free cash flow $284M .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brunswick Corporation | EVP & President — Brunswick Boat Group | 2024–present | Leads portfolio of 18 boat brands including Boston Whaler, Sea Ray, Bayliner, Lund, Harris, Quicksilver, and Princecraft . |
| Brunswick Corporation | EVP & President — Business Acceleration | 2019–2024 | Expanded Freedom Boat Club from 170 to 410 locations; launched Boateka; built financing/insurance/warranty businesses . |
| Brunswick Corporation | Chief Human Resources Officer | 2016–2021 | Senior HR leadership across enterprise; executive officer since 2016 . |
| Brunswick Corporation | Chief Strategy Officer | n/a | Held corporate strategy leadership; referenced among prior executive positions . |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year summary for Brenna D. Preisser (NEO):
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $521,442 | $548,692 | $579,250 |
| Bonus ($) | — | — | — |
| Stock Awards ($) | $799,977 | $799,678 | $1,300,051 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | $311,700 | $281,500 | — (no BPP paid for 2024) |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $146,530 | $152,943 | $104,695 |
| Total ($) | $1,779,649 | $1,782,813 | $1,983,996 |
2024 Annual Incentive (BPP) target opportunity levels (absolute):
| Grant Year | Threshold ($) | Target ($) | Maximum ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 BPP | $111,274 | $445,096 | $890,192 |
Notes:
- 2024 BPP paid 0% due to performance below thresholds .
- BPP target percentages for NEOs ranged from 77% to 150% of salary; Ms. Preisser’s target was increased with her August 2024 promotion (exact % not disclosed) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (BPP) Design and 2024 Outcome
| Metric | Weighting | Targeting/Design | 2024 Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise Adjusted EPS | 50% (Division NEOs) | Board-approved plan; capped at 200% | Below threshold | 0% |
| Enterprise Free Cash Flow (FCF) | 25% (Division NEOs) | Board-approved plan; capped at 200% | Below threshold | 0% |
| Division EBIT (Boat Group) | 25% (Division NEOs) | Line-of-sight for unit performance | Below threshold | 0% |
Long-Term Incentives (PSUs and RSUs)
Plan structure:
- Performance Shares (PSUs): CFROI and Operating Margin over 3 years, modified +/-20% by relative TSR vs S&P 400 Consumer Discretionary; 50% of targeted equity value .
- RSUs: 50% of targeted equity value; 2024 grants vest ratably over three years; prior years vest 100% at third anniversary .
2024 grants to Brenna D. Preisser:
| Grant Date | Instrument | Units (Target) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/15/2024 | PSUs | 5,850 | $500,292 | 3-year performance; TSR modifier +/-20% |
| 2/15/2024 | RSUs | 5,680 | $500,351 | Ratable vesting over 3 years |
| 8/19/2024 | PSUs | 2,020 | $149,743 | 3-year performance; TSR modifier +/-20% |
| 8/19/2024 | RSUs | 1,960 | $149,666 | Ratable vesting over 3 years |
Outstanding equity at FY-end 2024:
| Grant Date | Unvested RSUs (Units) | Market Value ($) | Unearned PSUs (Target Units) | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/17/2022 | 4,428 | $286,384 | — | — |
| 2/16/2023 | 4,706 | $304,389 | 4,520 | $292,354 |
| 2/15/2024 | 5,803 | $375,328 | 5,850 | $378,378 |
| 8/19/2024 | 1,982 | $128,173 | 2,020 | $130,654 |
| Note: Market values reflect $64.68 closing stock price on 12/31/2024 . |
PSU performance results (2012–2024 cycle measured 2022–2024):
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CFROI | 75% | 14.5% | 20.5% | 26.5% | 9.0% of target opportunity |
| Operating Margin | 25% | 11.0% | 16.0% | 21.0% | 9.0% of target opportunity |
| TSR Modifier | +/-20% | Comparator: S&P 400 Consumer Discretionary | — | — | No modifier applied (25th–75th percentile) |
2024 stock vested:
| Name | Shares Acquired on Vesting | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Brenna D. Preisser | 5,023 | $424,973 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (3/10/2025) | 45,466 shares; less than 1% of class . |
| Unvested Equity (12/31/2024) | RSUs: 4,428 (2022), 4,706 (2023), 5,803 (Feb-2024), 1,982 (Aug-2024); PSUs (target): 4,520 (2023), 5,850 (Feb-2024), 2,020 (Aug-2024) . |
| Ownership Guidelines | Tier II executives (incl. Preisser) must hold 3.0x base salary; officers not meeting must retain 50% of after-tax profits on shares acquired until compliant . |
| Compliance Status | All NEOs in compliance as of 12/31/2024 . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for employees and Directors; no pledging allowed . |
| 10b5-1/Trading Policy | Insider Trading Policy governs officers; referenced in 2024 Form 10-K exhibit . |
Alignment notes:
- RSU vesting changed from 3-year cliff to 3-year ratable beginning in 2024 to support retention; reduces lump-sum vest-driven selling pressure and smooths release cadence .
- Retention ratio (50% of after-tax profits) promotes ongoing ownership and limits immediate sales after vesting .
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Severance | Welfare Benefits | Long-Term Incentives | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary Termination (Absent CIC) — 12/31/2024 hypothetical | $990,878 | $54,778 | — | $1,045,656 |
| Following Change in Control (Double Trigger) — 12/31/2024 hypothetical | $2,281,170 | $69,705 | $2,169,255 | $4,520,130 |
Key contract terms (NEOs other than CEO):
- Severance multiples: 1.5x salary plus defined contribution plan contributions absent CIC; 2.0x salary + target BPP + defined contribution plan contributions following CIC; benefits reduced if needed to achieve “best after tax” outcome under 280G; double-trigger equity vesting acceleration upon involuntary termination post-CIC .
- Restrictive covenants: Non-compete and non-solicit for 18 months post-termination; non-disclosure and non-disparagement at all times; not applicable after CIC termination; clawback includes severance and equity gains for restrictive covenant violations (12 months prior to termination window) .
- Definitions: Good Reason includes material breach, reduced authority/responsibility/compensation, inadequate benefits, relocation; CIC definition includes 25%+ stock acquisition, board composition change, certain mergers, or liquidation .
Deferred compensation:
| Plan | Executive Contributions (2024) | Company Contributions (2024) | Aggregate Earnings (2024) | Aggregate Balance (12/31/2024) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Restoration Plan | $37,253 | $37,199 | $108,617 | $996,242 |
Performance & Track Record
- Business Acceleration: Led Freedom Boat Club growth from 170 to 410 locations and launched Boateka, scaling shared-access and resale capabilities .
- Technology/ACES: As EVP Business Acceleration, articulated AI use cases in Boating Intelligence (virtual agents, autonomous docking) to simplify boating and enhance member experience .
- 2024 enterprise context: Net sales $5.2B, adjusted EPS $4.57, free cash flow $284M, capital returns of $312M via buybacks/dividends; substantial new product launches and market share gains cited .
Compensation Structure & Governance Signals
- Pay mix: Substantial portion at risk via BPP and PSUs/RSUs; disclosure of metrics, weights, and outcomes; independent consultant (FW Cook) supporting median-market targeting .
- Anti-hedging/pledging: Explicit prohibitions; no option repricing; no excise tax gross-ups; double-trigger CIC only .
- Say-on-Pay: 95% approval at 2024 annual meeting .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong ownership rules (3x salary), retention ratio, and anti-hedging/pledging minimize misalignment and reduce forced-selling dynamics around vest dates .
- Incentive quality: Annual BPP tied to EPS/FCF/divisional EBIT and PSUs tied to CFROI/Operating Margin with TSR modifier underscore cash discipline and operating efficiency focus; 2022 PSU payout at 9% signals demanding long-term hurdles .
- Retention risk: Enhanced 2024 RSU ratable vesting plus defined severance and post-CIC protections lower exit risk; 18-month non-compete/non-solicit adds retention friction outside CIC .
- Near-term trading signals: 2024 vesting of 5,023 shares ($424,973) coupled with retention ratio suggests moderated discretionary selling; upcoming ratable RSU releases through 2026–2027 will create periodic supply, but policy constraints should dampen pressure .
- Performance dependence: With BPP at 0% for 2024, future cash incentive realization is contingent on improved EPS/FCF and Boat Group EBIT execution; equity value realization hinges on CFROI/Operating Margin delivery and TSR versus S&P 400 Consumer Discretionary .